THE USE OF
AVICENNA'S *METAPHYSICS*, VIII, 4

IN THE
SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES

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INTRODUCTION

Source studies place the work of an author into its historical context where alone it may yield its fullest intelligibility. All the more is this true when one comes to study the great philosophers. The history of thought shows itself to be a vast organism whose creative moments are more often like new offshoots from a parent stock than utterly novel realities. So it is with the scholastics of the thirteenth century. That age saw the classical heritage of western Europe rejuvenated by cultural contacts with the Byzantine East and with the elaborate civilization of Islam. Modern studies of the thought of the thirteenth century have demonstrated the profound impact of Arabian mathematics, science and philosophy upon an emerging European scene. Latin translations of Arabic works were the bridges of this encounter.

The thought of St. Thomas Aquinas was no exception to the rule. As a youth he studied at the University of Naples, where he first became aware of the possibilities of the new sources for philosophical material. Later, under the tutelage of Albert the Great at Cologne, he learned how a Christian's intellectual life must be open to every opportunity for truth. Albert's immense curiosity devoured the new scientific and philosophical books in order to broaden the base of Christian philosophical speculation. In his maturity St. Thomas lectured at the two focal points for the intellectual crisis provoked by the collision of Arabic thought and Christian doctrine, Paris and the Papal Court. Thus it is virtually impossible to grasp the import of his achievement without placing them in the perspective of Arabic philosophy. It was an intellectual factor pervading every aspect of his work from beginning to end.

The specific purpose of this study is to examine in detail a major instance of St. Thomas' use of Avicenna's philosophy. In the beginning of his *Summa contra gentiles* he appropriates a considerable portion of Avicenna's *Metaphysics* in establishing the doctrine of the unique divine simplicity. The identification of essence and existence in God, and its correlative, the real distinction of essence and existence in creatures, are acknowledged to be the keys to the understanding of St. Thomas' thought. [1] In this regard scholars have been aware of his dependence upon the writings of Avicenna. By the examination of passages from the works of both philosophers this study hopes to cast some additional light on precisely how Avicenna's insights were assimilated and transformed by Aquinas.

There have been many studies of the doctrine of existence in the respective philosophies of Avicenna and St. Thomas. Other studies have investigated the influence of the former upon the latter in the matter of doctrines other than the one presently under consideration. Fr. M.-D. Roland-Gosselin has provided the most useful historical study of the development of the doctrine of the real distinction in St. Thomas, allotting a prominent place to the influence of Avicenna. [2] The brevity of his study, however, did not permit detailed textual comparisons which scholarly discipline requires. Nor have we found any study which fully identified and examined the strikingly detailed appropriation by St. Thomas of what we consider to be the most important Avicennian text on this question, chapter 4 of Tract VIII of the *Metaphysics* of the *Shifa*. In three closely related passages from the First book of the *Summa contra gentiles* we have discovered what appears to be a Thomistic paraphrase or version of
almost the entire aforementioned chapter of Avicenna. Since St. Thomas does not explicitly cite Avicenna, the Leonine editors did not recognize the source of these passages. A very few studies have noted the Avicennian character of these texts from the *Summa contra gentiles* (along with a number of other Thomistic passages), but none to our knowledge has acknowledged their extraordinary similarity. Therefore we have deemed it expedient to underscore this likeness by means of a detailed textual comparison so as to scrutinize this extensive use of an Arabic source by St. Thomas.

Our study has two purposes. The first is to demonstrate the fact of St. Thomas' dependence upon the Latin text of Avicenna's *Metaphysics*, Tract VIII, chapter 4. By so doing we hope to contribute to the painstaking task of documenting the implicit sources of the Angelic Doctor. The second purpose of this study is to take the opportunity provided by such parallelism in order to examine the manner in which St. Thomas adapts his source-text to the requirements of his own philosophical synthesis. The importance of the *Summa contra gentiles* among the works of Aquinas further augments the significance of such a study, and the excellence of the Leonine edition provides sufficient apparatus for the uncovering of other implicit uses of the same Avicennian source.

The method to be used in the study of the texts will be that of a careful comparison of texts by means of their parallel presentation. We have chosen to follow the order of texts as they appear in the *Metaphysics* of Avicenna. Not the whole of chapter four, but only the latter three-fourths of the chapter can be paralleled by passages from chapters 22, 26 and 25 of the first book of the *Summa contra gentiles*. Once the parallelism begins, the mediaeval text of Avicenna will be given in its entirety and in its exact order to the end of the chapter. Only a slight rearrangement of the Thomistic texts is required to match them to the Avicennian sequence of thought. Reasons of length and content have led us to divide our scrutiny into five sections, lettered A to E. The first two sections are concerned with the basic argumentation of the chapter, the demonstration of the divine simplicity. The last three sections discuss some immediate negative corollaries to this doctrine -- that God is not common being, that he is not in a genus, and that he cannot be called "substance." Preceding the first comparison, we shall give a brief résumé of the contexts of both the Avicennian and the Thomistic passages.

Within each of the five sections the methodology will take the following pattern. After the presentation of the texts in parallel columns, we shall attempt to paraphrase the Avicennian portion in order to understand the source as well as possible. Then, very briefly, we shall list in the order of their occurrence the most significant points of contact between the two texts. This listing should constitute an adequate argument for the fact of dependence of the *SCG* upon Avicenna. Finally, we shall examine in greater detail the very text of St. Thomas, dwelling more upon the differences between his version and that of the source. As the occasions present themselves, we shall take up at greater length the critical points of difference, drawing upon parallel places in his other works. The general pattern of this method is, thus, to begin with the source in itself, and then to follow its assimilation and adaptation into the Thomistic synthesis.

The ultimate purpose of our study is a better understanding of the doctrine of St. Thomas. In order to achieve this it is necessary that our study be properly situated within the context of a sufficient appreciation of Avicenna and his work. One should be aware of the general impact that the Latin translations had upon thirteenth-century thought, as well as the particular way in which St. Thomas seemed to have used the authority of this Arab master. To this end we shall devote the initial part of
our study, giving a historical and bibliographical survey which will serve to alert us to the special difficulties and the unique opportunities provided by such a textual study.

St. Thomas' life and works are well known in comparison to the other author with whom we are concerned. It is fitting that we give a brief summary of the life and works of Avicenna insofar as such information will have some bearing upon our understanding of his Metaphysics. We must not neglect to mention the present state of Avicenna-studies, including such items as the critical text, the translations, lexica and monographs. Since the influence of Avicenna upon European thought is based upon the work of translation which flourished in the twelfth century, we shall incorporate the conclusions of recent scholarship on this question of cultural cross-pollination. The preparation of a critical edition of the Avicenna Latinus is still in progress. From the first fruits of this work we have been aided in our reconstruction of a working text for this study.

Avicenna's influence on mediaeval authors other than St. Thomas must be noted, for it was in a living intellectual milieu that Aquinas encountered his doctrine. Avicenna's part in the important doctrinal crises of the thirteenth century can be documented from the condemnations and lists of errors of that period. We cannot ignore this fact if we are to put our conclusions in context. Finally, one aspect of the vast corpus of recent Thomistic scholarship stands out as particularly relevant. It is the discovery of what has been called St. Thomas' changing attitude toward Avicenna. An examination of his explicit citations of Avicenna reveals a dramatic decrease in number in his later works.(3) The texts investigated in our study reveal themselves as prime examples of this phenomenon. With all this in mind, we have judged that our paper should begin with a historical and bibliographical survey in order to provide an adequate background for the textual study.

We acknowledge with gratitude the valuable assistance of Rev. Joseph Owens, C.Ss.R. in the preparation of this study. In addition, we thank Rev. G.-C. Anawati, O.P., for his aid in verifying some of the Arabic text. Without the support and cooperation of the staff and facilities of the Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies in Toronto, our research would have been impossible

NOTES


I

BACKGROUND: HISTORICAL AND BIBLIOGRAPHICAL SURVEY

In the year 1926 three scholarly works were published which typify the three areas of investigation necessary to shape the background of our study. The first of these works was Msgr. Nematallah Carame's Latin translation of the metaphysical portion of a work of Avicenna, entitled *Najâr* (The Deliverance).[4] It seems to be a compendium of the better known *Metaphysics* of the *Shifa*, and its appearance in translation typifies the relatively recent effort which, through the edition of texts and translations, has promoted interest in the thought of Avicenna.

The second work in the same year was Etienne Gilson's initial article in the series *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge*. Under the title "Pourquoi saint Thomas a critiqué saint Augustin," he proposed to demonstrate the existence of a tendency in thirteenth-century scholasticism which could be called *augustinisme avicennisant*.[5] This theological approach, detected in William of Auvergne, Roger Bacon and Roger Marston, was fundamentally Augustinian in tone; it was also deeply influenced by the new Aristotelian learning that had appeared in the West in the works of Avicenna. By designating certain theses as clearly "Avicennian," Gilson stimulated a re-examination of the general impact of Avicenna's thought on Western theology and philosophy.

The third work to appear in 1926 was: the edition of the *De ente et essentia* of St. Thomas by M.-D. Roland-Gosselin, with valuable historical studies on the doctrines of individuation and the real distinction between essence and existence.[6] In documenting the sources of St. Thomas, the editor went beyond the simple identification of explicit references. He thoroughly uncovered the implicit sources of the work and cited numerous passages from the works of Avicenna. This critical apparatus, along with the appended studies, inspired more precise textual comparisons and greater impetus to that branch of Thomistic research which investigates the influence of Avicenna on St. Thomas.

Although these works were not the first of their kind to appear, their coincidental publication in 1926 seemed to mark the beginning of a new and fruitful age of research in their respective fields. From this date, scholarship has proceeded at a quickened pace, enriching these last fifty years with solid results. [7] In this preliminary part of our study we will review some of the work in each of the three fields -- Avicennian studies, Avicenna in the West, Avicenna in St. Thomas -- insofar as it has a bearing on the textual comparisons we shall make.

1. Avicenna, the Man and his Works

Abu 'Alî al-Husain ibn 'Abd-Allah ibn Sinâ was born in 980 A.D. in the village of Kharmaithan near Bokhara, east of the Caspian Sea in what was then Persia.[8] The name by which the West came to know him -- Avicenna -- is the Latinized version of the last two elements of his full name as it was pronounced in the peculiar Arabic dialect of Spain.[9] Biographical details of his...
early life are not lacking, for he dictated the account of his childhood and his educational formation to his disciple al-Juzjānī. [10] In it we have an unblushing portrait of a genius whose brilliance was matched by his intense industry. He relates one anecdote about his exceptional gifts. About thirteen years of age, "under the direction of Nāṭili, I began to read the Isagoge. When he had explained to me the question on the definition of genus ('genus is that which is said of several things differing in species,' and this in response to 'what is it...?'), I began to refine this definition in such a way that my master had never heard the equal. He was astonished and dissuaded my father from occupying me with anything else but learning."[11] That this incident should the sign of his future vocation is curiously appropriate to our own study. In his philosophical system, logic and metaphysics are inextricably intertwined. The passages to be studied in the second part of our work concern themselves with this characteristic of his doctrine. the relationship of necessary being to genus and definition.

This incident also suggests that Avicenna's vocation was to be among the philosophers of Islam, those who found the sources of their speculations principally in the Greek traditions rather than in the Koranic and properly Islamic theological traditions. Avicenna acknowledges his mastery of the classical disciplines: logic, mathematics, astronomy, natural philosophy, metaphysics and even medicine.[12] His success at this last art gained for him professional repute and privilege with the Samanid rulers of his region.[13] During his adult years he functioned both as a physician and as a general administrator for his patrons, finding time for philosophical writing and discussion in the earliest and latest hours of the day.[14] His predilection for the highest level of philosophy is documented by his confession that he had read the Metaphysics of Aristotle no less than forty times in a futile effort to penetrate its mysteries. He knew it by heart but had despaired of ever understanding it One day, coming upon a bookseller in the bazaar, he was persuaded to purchase a volume which at first glance seemed unpromising. It turned out to be Alfarabi's Commentary on the Metaphysics and the key to his problem. He offered abundant alms to the poor in thanksgiving to God for his good fortune.[15]

His literary production was enormous when one considers that it was achieved amidst a constant round of administrative duties, travels and occasional exiles. One list of his works comes to a total of 120 separate items. [16] Mlle Goichon would add thirty-six more to this number,[17] Anawati's bibliography of Avicennian materials still extant numbers 256 entries.[18] The work of distinguishing the authentic writings from the dubious and spurious still continues, although we are certain of the major works.

In his biography Avicenna is reported to have said that "medicine is not one of the difficult sciences." [19] Yet, probably the most influential of his writings was the great Canon of Medicine, which was translated into Latin in the twelfth century and reprinted as late as the seventeenth. Next to this work in importance was his philosophical encyclopedia, to which he had given the title Shifa, the Healing or Cure. It was a vast survey of the classical divisions of theoretical philosophy and logic along Aristotelian guidelines. Its 22 treatises divide into the following headings: 9 parts of Logic, 8 parts of Natural Philosophy, 4 parts of Mathematics and a single treatise on Metaphysics.[20] One typical manuscript of the entire Arabic Shifa comes to 427 folios.[21] This summa of philosophy was not known in the Latin West in its totality, but
the parts which were translated served as the principal vehicles of Avicennian speculative thought. Our present study concerns itself with the single treatise on metaphysics. It will be useful to note some of Avicenna's other metaphysical works which can compliment the understanding of the Metaphysics of the Shifa.

We have already mentioned the Kitāb al-najāt, the Book of Deliverance, which is a compendium of the sections on logic, physics and metaphysics found in the Shifa. Another work of Avicenna on the same three philosophical disciplines is the Dānesh-nāme, the Book of Science, which was written not in the usual Arabic but in his native Persian. Closely following the content of the Shifa, this work differs somewhat in its order of approach to complete theoretical wisdom. It begins with logic but then ascends immediately to metaphysics, descending finally to the natural and mathematical sciences. M. Achena and H. Massé have translated the complete work into French.[22] Mlle Goichon has published a French translation of one of Avicenna's latest philosophical works, the Kitāb al-'išārāt wat tanbihāt, the Book of Theorems and Remarks. [23] The availability of these three works with their introductions and notes make the interpretation of the Shifa far more certain than was hitherto possible.

Avicenna died in 1037 A.D. at the age of 58. Controversial in his lifetime, he would continue to be controversial in lands far from his central Asian birthplace, in regions and in times distant from the actual sites of his life and work.

In modern times Arabic and European scholarship have begun to provide the necessary critical texts and studies of his writings. Near the end of the last century some German scholars broke the ground in this field. The appearance of a lithographed version of the Arabic Physics and Metaphysics of the Shifa in 1886 (Teheran, 1303 A.H.) rendered these works more accessible, although the text itself was uncritical. [24] Max Horten, using other Arabic texts, translated the Metaphysics of the Shifa into German in 1907.[25] The upsurge of Avicennian studies, however, dates from the second quarter of this century.

Carame's work appeared in 1926 and was soon followed by a study of the Avicennian metaphysics by U. Saliba.[26] S. Munk's earlier collection, Mélanges de philosophie juive et arabe was reprinted in 1927.[27] Shortly thereafter began the remarkable series of translations and studies by Mlle Goichon. The Introduction à Avicenna: Son Épître des Définitions combined biography and bibliography with a translation of a short philosophical dictionary of Avicenna, the Al-Hudud.[28] This work was followed by the masterly study to which we shall often refer, La distinction de l'essence et de l'existence d'après Ibn Sinā. [29] This work led to her lexicon of Avicenna's philosophical terminology and to various essays and studies, as well as to the translation of the Al-'išārāt mentioned earlier.[30]

The millenary of Avicenna's birth, celebrated in 1951-52, saw the convening of several conferences and congresses in the Near East and in Europe.[31] The principal outcome of this rekindled interest was the proposal to publish the critical Arabic edition of the Shifa. To the present, five of the nine parts of the Logic have appeared. One treatise on music, and, most
significantly, the critical edition of the *Metaphysics*. G.-C. Anawati has translated the *Metaphysics* of the Shifa into French from the Arabic of the Teheran version, but this work is yet to be updated according to the critical text.

Two fairly recent studies of the metaphysical doctrines of Avicenna are those of M. Cruz Hernández and O. Cachine. To these monographs may be added the meticulous studies of the technical language of Avicenna, such as the word-list of M. El-Khodeiri and the many articles by M. Alonso Alonso. Satisfactory bibliographies of Avicennian studies have been published in Arabic, Persian and Turkish. We have deliberately omitted mentioning the work being done on the mediaeval translations of Avicenna which properly belongs to the next section of our introduction. This brief sketch of the principal resources already available in the area of purely Avicennian research provides us with one dimension of the necessary background for our textual study.

2. *Avicenna in the West*

Avicenna's fame and influence spread widely throughout the Islamic world during the century after his death. However, his philosophical approach was not whole-heartedly received by Islam, as the critical reaction by Algazel (1058-1111 A.D.) testifies. Algazel's critique of philosophy in general and Avicenna's emanationism in particular is embodied in a two-part work. The first part, entitled *The Intentions of the Philosophers*, consisted in a rather objective restatement of philosophical doctrines from Alfarabi, Alkindi and especially Avicenna. This part alone, without its explanatory introduction, was translated into Latin, causing the scholastics to see Algazel as a partisan of these positions. In the second part of the work, called by Algazel *The Incoherence of the Philosophers*, he argues his case against them on the grounds of orthodox Islamic theology and mysticism. Averroes (1126-1198 A.D.) took up this challenge on behalf of the philosophers and in his *Incoherence of the Incoherence* presents a defence of such activity, pointing out the defects of Avicenna as well as those of his critic. This ebb and flow of Arabic intellectual life in the twelfth century serves to indicate the prominent place Avicenna had achieved through his writings. Not only Arabs but also Jews such as Maimonides found his speculations attractive, and within a century and a half, Avicenna was an intellectual force in areas far from the scholarly centers of Bagdad and Cairo. Moslem Spain debated the pros and cons of his system.

A. Translations.

The end of the eleventh century had seen the Christian reconquest of half of Spain. The city of Toledo was captured from the Moors in 1085. It was there that an organized effort of translation developed, an enterprise that drew from the bountiful torrent of Arabic and Jewish learning on behalf of the Latin mind. Toledo was the door through which Avicenna would pass to the university centers of western Europe.

The age of translations at Toledo seems to have begun around the middle of the twelfth century, and it continued to flourish for over a century. One can detect in this effort three
successive waves of exceptional productivity.[40] The first originated under the patronage of the archbishop of Toledo, Francis Raymond de Sauvetat (1126-1151 A.D.), and continued under his successor John. Two persons emerge as the principal agents of this work. the first, an extraordinary Jewish scholar, Ibn Daud or Avendauth; the second, a Christian canon, Domingo Gonzalez or Gundissalinus. One or the other or both figured prominently in the translations of works by Alkindi, Alfarabi, Avicenna, Algazel and Avicebron. From the Shifa of Avicenna were translated the first book on logic, fragments of his Posterior Analytics, and his own version of Aristotle's De anima. This last translation was known in the West as the Sextus liber naturalium, a name which denoted its position among the eight treatises which comprised the section on natural philosophy in the Shifa.[41] The translations of the Metaphysics and the Physics of the Shifa also belong to this first wave of Toledan translations.[42] The title Sufficientia or Sufficientia physicorum given by the mediaevals to the Avicennian version of the Physics of Aristotle seems to be derived from the Arabic title for the entire encyclopedia, Shifa. The Latinized form sometimes signifies the whole collection and sometimes the entire section of natural philosophy. Usually, however, it applies only to the first book of this section.[43]

The second wave of translations is associated with the prodigious labors of Gerard of Cremona (d. 1187 A.D.) who devoted particular attention to the translation of the Aristotelian works themselves, especially those which hitherto had been unavailable in the West. From Arabic versions he translated Aristotle's De caelo et mundo, De generatione et corruptione, De meteoris and the Analytica posteriora. He also translated certain works of the Greek Aristotelian commentators, Themistius and Alexander of Aphrodisias.[44] The Book of Definitions by Isaac Israeli and Avicenna's monumental Canon of Medicine belong to the list of Gerard's translations.[45]

In the early decades of the thirteenth century a third wave of translations solidified the place of Aristotle in the universities of Europe. The foremost figure associated with this important series of works was Michael Scot (fl. 1220 A.D.) whose versions of Averroes' literal commentaries on Aristotle were to occasion a major intellectual crisis.[46] Additional parts of the Shifa of Avicenna were added to the number already translated. Throughout the thirteenth century increased contacts with the Byzantine East and a better knowledge of Greek enabled individuals such as Robert Grosseteste and William Moerbeke to forego the Arabic detour in favor of direct renditions from the Greek manuscripts of Aristotle.

Since our interest is principally in Avicenna and his Metaphysics, let us return to the first wave of translations in which this work became accessible. Recent studies by Mlle d'Alverny have cast some light on the conditions and peculiarities connected with the origins of these works. In her judgment the proposal to translate the Shifa of Avicenna, or at least the most important parts of it, came from Ibn Daud. [47] The process of translation involved the collaboration of two translators. One, skilled in Arabic and the romance vernacular of Spain, would translate the original into the vulgar tongue. Another, a Latinist, and most probably a cleric, would translate from this early Spanish into the Latin of the final product. This tedious, word for word, phrase for phrase, procedure had pitfalls at every turn. Citing one example, Mlle d'Alverny notes that the Arabic word for cause ['illa] and thing [shay] were both translated by
the early Spanish *cosa*. Some ludicrous results of this confusion contaminate the Latin philosophical text.[48] Ibn Daud was probably trilingual, but he seems to have used a Latinist less skilled than Gundissalinus in the execution of some of the treatises of the *Shifa*. Explicit ascription testifies to the collaboration of both of these major figures in the version called the *Sextus liber naturalium*. On other occasions, however, Gundissalinus relied on someone less skilled than Ibn Daud in Arabic and the intricacies of Muslim and Jewish philosophy. [49]

The *Metaphysics* of Avicenna's *Shifa* seems to have been translated at Toledo in the second half of the twelfth century by Gundissalinus and an assistant, perhaps a certain "John," most probably not Ibn Daud. This assistant also aided Gundissalinus in the translation of Avicebron's *Fons vitae* as well as the *Philosophia* of Algazel. The positive correlation of particular linguistic characteristics points to the fact that the same pair of translators were responsible for these three works, with Gundissalinus identified as the Latinist.[50]

Some knowledge of these translators' methods helps to explain the perplexing opacity of the Latin verions of Avicenna. The works themselves are dense and concisely written, in a language which had absorbed and adapted Greek categories and syntax to the Muslim mentality. As a result they are enriched with nuances and dimensions proper to a Semitic tongue. The result is a technical philosophical vocabulary of remarkable subtlety. Witness Mlle Goichon's list of ten words which signify "essence" under different aspects.[51] Any effort on the part of translators to convey these nuances through two new languages -- the intermediary vernacular and then clerical Latin could not possibly be totally successful. We should not be surprised at a text which is forced to resort to unusual structures and even neologisms. The qualified success which the scholastics had in penetrating the cryptic language of these translations testifies to the enthusiasm and the intelligence which they brought to their task.

The knowledge of the philosophy of Avicenna in the West was, for the most part, the result of these Latin translations of selected treatises from the *Shifa*. [52] Of its twenty-two parts, nine seem to be extant in complete translations while two others are known only in part. No works from the mathematical section were translated into Latin. The most influential parts were the first treatise from the logic (Avicenna's version of the *Isagoge*, known to the West simply as the *Logica Avicennae,* the part on general natural philosophy (*Sufficientia,* the *Sextus liber naturalium* and the *Metaphysics.* These four sections all emerge from the Toledo milieu and seem to be the product of one or both of the principal figures of this period. Eventually the major portion of the other works on natural philosophy were translated. The translations of the *Rhetoric* and the *De animalibus* should be dated in the thirteenth century.[53]

Further study of the influence of these works on scholasticism in the West awaits the critical edition of the *Avicenna Latinus*. At present the most useful instruments for the study of the Latin Avicenna are the facsimile reprints of the earliest printed editions, Venice 1495 and Venice 1508.[54] However the text of the standard edition, 1508, is not reliable and must be used with great caution. With regard to the text of the *Metaphysics* to be examined in this present study, it is most fortunate that Mlle d'Alverny in a recent article has already edited and published a major portion of chapter 4, Tract VIII. [55] On the basis of one of the most important manuscripts as
well as the two editions we have established a working text of the remainder of the chapter.[56]

B. Influence.

Having seen how the works of Avicenna, and especially his *Metaphysics*, came to be translated, we should now investigate the actual influence of this Islamic philosopher on the thought of the Latin scholastics. While it is true that Avicenna's *Shifa* was meant by him to be more than a mere paraphrase of Aristotle, for it was a highly original product of a mature philosophical milieu in which Aristotle and his Greek commentators were well known, the works were indeed patterned upon the Aristotelian treatises. For the Latins, who had not yet seen many of these treatises, the translations of Avicenna were the first real introductions to Greek physical and metaphysical speculation. It is unrealistic to presume that the Latin world was excited by Avicenna's work as examples of Arab speculation as such. For about fifty years they knew the *Metaphysics* of Aristotle only in its Avicennian version. [57] The translations of the *Shifa* were regarded as commentaries on Aristotle and were received gratefully as the first successful attempts to digest the tough meat of Greek physical and metaphysical writings. [58] Only after another half-century of experience with the text of Aristotle and the literal commentaries of Averroes would it be possible to "purify" Aristotle of his Arabic colorings.

Mlle Goichon views the first century and a half of Avicennian influence as progressing through three stages.[59] The first begins with the translations (ca. 1150) and extends to the time of William of Auvergne (ca. 1230). This was a period of a relatively uncritical acceptance of the new learning. Toward the end of this stage a reaction developed to difficulties latent in the Avicennian synthesis which resulted in the prohibitions of 1210 and 1215.[60] The Avicennian debate takes on clearer lines when in 1231 Pope Gregory IX relaxed the Church's official attitude somewhat with regard to the new Aristotelianism. Moreover, William of Auvergne brought into focus the principal difficulties disturbing orthodox theology about Avicenna: his emanationism, the doctrine of intermediaries in creation, and the identification of the agent intellect with some created spiritual substance. The second stage was characterized, according to Mlle Goichon, as one of explicit debate, and it continued until the period of Albert's commentaries on philosophy (ca. 1260). The third and final stage is characterized by the critical and judicious incorporation of Avicennian elements into the works of St. Thomas. In the Thomistic writings the doctrine of Avicenna finds a niche in Western philosophy and theology which would insure its survival through the centuries. This three staged evolution of Avicenna's influence cannot be rigorously insisted upon in all its details. Its utility is to serve as a rough sketch of the drift of Western attitudes toward the new doctrines.

Let us now examine in greater detail some of the persons and events which comprised this historical sequence. Gilson has pointed out that the first Western philosopher to draw upon the Toledan translations was the translator Gundissalinus. [61] His own *De divisione philosophine* reflects similar works by Alfarabi. His *De anima* re-interprets Avicenna's separate agent intellect so that it becomes, along Augustinian lines, the one Christian source of all light and truth, God himself. This is the central doctrine of the theological tradition Gilson calls "*l'austinisme avicennisant*." [62] An eclectic for the most part, Gundissalinus leads the thought of Avicenna,
Avicenna, Alfarabi and Algazel on the first step toward full involvement in Western speculation.

The Avicennian metaphysical and theological theses did not come upon an intellectual scene totally unprepared for them. An adventuresome school of theological speculation during the last quarter of the twelfth century continued the experiments of Abelard, Gilbert of Poitiers and the theologians of Chartres. [63] Such men as Simon of Tournai, Alan of Lille, Nicholas of Amiens and Ralph Ardent theologized about God and the Trinity with the headier Neoplatonic elements of predecessors like Augustine, Dionysius, Boethius and Erigena. The divine processions and creation were explained in quasi-mathematical fashion by an arithmetical theology which tried to come to grips with the problem of the one and the many. This tradition "de Unitate," as it is called, would naturally have been receptive to Avicenna dicta such as "ex uno secundum quod unum non est nisi unum." [64]

Both the Arabs and the Latins found it disconcerting that the theology in Aristotle's Metaphysics was incomplete. For this reason they turned to certain Neoplatonic works masquerading as his, such as the Liber de causis (or the Liber Aristotelis de expositione bonitatis purae) and the so-called Theology of Aristotle, to complement this phase of the speculative system. Through Gerard of Cremona's translation of the Liber de causis, the West had another metaphysical source, in harmony with Avicenna's Metaphysics and reinforcing the Neoplatonic interpretation of Aristotle.

One of the earliest important products of this confluence of Eastern and Western thought in this area is the late twelfth or early thirteenth-century Latin work entitled Liber de causis primis et secundis et de fluxu entis. Ascribed to Avicenna in the 1508 edition under the title De intelligentiis, it is, in fact, a Christian work compiled from the doctrines of Dionysius, Erigena, Avicenna and the other De causis. [65] It is important as a witness to the early reception of Avicenna into theological thinking and provides an example of the kind of enterprising speculation that would provoke from more orthodox authorities a reaction of great caution regarding Avicenna's versions of Aristotle. This work typifies the speculative tendency to find an emanationistic explanation for the origin of the cosmos. Complicating the affair is the germ of pantheism which lies at the root of any system of necessary emanation.

The names of Amaury of Bêne and David of Dinant figure preminently in the precipitation of this first crisis of Aristotelianism in the West. In the first decade of the thirteenth century forces were brought to bear by the theological faculty of Paris to denounce the excesses of philosophers whose speculations took the shape described above. In 1210 the assembled bishops of the ecclesiastical province of Sens rebuked the followers of Amaury and condemned the writings of David of Dinant to be burned. They also forbade the teaching of certain works of Aristotle and their commentaries under pain of excommunication. [66] Five years later the papal legate, Robert of Curçon, renewed this prohibition in laying down some statutes for the University of Paris. Regarding the faculty of arts he prescribed: Non legantur libri Aristotelis de metaphysica et de naturali philosophiua, nec summe de eisdem aut de doctrina magistri David de Dinant, aut Amalrici heretici, aut Mauricii hyspant."[67] De Vaux has pointed out that the
**summe or commenta** referred to in the documents could not have been the literal analyses of the Commentator, Averroes, which had not yet been translated, but rather must have been the briefer Arabic paraphrases and especially those of Avicenna.[68] The exact effect of these interdictions is a subject of discussion, but it seems clear that the Avicennian works were not publicly read for some years thereafter.

In his work, *Notes et textes sur l'avicennisme latin*, De Vaux presented fragmentary evidence of what might be called Latin Avicennism in some Christian philosophers and theologians of the early thirteenth century. Such a tendency would have been significantly less orthodox than the "augustinisme avicennisant" of the Franciscan school. He looked upon it as analogous to the Latin Averroism of the second half of the thirteenth century. William of Auvergne alludes to the *sequaces Aristotelis* who seem to have been not only the Arabs and Avicenna but also some contemporary disciples of Avicenna. [69] From evidence such as the condemnations of 1210 and 1215, the allusions to " Avicennians " in William of Auvergne, and the tenor of the *Liber de causis primis et secundis*, De Vaux infers the existence of a Latin Avicennism. [70] Most historians of philosophy have hesitated to accept his thesis as proved, but the evidence certainly demonstrates the impact of Avicenna's thought upon the period.

The entry of the translations of Avicenna into the stream of Latin theological and philosophical speculation evoked a variety of responses. On the one hand there was an inclination to accept eagerly an Aristotelian synthesis that was open to revelation and religion. On the other hand there was a growing reaction to the obvious discrepancies between his system and that of Christian orthodoxy. The *Liber de causis primis et secundis* exemplifies the former response, while the condemnations typify the latter. It was time for a more balanced assessment of both the good and bad points of the new Arisiotelianism. Only those of the stature of William of Auvergne were capable of undertaking the critical work of discrimination which would avoid both naive acceptance and blanket condemnation of this rich source of speculation.

William of Auvergne is called by De Wulf the first of the great thirteenth-century philosophers. His career as master of arts, master of theology and then as bishop of Paris makes him the central figure of the first half of the century. "It is he," De Wulf continues, "who opens the doors of the university to Avicenna."[71] Quick to point out the more questionable theses, he was, nevertheless, profoundly influenced in a positive way by the sounder aspects of the Arab's thought. The distinction of essence and existence, so prominent in Avicenna's metaphysics, seems to be clearly promoted by William.[72] The immediate ramifications of this doctrine on the theological explanation of the divine simplicity are significantly similar in both authors. Since this doctrine is the immediate concern of our study, it will be useful to present these parallels as an indication of a dependence of William of Auvergne upon the *Metaphysics* of Avicenna, and especially upon Tract VIII, chapter 4.

Part. of a larger work called the *Magisterium divinale*, the *De Trinitate* of William of Auvergne contains his doctrine on God. In the first few chapters William presents an exposé of the divine nature and its attributes. There are definite signs that he has drawn upon the *Metaphysics* of Avicenna in elaborating his own positions although he does not mention
Avicenna by name. His argument for the existence of God begins with a Boethian distinction between what is essential and what is participated. In explaining the latter, his language begins to sound Avicennian as he designates "the participated" as something which is accidental and praeter essentiam. [73] He distinguishes the two aspects of ens or esse. One pertains to the essence, the substance of the quiddity; the other pertains to the act of existence, expressed by the verb "to be," which is "praeter uniuscuiusque rationem." [74] This latter phrase is clearly reminiscent of Avicenna. It is not exceptionally significant that the argumentation for the necessary existence of William's ens per essentiam had some similarities with Avicenna's arguments for the necesse esse, since the impossibility of any real composition in God and the impossibility of God causing himself are commonplaces in this type of demonstration. What is perhaps more striking is the fact that William of Auvergne's sequence of divine attributes pertaining to God's simplicity corresponds exactly to a similar sequence in Avicenna's Metaphysics, VIII, 4. That God is uncaused while everything else is caused, that he is entirely "stripped" of particularizing differences or accidents, that nevertheless he is not common being, and that he thus had no quiddity or definition are conclusions common to both expositions. The following table show clearly these parallels:
The last text from William of Auvergne is noteworthy. As we shall see later in this study, the denial of quiddity to God is a major conclusion of Avicenna's argument. Western theology, however, found it difficult to speak of the divine essence and at the same time deny that God had a quiddity, for the Arabic precision in this regard evaded them. This passage of the *De Trinitate* is taken from a concluding paragraph and the denial of quiddity is not explained. It is in just such a summary passage that Avicenna recapitulates the denial of quiddity and definition to God, after having thoroughly discussed and proved his point.

For the most part William of Auvergne must be seen as one of the earliest and most knowledgeable critics of the new learning. Many of the theses which were to be the centers of debate throughout the whole Averroist crisis are already identified by him as dangerous in the works of Avicenna.[75] Yet, in spite of unacceptable Arabic theories on the eternity of the world, emanation, mediate creation, human intelligence and immortality, there were certain areas of doctrine which could be assimilated and accepted as valuable contributions to Latin philosophy and theology. One of these areas, we submit, was embodied in the chapter from Avicenna's *Metaphysics* under discussion in this study, i.e., on the divine simplicity. The *De Trinitate* of William of Auvergne is the detailed indication we have found of the influence of this Avicennian chapter on Western thought.

The years of William of Auvergne's prominence at Paris were marked by a number of influential events. In 1225 *De divisione naturae* of John Scotus Eriugena was condemned and copies of this major source of Christian Neoplatonic speculation were burned.[76] The first years of William's episcopacy were marred by the disruptive strike of students and teachers at Paris.
(1229-1233), which marked a political and doctrinal watershed for the University.[77] During these years the mendicant friars gained their foothold on the theological faculty and began their ascent to unequalled prominence over the secular masters and the arts faculty.[78] Finally, it was during these years that the commentaries on Aristotle by Averroes were translated by Michael Scot, and the influence of the Stagirite on Latin philosophy and theology both broadened and deepened.[79]

The new Aristotelian learning was beginning to make inroads at Oxford, too, by the first decade of the thirteenth century. Translations from the Arabic, along with Avicenna's commentaries, were its principal vehicles. Fr. Daniel Callus mentions John Blund and Robert Grosseteste as the first arts masters to have emphasized the new philosophy. He adds "Although Avicenna and Avicebron are not mentioned by name by Grosseteste, their influence on his philosophy is great. [80] In time, the mendicant masters in the faculty of theology such as Richard Fishacre (ca. 1240) and Richard Rufus (ca. 1256) were citing Avicenna in their commentaries on the Sentences.[81] The prominence of Avicenna in the works of Roger Bacon is well known and easily documented. He seems to have been well acquainted with the scope of Avicenna's work and preferred his exposition of Aristotle to all others: "Avicenna quidem praecipuus imitator et expositor Aristotelis, et complens philosophiam secundum quod et fuerit possibile."[82] Bacon complained that few really knew the works of Aristotle on natural philosophy which included the Metaphysics, for the emphasis had been on logic and ethics. Before mid-century, however, both Paris and Oxford had overcome the hesitancies of the early condemnation and the period of a deeper assimilation of the Metaphysics, along with the commentaries of Avicenna and Averroes, was in full progress.

An outstanding example of the use of a broad spectrum of philosophical sources is to found in a work entitled Sapientiale, composed by the Franciscan master Thomas of York, who taught at Oxford [1253-1256]. [83] In the first part of this metaphysical summa there are no fewer than nine explicit uses of Tract VIII, ch. 4 of Avicenna's Metaphysics. The text is quoted verbatim in the chapter dealing with the primacy of the divine nature: [84]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Avicenna, Meta., VIII, ch. 4</th>
<th>Th. of York, Sapientiale, I, ch. 8.</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>#13. Igitur necesse esse non habet quidditatem nisi quod est necesse esse, et haec est anitas.</td>
<td>...quia in ipso est idem anitas et quidditas alioquin non esset causa prima sed causatum, sicut dicit Avicenna VIII, ca. 4: &quot;quidquid habet quidditatem praeter anitatem causatum est.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#14. Item dico quod quicquid habet quidditatem praeter anitatem causatum est.</td>
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Thomas of York is faithful to the text of Avicenna in preserving the curious term anitas, but differs from his source in maintaining the identity of quiddity and "anity" in the godhead. Avicenna's principal thesis, as we shall see later, does not tolerate such an identification of two distinct notions. God, or the necessary being, does not have a quiddity but only an "anity." Thomas of York, like other of his Latin colleagues, resisted the total exclusion of quiddity From
God.

In two other chapters (16 and 20) the Franciscan master summarizes almost every major conclusion contained in Avicenna's chapter 4: the necessary being cannot be a composite of quiddity and necessity, it is a being without any addition, it does not have any genus or difference, and cannot be given the name of "substance." In reference to this last item, Thomas of York has either misinterpreted one part of the Avicennian text or has deliberately modified it, Avicenna, as we shall see, begins his discussion in the person of an objector who suggests that although we cannot give the name of "substance" to God, we can, nevertheless, attribute the notion (intentio) of substance to him, for he exists and is not in a subject.[88] Avicenna, in reply, immediately rejects the validity of this notion of substance.[86] Thomas of York has Avicenna conceding this notion to God. [87]

In spite of this imperfect understanding of the text, Thomas of York demonstrates an awareness of the significance of Avicenna's exposition on the divine simplicity. All of its important themes are woven into the Sapientiale, although there seems to be some confusion or deliberate modification of certain elements. In the work of Thomas of York we find the most detailed use of this important Avicennian chapter before St. Thomas. There is no reason to believe that the Angelic Doctor derived his knowledge of Avicenna from his Franciscan namesake.

The Franciscan school at Paris -- Alexander of Hales, John de la Rochelle and St. Bonaventure -- is characterized by an interest in acknowledging both Augustinian illuminationism and the Aristotelian doctrine of abstraction.[88] This blend of epistemological preferences is similar to Avicenna's doctrine, although the Franciscans are not especially partial to him. Moreover, in the matter of philosophical theology and especially cosmogony, they would seem to be stout opponents of the Persian sage. They reject his emanationism and its consequents, such as the denial of God's direct knowledge of particulars. Citations of Avicenna are relatively rare in their works. In the questions dealing with the divine simplicity, references to Arabic thought are not prominent. The Metaphysics of Avicenna is only implicit in Alexander's Quaestiones disputatae "Antequam esset frater" and in his Glossa in IV libros Sententiarum.[89] The so-called "Summa fratis Alexandri" cites Avicenna explicitly over forty times, but only a few of these refer to the Metaphysics; most designate the De anima. When the sum of explicit and implicit references (105) is compared to the size of the work and to the number of citations of Aristotle, for example, we understand why the editors were justified in concluding that "Algazela et Avicenna ... nonnisi rare ... nominantur." [90] The only reference that could possibly point to the Avicennian chapter which interests us is to be found in the question in the "Summa fratis Alexandri," asking whether the notion of substance is to be acknowledged in the divinity. [91]

St. Bonaventure's use of Avicenna is consistent with that of Alexander and the "Summa fratis Alexandri." Citations are rare. Of the ten identified as referring to Avicenna's Metaphysics, less than half are explicit and none refer to the chapter on the divine simplicity.[92] In general the Franciscan school treated his theological doctrine in the Metaphysics with great
caution. Their reaction to emanationism and the limitation of the divine knowledge prejudiced them against other doctrines contained in the same work.

When we turn to the Dominican masters, and especially to St. Albert the Great, another attitude is found. Albert had set for himself the task of reviewing the Aristotelian corpus by means of a series of commentaries which would include, besides his own personal observations, the whole breadth of Aristotelianism -- Greek, Arabic and Jewish. From this broader philosophical base he could erect theological works which would take advantage of the contributions of such thinkers as Avicenna and Maimonides. In his commentary on the Isagoge, for example, Albert adds a concluding tract which incorporates the essence of Avicenna's Logic of the Shifa.[93] Although Avicenna's Metaphysics has only a slight place in Albert's commentary on the Sentences and his Summa de creaturis, it assumes a much greater role in the Summa theologicae, one of his later works. The first part of St. Albert's Summa theologicae draws upon Avicenna in reference to the question of God's relationship to esse. He quotes philosophical arguments from two sources, "ab Aristotele in quadam epistola De principio universi esse, et Avicenna in Metaphisica sua, ubi loquitur de primo principio." [94] It is difficult to be specific about the reference in this place, although the description of the accidentality of esse in creatures has close connections with the doctrine of the simplicity of God in Metaphysics, VIII, 4.

The most explicit use of Avicennian theology by Albert can be found in the second part of the Summa theologicae, Tract. I, q. 3, entitled "De proprietatibus primi principii." [95] Albert's prologue to this question reads: "Tertio, quaeritur, Quae sint primi principii proprietates? hae enim plures colliguntur a Philosophis, Avicenna scilicet, et Algazele in metaphysicis suis. Et sunt inter eas quaedam primae, quaedam consequentes ex illis." [96] In the course of his subsequent exposition, Avicenna is cited explicitly fourteen times. The properties of the first principle are two, that it is first, and that it is the principle of all. It is first because it has esse a seipso and thus can be called the wellspring of being, pouring forth being upon everything that is.[97] The expression primum principium is determinate not in the way that would make principium a genus positively limited by the constricting difference primum, but in the sense of a relative determination which adds nothing to the thing and results in no composition. The first principle is a principle per se, dependent on none other according to efficient, formal, exemplary and final causality. [98]

As consequences of these basic attributes, Albert produces a long list of conclusions which is remarkably similar to the theology of Avicenna and Algazel. Algazel, as we have mentioned, is an abbreviator and paraphraser of Avicenna. Albert's conclusions are all predicated of the necessary being, an Avicennian designation for God. The necessary being is seen to be necessary absolutely and in every way. [99] It is proved to be simple, one, the cause of everything else that exists, in no way in potency, not an accident or bodily force, neither a body nor a power in a body.[100] Furthermore, it is not dependent upon anything else, which in turn are all dependent upon it; [101] it is unique and there can not be two such necessary beings; [102] it cannot be designated by any predication which would imply something added to its being, and finally, it cannot be known according to its quiddity: "non cognoscitur eius quod quid est." [103] This veritable index ot Avicennian conclusions is explicitly attributed to its source. Although
arguments from Boethius and from the *Liber de causis* are to be found woven into the explanatory text, there can be no doubt that this extensive passage from Albert's *Summa theologiae* is a thorough-going attempt to appropriate the natural theology of Avicenna into Western Christian speculation. It is certainly in this spirit that St. Thomas will draw upon Avicenna's closely knit argumentation to construct a philosophical explanation of the negative divine attributes.

St. Albert's scholastic career was marked by an openness to whatever was valid in the newly acquired non-Christian versions of Aristotelianism. Sometimes a vigorous and outspoken critic of the theological conservatism which viewed with blanket condemnation any effort to introduce pagan philosophy into theological speculation, he strove to assimilate in a discerning and discriminating fashion those elements of philosophy which promoted a better understanding of the Christian world-view. This stance, however, required him to react against excesses in the other direction as well, i.e., against the penchant of some arts' masters to promote philosophical theses which could not be integrated into orthodox doctrine. Shortly after the midpoint of the thirteenth century there developed at Paris what has come to be known as Latin Averroism, a following of Averroes along paths which diverged from the Christian positions on the immortality of the soul, the creation of the world, and the divine omniscience. In 1256 Albert's *De unitate intellectus contra Averroem* sounded a note of warning. Van Steenberghen sees this philosophical polemic as a preliminary stage of a crisis which would develop in the years from 1260 to 1277. [104] This upsurge of heterodox teaching within the arts faculty by masters such as Siger of Brabant and Boethius of Dacia was to provoke a second crisis for Arabian philosophy at Paris -- that of Latin Averroism. St. Thomas would find himself at Paris for a second time in 1269, and his moderate attitude toward the new learning drew the attacks of both factions, the Averroists and the orthodox Augustinians. The efforts of the latter group culminated in the sweeping series of condemnations of 1270 and especially 1277, resulting in the temporary stifling of further efforts at assimilation.

Although the condemnation of 1270 listed as Averroistic errors, and rightly so, such theses as God's lack of knowledge of singulars, his lack of providence over them, the eternity of the world, the numerical unity of the human intellect, the corruptibility of the human soul and psychological determinism, some of these doctrines were also a part of the Avicennian heritage.[105] In any case, the fate of Avicenna in the West was profoundly affected by the condemnations.

In the period between 1270 and 1277, the young Giles of Rome produced an interesting little treatise which may enable us to sort out the philosophical doctrines judged to be unorthodox according to their source. It has the cumbersome title: *Tractatus de erroribus philosophorum Aristotelis, Averroes, Avicennae, Algazelis, Alkindi, et Rabbi Moyses*. [106] In the chapter devoted to the errors of Avicenna, nineteen doctrines are listed. A brief survey will give us some notion of the more controversial dimensions of his teachings. The errors fall into two general categories: errors concerning creation and errors regarding religious naturalism. To the former belong such items as the eternity of motion (#2) and time (#5), the necessity of pre-existent matter (#3), the necessity of the emergence of the first intelligence (#6) in order that...
there be diversity in creation (#4), the creation of the heavenly spheres by the intelligences (#6), and their souls (#7, 10), and the creation of human souls via intermediaries (#9). The religious naturalism of Avicenna is represented by doctrines regarding prophecy (#16), prayer (#17) and beatitude. Outside of these two categories fall the controversial teachings on the unity of form (#1), God's knowledge of singulars (#13), and the negative nature of the divine attributes finally there are objections to his doctrine on the Function of the last intelligence as the *dator formarum* (#11) and as the agent intellect (#19).

Most of these theses can be traced to the final tracts of Avicenna's *Metaphysics*, Tracts IX and X, where the subjects under discussion are the emanation of creatures and religion. His metaphysics of the divine simplicity was not directly under attack. The only objectionable doctrine in this list traceable to Tract VIII is the one concerning the negative nature of all divine attributes (#14), which will be found in chapter 6. Although the doctrines of Tract VIII, ch. 4 are not at stake in this doctrinal crisis, the opprobrium which fell upon Avicenna in these other matters would have rendered them suspect also.

The climactic outcome of the Averroist crisis was the publication of a list of 219 errors in philosophy and theology by Stephen Tempier, bishop of Paris, on March 7, 1277. The list is directed against the opinions of Siger of Brabant, Boethius of Dacia and "others," among whom were St. Thomas, Averroes and even Avicenna. [107] This Parisian list and, to a lesser extent, its counterpart at Oxford mark the low point of the tides of influence which the Arabic interpreters of Aristotle had in the West. For a time the voices of those promoting a heterodox, Arabic-styled Aristotelianism were effectively muffled. Silenced too, were those moderate voices that tried to derive the best from the non-Christian sources without endangering the integrity of Christian doctrine. The crisis was provoked by the zealous followers of Averroes, but the prestige of all the Arabic commentators suffered from the outcome.

No single event, upon scholastic thinkers. Too much had already been done by way of assimilation. By 1277 St. Thomas was dead, but in his works remained the indelible presence of the author of the *Shifa*. This presence was found in the works of other masters as well. It is not correct to say, moreover, that after the condemnation of 1277 there was to be no new age of Avicennian influence. Gilson has pointed out that Duns Scotus, in the beginning of the fourteenth century, looked to Avicenna in preference to Averroes for numerous critical insights.[108] The Subtle Doctor's system can be called more Avicennian than that of St. Thomas. In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, a number of printed editions of Avicenna's work bear witness to his lasting popularity, not only as the great physician of the *Canon*, but also as the acute metaphysician and natural philosopher of the *Shifa*.

This survey of the general influence of Avicenna on scholastic thought was intended to put into perspective the role St. Thomas played in the process of assimilation, which we shall discuss in detail immediately. The results of our present section show that from the time of the first translations of his philosophical work until the time of the editions, his version of Aristotelianism was a significant factor in the shaping of Western thought. An early period of acceptance, exemplified in the career of Gundissalbinus and in the *Liber de causis primis et
secundis, was brought to a temporary halt by the prohibitions of 1210 and 1215. A second period of discriminating acceptance was spearheaded by figures such as William of Auvergne, Roger Bacon, Thomas of York and Albert of Cologne. St. Thomas’ career can be placed in this second period of open discussion, and it extended into the years of crisis in the late sixties and seventies. He was not a Latin Avicennian, if there ever were such partisans, nor was he a part of the tradition designated by Gilson as "augustinism avicennisant." Situating himself between the heterodox, Averroistic Aristotelianism of Siger of Brabant and the conservative orthodoxy of the Franciscan school, he was free to exploit what was of value in the Avicennian corpus and reject what seemed opposed to Christian doctrine. The more stringent condemnation of the philosophers in 1277 ended this fruitful era of assimilation for more than two decades, until the time when Scotus returned to Avicenna for some elements in his own synthesis. Even without this later revival, Avicenna's presence and importance in Christian theological and philosophical speculation was assured by the growing importance and popularity of the works of St. Thomas.

3. Avicenna and St. Thomas

Let us now examine more closely the way in which Avicenna enters into the writings of St. Thomas and especially into the SCG. Much has been learned about this process since Grabmann remarked fifty years ago that "Aquinas had a special ardor for Avicenna in the works of his early period, but later a somewhat cooler attitude became evident." [109] We have already mentioned that Fr. Roland-Gosselin's edition of the De ente demonstrated St. Thomas' heavy reliance upon Avicennian metaphysics in this early work. More recently M. Bouyges and B. Zedler have argued for a strong Avicennian contest for the De potentia. [110] However, M.-M. Gorce was one of the first to provide statistical evidence in favor of a shift of attitude by Aquinas in his use of Avicenna-citations. He noted in his review in the Bulletin thomiste of 1930 that Avicenna was cited more than seventy times in the first book of his commentary on the Sentences, and more than eighty-five times in the second book, and usually in an approving manner. [111] A sharp contrast to this practice can be seen in the number and nature of the citations in the SCG. In the latter work, "Avicenna appears in the role of an enemy." [112] When citations do occur, they are for the sake of refutation of an Avicennian doctrine. Gorce uses this phenomenon to draw certain conclusions about the purpose of the SCG.

The need for a list of Avicenna-citation by St. Thomas was partially met by the appendix to A. Forest's La structure métaphysique du concret selon saint Thomas. [113] The author compiled a table of 238 citations of Avicenna from some of Aquinas' most: important works. He observes: "On remarquera que ces citations sont proportionnellement plus nombreuses dans les premières œuvres." [114] The task of compilation has been completed by C. Vansteenkiste, whose list, "Avicenna-citaten bij S. Thomas," totals over four hundred entries from both the certain and doubtful works. [115] Unfortunately he gives only the Thomistic text and does not attempt to identify each Avicennian source.

Expanding the earlier statistical observations of Gorce with the aid of these lists, the late Dom. P. Marc has suggested a more complete picture of Aquinas' shifting attitude toward Avicenna. [116] A careful compilation of both the number and nature of the Avicennian citations in St.
Thomas, noting, for example, how often the citations are given in an objection and how often in solutions, and further, how often they are accepted and how often rejected, reveals with some exactness when this change of attitude took place. According to Marc, the earlier characteristic of a predominantly favorable use of Avicenna can be detected in the *De ente*, the *Sentences*, the *De veritate*, the early *Quodlibets* (VII-XI), the *De potentia* and the *De spiritualibus creaturis*. The *Quaestiones disputatae de anima* marks the turning point, and from the time of these questions onward (from 1269) a more hostile attitude is apparent. Works falling into this second category are the *De malo*, *De virtutibus*, the *Quodlibets* I-V with XII, and most importantly the two great *Summae*: the *Summa contra gentiles* and the *Summa theologiae*. Some of Marc's conclusions are as follows:

"Sicque per totum secundum Parisiense magisterium, in publicis disputationibus, Avicenna numquam introductus est ab ipso Auctore nisi ut reproberetur ... Et sic patet quod S. Thomas Parisius adveniens mense Ianuario 1369, statim iudicavit perculosum Avicennam commendare animis in fide infirmis vel in theologia novitiis."

What held true for the public disputations was also generally verified in the theological *Summae*. The manner of citing Avicenna is developed by Marc into one of several criteria by which certain chronological problems regarding the works of St. Thomas may be resolved. According to this rule, the *Summa contra gentiles* must be located in the second Parisian regency of St. Thomas, making it contemporaneous in origin with the *Summa theologiae*. [119]

Marc's thesis on the late dating of the *SCG* is opposed to the common opinion that this work was written during the pontificate of Urban IV [1261-1264] and could have been begun as early as 1258. This would place it in St. Thomas' Italian period. The elaborate study of Marc develops over two dozen distinct arguments from both doctrinal and historical grounds in favor of the late dating. The argument based on Avicenna-citations is only one of this number. We do not wish to engage ourself in the enormously complex task of evaluating each of his arguments or of attempting to refute the reasons for the traditional opinion. Marc's thesis, for example, requires an almost incredible literary productivity at Paris following a very modest Italian output. It will be sufficient for our purposes, however, to acknowledge that if St. Thomas was consistent in each of his two manners of citing Avicenna -- at first favorably, and later only unfavorably -- then the *Summa contra gentiles* seems clearly to represent the latter mode of citation. The *De potentia* exemplifies the earlier attitude. If both of these works belong to the Italian period, then the shift of attitude would have to be placed at a date earlier than that suggested by Marc.

An important refinement of this phenomenon of Aquinas' shifting attitude toward Avicenna is revealed by the study of the texts of the two great *Summae*. It can easily be documented, and our own study may serve as a contribution to such documentation: that the disappearance of all favorable references to Avicenna is not to be understood as a total rejection of the truth and utility of his teachings. Marc shows that many such doctrines which appeared in the *Sentences* accompanied by the name of their author reappear again in the *Summa theologiae* anonymously. St. Thomas, it seems, remained deeply indebted to Avicenna for many elements of his thought, but he deliberately disguised their provenance. Marc notes: "in Prima etiam parte Summae, si forte aliqua doctrina quandam ex Avicenna ab Auctore sumpta adhuc assumitur, nomen illius
We shall show that this holds true also for the SCG. Thus the phenomenon of the disappearance of all favorable reference to Avicenna in these works is seen to be a deliberate suppression, not of his arguments and doctrines, but merely of his name. In fact, the text we are to examine in our study is one of the most explicit and deliberate appropriations from Avicenna found in all of Aquinas' works, and yet it appears with no mention at all of its source.

The philosophical crisis in Western Christendom, which reached a peak in the late sixties and the seventies of the thirteenth century, is good reason for the caution of St. Thomas regarding the names of the "philosophers." It would have been imprudent to flaunt the name of Avicenna when it might prejudice the acceptance of some element of his thought that could usefully be incorporated into an acceptable Christian synthesis. St. Thomas, it seems, was exercising discretion and not disapproval when, for all practical purposes, he ceased making mention of Avicenna apropos of certain acceptable doctrines.

Shortly after St. Thomas left Paris, St. Bonaventure would deliver his famous Collationes in Hexaemeron in which he warned the university: "...unde magistri cavere debent, ne nimis commendent et appretientur dicta philosophorum, ne hac occasione populus revertatur ad Aegyptu, vel exemplo eorum dimmitat aquas Siloe, in quibus est summa perfectio, et vadant ad aquas philosophorum, in quibus est aeterna deceptio." [122]

The study of Avicenna in the works of St. Thomas has made great progress. In Dom Marc's examination of the composition of the Summa contra gentiles we find the question of Avicenna-citations playing a significant though not decisive role in the dating of that work. It is not our purpose to defend his rather radical conclusions on this matter. We only wish to be able to contribute one more element to the accumulating body of evidence pointing to the fact that St. Thomas was profoundly influenced by Avicenna and often used his sources anonymously. Any conclusions regarding the dating of the work should be left to more experienced Thomistic scholars.

4. Conclusions to Chapter I

We may now summarize the results of this first part of our study. Although Avicenna's life and philosophical milieu were somewhat remote from thirteenth-century Paris, his writings were eagerly received as introductions to Aristotelian physical and metaphysical thought. The tendency to link closely logical and metaphysical speculation harmonized well with certain twelfth-century Western tendencies. The Neoplatonic overtones of his cosmology and mysticism had affinities with some Christian patristic traditions. All of this, in addition to an immense prestige in the Arab world, pointed toward the possibility of his having a considerable impact upon Western thought once his works became available.

The translators of Toledo during the twelfth century struggled with the subtlety of the Arabic manuscripts and only partially succeeded in their efforts to render them into scholastic Latin. Ibn Daud, Gundissalinus and Gerard of Cremona are responsible for a new philosophical vocabulary
which would convey, however imperfectly, some of the technical apparatus of Arabic
Aristotelianism to Western Europe. In the Latin Avicenna we find intelligibility blended with
linguistic mystery, a mixture which only stimulated a greater interest in the new learning.

The doctrines of Avicenna met with a mixed reception in the West. More adventurous spirits
embraced it eagerly and found that it added impetus to the Neoplatonism of Erigena, with the
result that theological speculation sometimes exceeded the limits of, orthodoxy. There were
others who viewed the arrival of Avicenna with deep suspicion, and at their instigation the new
Avicennian works, along with their heterodox by-products, fell under official disapproval. A
period of moderate criticism began with William of Auvergne, who used what he judged to be
beneficial in the Avicennian corpus and clearly underscored what could not be accepted. The
"augustinisme avicennisant" of the Franciscan School represents a deep harmonization of the
mystical doctrine. Bacon has a very positive altitude toward Avicenna and Thomas of York
incorporates explicit passages from the *Metaphysics* VIII into his *Sapientiale*.

Albert the Great undertook his proposed task of making Aristotle intelligible to the Latins
through a series of Avicenna-like paraphrases of the Stagirite's works, in which he shows a
thorough acquaintance with tile new Arabic and Jewish Aristotelianism. In his own *Summa
theologiae* he explicitly invokes Avicenna in witness to the argumentation dealing with the
divine simplicity. Albert's example of a thorough knowledge and a bold but not uncritical
acceptance of the new ideas must have deeply affected the attitude and style of his gifted
disciple.

The efforts of William of Auvergne and the mendicant friars to refine the ore of Avicennian
thought represent a balanced and thoroughly commendable intellectual attitude. Unfortunately
the upsurge of Latin Averroism in the 1260's and 1270's put severe pressure on this moderate
position, and eventually triggered a second and more severe reaction to Arabic thought. Bishop
Stephen Tempier's list of 219 condemned propositions in 1277 was meant to sweep the house
clean of the errors of Greek, Arabic and Jewish thought. Its success, dramatic at the moment,
proved to be only temporary, however, for by then it was impossible to undo the assimilative
effort already inscribed in the writings of men such as St. Albert and St. Thomas. Duns Scotus
would later renew this effort.

St. Thomas' role in this process of incorporating the best insights of Avicenna into the
intellectual traditions of Christendom was a major one. It is only in recent times, with the
appearance of critical and documented editions of his works and such useful tools as citation-
lists and special studies, that his relationship to Avicenna is beginning to be specified. From his
earliest writings he shows a full acquaintance with the Avicennian corpus as it was available to
the West. He cites Avicenna frequently and favorably in his earlier works. At a certain point in
his career, however, the number of explicit citations falls off drastically and the only clear
references are unfavorable. The date of this shift of attitude is not yet certain. Although
Avicenna is cited only for refutation, Avicennian materials can still be found in St. Thomas' later
works, serving their functions anonymously.
Dom Marc has argued that the *Summa contra gentiles* is one of the late works. We need not take a stand as definite as his as to the date of this work in order to achieve our own purpose, the identification and study of an extraordinary appropriation of Avicenna's *Metaphysics*, VIII, 4. Our investigation of Avicenna himself, his works and his special interests gives us some appreciation of the origin of the text we shall study. Our description of the translation efforts of the twelfth century should engender a sympathy for the difficulties in the *Avicenna Latinus*. The brief report of the fate of Avicenna in the West and the earliest traces of his metaphysics in scholastic writings gives us an estimate of St. Thomas' predecessors. Finally, the phenomenon of the apparent shift of attitude on the part of St. Thomas with respect to the citation of Avicenna arouses a special interest in what seems to be one of the more noteworthy examples of this trait. St. Thomas drew upon Avicenna in the development of his own doctrine on the real distinction between essence and existence. The theology of the divine simplicity is intimately involved in this doctrine both in Aquinas and in Avicenna. We hope that this first part of our has given us some perspective in which to locate the minute textual comparisons we shall make in the next sections of this study.

NOTES

Chapter I


5. 1926, pp. 1-127.


7. An excellent introduction, slightly different from our first chapter, but still quite useful, can be found in A. Lobato, "Avicena y SantoTomas." *Estudios Filosoficos* 4(1955) 45-80.


11. "Ensuite, sous la direction de Natili, j'entrepris la lecture de l'Isagoge [de Porphyre]. Quand il m'eut exposé la question de la définition du Genre ('le genre est ce qui se dit de nombreuses choses qui différent d'espece,' et cela en réponse à 'qu'est-ce que...?'), je me mis a preciser cette définition, de telle manirque que mon maître n'avait rien entendu de


28. *Supra*, p. 4 , n. 16,

29. A.-M, Goichon *La distinction de l'essence et de l'existence d'apres Ibn Sina*, Paris: Desclee,
1937.


45. Gardet and Anawati, *loc. cit*.


49. *Ibid*.

50. *Ibid*.


52. One should not overlook the summary of Avicenna's doctrine contained in Algazel's *Maqacid* or Intentions of the Philophers. The scholastics would cite Algazel as a disciple of Avicenna. Gilson, *History*, p. 216.


56. In addition to the two editions mentioned in n. 52 we have used MS. Paris, Bibl. Nat. Lat. 16096, to reconstruct a working text. Our text, with the variant readings, is found in Appendix I.

57. James of Venice (fl. 1140) was responsible for the partial translation called the *Metaphysica vetustissima* (Books I-III, and IV to ch. 4, 1007 a 32). *Cf.* L. Minio-Paluello, "Iacobus Veneticus Graecus, Canonist and Translator of Aristotle," *Traditio* 8(1952)241. The more complete versions such as the media, vetus and nova seem to date from the first decades of the thirteenth century.

58. An example of this confidence that Aristotle could be discovered through the paraphrases of Avicenna can be found in a remark by the author of the *Quaestiones supra libros primae Philosophiae Aristotelis*, sometimes ascribed to Roger Bacon. Metaphysics’ normative role over


60. *Infra*, p. 16.


64. Avicenna, *Metaphysica*, IX ch. 4; ed, Venice (1508), f° 104'b B. All subsequent references to the *Metaphysics* other than those to VIII, 4, will be to this edition.


72. "Quoniam autem ens potentiale est non ens per essentian, tune ipsum et eius esse quod non est ei per essentian duo sunt revera, et alterun accidit alteri, nec cadit in rationen, nec quidditati ipsius." William of Auvergne, *De Trinitate*, ch, 7, ed. Paris, 1674, p. 8 b.


76. Denifle and Chatelain, *op. cit.*, I, 106-107. no. 50.


84. For the text of the *Sapientiale* we have consulted a microfilm of MS Florence, Bibl. Nazionale Centrale, Conv. Sopp. A. 6. 437. The present reference is to fo 9rb, lines 17-19.


87. Et sic dici potest causa prima substantia secundum quod habetur ab Avicenna VIII, ca. 4, quod quamvis refugiamus de Deo dicere nomen substantiae, non tamen intentionem cuius intentio est res habens quidditatem stabilem, cuius esse est esse quod non est in subiecto corpore vel anima, et propter hoc dici potest substantia." *Sapientiale*, I, ch. 16, fo 17ra, lines 13-17. For Avicenna, God could not possibly considered as a "res habens quidditatem stabilem."


91. Lib. I, pars 2a, inq. 1a, q. 2, c. 3, a. 1; I (Quaracchi, 1924), p. 503, no. 339.


95. Note Avicenna's title to *Meta*. VIII, 4: "De proprietatibus primi principii quod est necesse esse."


102. *Ibid*.


II

A TEXTUAL STUDY

The historical and bibliographical sketch we have given in the first part of our study may serve as a preparation for the actual comparison of texts. In this second part of our study we shall turn to the text of Avicenna's *Metaphysics* and St. Thomas' *Summa contra gentiles*, following the method previously outlined. Preserving the order of Avicenna's chapter four, Tract VIII, we have divided his argumentation into five sections (Sections A-E). Each section begins with a synoptic presentation of the texts from Avicenna and St. Thomas. Next, the meaning of the Avicennian arguments is explained. There then follows a listing of the positive parallels between the source and the *Summa contra gentiles*. Finally, the nature of the Thomistic adaptation is investigated along with the relevant questions arising from this comparison.

Before we begin, however, it is important to situate both passages in their respective contexts. Presuming once again a more widespread unfamiliarity with the source, Avicenna's *Metaphysics*, we shall devote proportionately a proportionally greater effort in its regard. A three-staged summary of the Avicennian context will serve our purposes. We shall give first a brief description of the structure of the entire *Metaphysics* of Avicenna in order to indicate the relationship of the work to Aristotle and the internal sequence of its tracts. Secondly, we shall take a closer look at the argumentation within Tract VIII, and by so doing situate chapter four within its immediate surroundings. Finally, we shall give a summary of the initial argumentation of chapter four (#1-6), up to the point where the parallels begin. This includes approximately one-fourth of the chapter's text. The remaining three-fourth of the chapter will appear in the detailed comparisons (Sections A-E). Since the *Summa contra gentiles* is much more familiar to students of mediaeval thought, only a few remarks regarding the context of the chapter in question (I, chs. 22, 25, 26) are needed.

1. Context

   A. Avicennian Context

   a. The *Metaphysics* of the *Shifa*.

   The *Metaphysics* of Avicenna is the sole member of the fourth major section of the *Shifa*. The three other general groupings -- Logic, Physics and Mathematics -- each include several treatises. Avicenna's title for his *Metaphysics* is *Al-Ilāhiyyāt*, meaning "the divine science." This suggests, and rightly so, the prominence given to that aspect of metaphysical inquiry which concerns itself with the absolutely first principle. [1] Both Neoplatonic and Islamic theological interests are
The work is divided into ten tracts, each of which is subdivided into chapters varying in number from three to ten. Attempts to establish a concordance between Avicenna's *Metaphysics* and the fourteen books of Aristotle are interesting, but only partially successful. Avicenna bases himself upon the Stagirite, but his approach to this science and his elaboration of its theological aspects reveal his familiarity with Greek and Arabic commentators, with due credit being given to his own original genius. Although it is not a literal commentary like that of Averroes, it is far more than a mere résumé. More compact and coherent than Aristotle's work, it is also broader in scope, touching upon theology, cosmogony, religion and ethics.

The first tract (nine chapters) is a general preface to metaphysics, establishing the usual topics of name, subject, utility and order. Chapters six to eight of this tract introduce the crucial primary notions of Avicennian metaphysics: *res, ens, possibile* and *necessa*. These chapters are often cited by later authors. In unfolding the implications of necessity, Avicenna outlines in an *a priori* fashion some of the lines of argumentation that will build up his theology in Tract VIII. Substance and its divisions are analyzed in Tract II (four chapters). Tract III dwells at length (ten chapters) on the major accidental categories of quantity, quality and relation. Some post-predicamental notions such as 'opposite,' 'prior' and 'posterior' come under scrutiny in Tract IV (three chapters) along with the distinctions of potency and act, completeness and incompleteness. In Tract V (seven chapters) Avicenna seems to blend logic with metaphysics when he presents his theory of definition. In this tract will be found questions about genus and species, whole and part, difference and property. Here too occurs the celebrated distinction of the three-fold status of universals. All of these matters are closely related to the first of the logical treatises in the *Shifa*, Al-Madkhal (Isagoge) known to the West as the *Logica Avicennae*. Tract VI (five chapters) undertakes an explanation of the four causes in general and their interrelationships. The shortest tract, Tract VII (three brief chapters) deals with the Aristotelian critique of Platonism and Pythagoreanism.

Tract VIII is the Avicennian equivalent of Aristotle's Book Δ. In its seven chapters, which we shall see in greater detail shortly, he demonstrates the existence of an uncaused first principle which is absolutely necessary and to which must be attributed the basic divine attributes of supreme life, truth, goodness and intelligence. Tract IX (seven chapters) describes the relationship of the first being to all outside itself. Here Aristotelianism yields to a version of Neoplatonic emanation which sees the visible world as the outflowing of a series of creative waves from the necessary being through the mediation of created intelligences. Tract X (five chapters) concludes the treatise in a remarkable way. It has been called a Muslim theological tract wherein the author expresses his mind on such religious phenomena as revelation, inspiration, saints and prophets, angels and religious cult. There are chapters which treat of social and moral principles as well as duties toward religious leaders. Although Avicenna chose not to include
the full dimensions of practical philosophy within the scope of the *Shifa*, these last chapters of the *Metaphysics* hint at its place in the complete scheme of philosophical wisdom.

b. *Tract VIII.*

From the above summary of the tracts of Avicenna's *Metaphysics* it is clear that the last three (Tracts VIII, IX and X) constitute his philosophical theology, roughly following the classical Neoplatonic pattern: God in himself, emanation from God, return to God. Turning to the text of Tract VIII in greater detail, we find this pattern sketched in the list of proposed tasks which begins chapter one. Following this broad list of questions, Avicenna lists in greater detail the precise matters which must be taken up in Tract VIII. The work of this chapter consists of three general tasks: 1) the demonstration of the existence of the absolutely first principle; 2) the designation of the uniqueness of the principle, the necessary being; and 3) the description of this principle by means of negative and relative attributions.

The greater part of the first three chapters is concerned with the discovery of the first principle. Following exactly the argumentation of Aristotle in *II Metaphysics* (α), chapter 2 (994a1-994b30), the author argues that in each line of causality the number of causes must be finite. His first inquiry proceeds from the general nature of caused causes, which cannot be understood without correlative terms at either extremes: a simple effect which does not cause, and an uncaused cause. The argument will stand for any genus of causality, but it is especially evident when understood in terms of efficient causality. A long discussion on material causality begins in chapter 1 and includes all of chapter 2. Chapter 3, still following the Aristotelian source, treats briefly of the limits implied in final and formal causality. At the end of this chapter Avicenna gathers the results of his investigations and draws his conclusions. It is the first principle in the line of efficient causality that seems to be the absolutely first principle, for it is prior to the many principles in the other lines of causality. This cause must be one in number, the necessary being, and all other beings in relationship to it are merely possible beings. They are caused by it and acquire their esse from it. Their dependence upon this principle is not partial, i.e., in respect merely to matter or form, but total, in respect to their very being. This is what it means to be created. The necessary being is the "giver of being" (*dator esse*). Everything else admits of a radical privation for they begin to be "after not being" (*post non esse*). Avicenna's doctrine on creation interprets this "after" not in a temporal sense but in an ontological sense, for the possible is related to the necessary as the posterior to the prior.

The task of chapter four and chapter 5 is to designate the uniqueness of the necessary being. The major steps of his argumentation are elaborated in the former
chapter, while in the latter he completes some of the details. In these chapters the theses are all obviously negative as they come to bear upon the utter simplicity of the divine being. Avicenna's name for God in this chapter is "the First" (Primus). It is by way of expounding the significance of this title that he proposes his theses: 1) the "First" does not have a quiddity but only an "anity" (anitas); 2) the "First" is "stripped being" (esse expoliatum); 3) the "First" cannot properly be a substance. In chapter 5 the divine uniqueness is confirmed by arguments refuting the possibility of there being several realities of this kind. Simpler arguments in chapter four have already proved this, but Avicenna approaches the problem from a somewhat different angle in chapter 5. As is his custom, he summarizes the achievements of this important section in a clear and compact passage at the end of chapter 5. [13]

Chapters 6 and 7 of Tract VIII take up what appear to be more positive attributes and explore their significance in God. God is perfect, and more than perfect. He is pure goodness and truth. He is pure intelligence and also the supreme object of understanding, without deriving any real multiplicity thereby, a doctrine which Neoplatonism might have rejected but which Muslim theology had to maintain. A considerable effort is made to explain God's knowledge of himself as well as his knowledge of the world. For Avicenna, this latter knowledge extends to particulars insofar as they can be known via the perfect knowledge of their universal causes. The example of the astronomer's foreknowledge of a particular eclipse is prominent.

In a brief but significant passage in chapter seven, Avicenna reflects on the nature of these attributions and divine properties and lists them all in order for the purpose of showing that they designate nothing positive other than the divine being itself with some negation or some relationship or both. He concludes the chapter and the tract with a reflection on the divine beauty and the divine beatitude or delight.

Thus we can see the immediate situation of chapter four in this Tract which constitutes the very heart of Avicenna's theology. Under the rubric of explaining the meaning of the name "First," Avicenna unfolds the deepest exigencies of the notion of necessity. He finds that the absolutely necessary being cannot have what every other reality has, namely a quiddity, a "whatness" distinct from its "whetherness" or anitas. The immediate consequences of this fact are the non-communicability and the transcendence of the necessary being over all the genera, including substance. Chapter four is the metaphysical pinnacle of his doctrine on God. It is true that these arguments have been somewhat foreshadowed by the discussions in chapters seven and eight of Tract I, on the nature of the possible and the necessary, but in Tract VIII they find their fulfillment and richest explication. No longer is it a case of expounding the implications of a mere, although primary, notion. Rather, here in Tract VIII, it is the exploration of the attributes of a
certified reality, the "altissimus et gloriosus" of a theistic philosophy and a religious believer.

c. Chapter four, #1-6

The third and final stage of our effort to supply the context to those passages of Avicenna which will appear in the comparative study consists in a summary of the content and method of the first part of chapter four, Tract VIII, the part which precedes the paralleled texts. Our purpose is first to grasp the significance of his argumentation as it prepares the way for the basic demonstrations found in Section A and B. Secondarily, however, we may begin to familiarize ourselves with the characteristics of method and style, and with the translation difficulties that confront any student of Avicenna's *Metaphysics*.

The title to chapter four indicates not only its purpose, but also the general aim of the other three chapters in this Tract: "On the properties of the first principle which is necessary being."[14] In the first paragraph of the text Avicenna summarizes succinctly the argumentation that leads from the notion of necessary being to the appellation "First," by which he will refer to God in the basic theses of the chapter. It has already been established that there is a necessary being and that this being is one. It does not communicate anything in its own order and so there is nothing else like it which is necessary being. Thus it is the principle giving being to everything that exists, either immediately or mediately. In this sense it can be called "the First."

He then begins to explain the import of this attribution. "First" does not imply any addition to the divine being but only the relationship of this being to all else outside of it. In #2 and #3 Avicenna reflects for a moment upon the possibility of predicating such relative attributes of God. Insistence upon the divine purity does not prohibit the possibility of relationships: "Whatever exists in some respect to other things that exist, has a certain mode of relationship and comparison, and this is especially so with regard to that being from which all being flows."[15] The unique divine essence stands in itself and by itself. Many affirmative and negative relationships are necessary concomitants of this essence. They are caused by this essence and are posterior to the being of this essence. These however, are not constituent parts of the essence. If one should seize upon the caused aspects of these relationships to make the classic objection that there will thus be an infinite regress of such relationships, Avicenna would refer him to the treatment of this question in Tract III, where he proves that relationships are finite in number.[16]

In #4 Avicenna states for the first time the major thesis of the chapter: "The first does not have a quiddity, except an 'anity,' which is distinct from it."[17] In this one line we encounter several problems typical of the text of the *Avicenna Latinus*. First of all there is the appearance of the curious word *anitas*, which we
have simply transliterated as "anity." It appears as the obvious correlative of "quiddity" and perhaps could be translated as "whetherness" as opposed to "whatness." The thesis maintains that "whatness" is inappropriate to the necessary being, whereas "whetherness" can be admitted. The precise meaning of these terms will be investigated later, for they imply an important dimension of Avicenna’s thought.[18] Their fate in the minds and in the pages of the Latin scholastics is another interesting tale. For the moment it is sufficient to note their first appearance and to recognize thereby the highly nuanced technical vocabulary of Arabic philosophy which underlies them. We can sympathize with the difficulties of a translator in rendering this vocabulary into Latin, and appreciate the perplexities of the Latin reader confronted with so unusual a disjunction.

A second problem which presents itself in this line is the one raised by the rather ambiguous concluding phrase, "quae sit discreta ab ipsa." The Latin text is defective at this point, omitting a full line of the Arabic original. After the term anitas, the text should read, "and you have learned the signification of quiddity and in what way it is distinguished from 'anity', and in what way it agrees with it, at the beginning of this exposition" [19] This lacuna seems to have affected the entire tradition of the Avicenna and is just one example of several similar instances in this chapter.[20] We must not try to understand the meaning of the Latin Avicenna by a reference to the Arabic text, but we can come to some awareness of the problems which faced the Latin reader whose task it was to understand the dense argumentation of Avicenna through a defective instrument.

According to our understanding of Avicenna, this basic thesis of the absence of quiddity in God is proved through two arguments, or in two complementary stages. The particular sub-thesis which constitutes the first stage is formulated immediately after the general thesis. It reads: "For I state that necessary being cannot have a quiddity upon which necessity of being follows." [21] This first argument covers #4 through #13. Section A of our comparisons will deal with the text from #7 to #13. Our task here is to see how #5 and #6 lead up to Section A.

Avicenna prepares for his argument by describing two ways in which it is possible to understand necessary being. This notion can be taken to mean necessary being itself (ipsum necesse esse), or it can be taken to mean some thing, some quiddity, which is necessary. The ways of understanding "one" are parallel. "One" can either be unity itself, or some thing, some nature which is what it is and also is one. In #6 Avicenna turns to the Aristotelian dialectic in I Physics, chs. 2-4 (184 b 15--188 a 17), to exemplify these two senses of "one" and thus to explain the parallel senses of necessity. Some philosophers mentioned in the Physics held the first principles of natural things to be many, and some held it to be one. Of the latter some spoke of the "one" in an absolute sense, as the essence of unity insofar as it is one. Others held for one nature, such as water or air or fire. There is then a difference between a quiddity which happens to be one or being, and the One or
Unity as such.

With this distinction in mind we see that Avicenna is about to refute the hypothesis that the necessary being is necessary in the sense that it is some specific quiddity which happens to have necessity added to it. In #7 he reformulates the sub-thesis previously stated in A and proceeds with the argument (Section A). By summarizing these first six paragraphs of chapter four, we have put our comparative study into its immediate Avicennian context and have sampled some of the difficulties to be encountered in the course of our work.

B. Thomistic Context

A have seen the context of the more unfamiliar of the texts to be compared, the texts of the *Metaphysics* of Avicenna. It is now fitting that we supply briefly the context of those passages from the *Summa contra gentiles* which enter directly into our study. The Thomistic selections at issue are to be found in chapters twenty-two, twenty-five and twenty-six of the first book of this work. The first book of the *SCG*, with the exception of its nine introductory chapters, is entirely devoted to questions about God, his existence, his essence, his entitative and operative attributes. After chapters ten to thirteen about God's existence, St. Thomas devotes a considerable section to the negative description of the divine essence (chs. 14-27). No true definition of God is possible, for we cannot conceive of any positive notions to serve as a genus and specific difference in him. The best we can hope for is to multiply negative differences to the extent of distinguishing him from everything else, and in this indirect fashion, through the via remotionis, we approach some understanding of the divine essence. [22]

Beginning from the principal notion of God established in the proofs for his existence the divine immutability, Aquinas first argues to God's eternity (ch. 15) and then to the absence of potentiality (ch. 16) and matter (ch. 17) in him. Next he established the general conclusion that there can be no composition in God (ch. 18). In subsequent chapters Aquinas explicates the divine simplicity by taking up, one by one, particular finances of composition and excluding them from the divine essence. God receives nothing by way of a violent imposition upon his essence (ch. 19). In a very long chapter which is practically a commentary on Aristotle's *Physics*, VIII, he presents his opinions on the traditional arguments that God cannot be a body (ch. 20). Ascending to the more metaphysical modes of composition he argues that "God is his essence, quiddity or nature," (ch. 21). [23] The apex of the argumentation on the divine simplicity is reached in chapter twenty-one where St. Thomas establishes that in God, essence or quiddity is not other than his existence. The major stage of his argument in this chapter, the first half of its entire text, is drawn from Avicenna's *Metaphysics*. This passage from the *Summa contra gentiles* will be examined in Sections A and B of our study. [24]
Chapter twenty-three eliminates the possibility that there are any accidents in God. The following chapter shows that no essential qualification can be added to the divine being which would specify it or designate it as a genus is designated by a specific difference (ch. 24). This proves that God is not a genus. The next chapter attempts to show that God is not in any genus. It is from chapter twenty-five that we have drawn the texts to be found in Sections D and E of this study. [25] They follow upon two preliminary arguments and together comprise the remaining text of this chapter. The arguments that God is not in a genus are followed by a special investigation of the nature of substance both in Avicenna's *Metaphysics* and in the Thomistic text in chapter twenty-five.

Chapter twenty-six of Book one of the *Summa contra gentiles* is a refutation of a metaphysical pantheism which would claim that God is the *esse formale* of each and every thing. We have selected one portion of this Thomistic text as reflecting the Avicennian distinction between the divine being and abstract common being (Section C).[26] The last chapter of the section on the divine essence in the *SCG* (ch. 27) refutes a more naturalistic type of pantheism which would understand God as the world soul or as the form of the heavens.

It is tempting to trace further analogies between the sequence of development of Thomas' treatise on God and Avicennian theology as found in the *Metaphysics*. Aquinas, like Avicenna, takes up the divine attributes in this order: perfection, goodness, intelligence, truth, knowledge, will and beatitude. Furthermore, the treatment of creation follows the treatment of the divine nature just as in Avicenna. There is a natural order in these investigations, of course, and both thinkers are striving to submit themselves to this objective sequence, nevertheless the Avicennian matrix for theology in Tracts VIII, IX and X of the *Metaphysics* must have had a profound influence on Christian theologians who found in it a pattern of exposition grounded on a vigorous and penetrating metaphysics.

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NOTES

Chapter II


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4. Tract V, ch. 1; fo 86va, A.


6. "Postquam autem pervenimus ad id in hoc libro nostro, oportet ut perficiamus eum per cognitionem primi principii universi esse, inquirentes, an sit, et an sit unum nec habens compar nec simile, et ut ostendamus ordinem eorum et dispositionem reductionis eorum ad ipsum, adiuti auxilio eius." Ch. 1; fo 97rb, A.

7. "Primum vero quod de hoc incumbit nobis est hoc, scilicet ut ostendamus quod causae omnibus finitae sunt, et quod in unoquoque ordine earum est principium primum, et quod principium omnium illorum est unum, et quod est discretum ab omnibus quod sunt, ipsum solum ens nescesse esse, et quod ab ipso est principium sui esse omnis quod est." Ch. 1; fo 97rb-97ra, A.

8. "Iam autem innuimus in manifestatione huius nos sequi id quod dictum est de hoc in hac doctrina prima in tractatu de scripto per Eliph Iuniorem." Ch. 2; fo 97vb, A.

9. "... et hoc modo ostendi potest quod in omnibus ordinibus causarum finitio est, quamvis per hoc non inquiramus nisi causas agentes." Ch. 1; fo 97va, A.

10. "Incipiam ergo et dicam quod cum dicitur principium primum agens, vel primum principium absolute, necesse est esse unum. Cum autem dicitur causa prima materialis et causa prima formalis et causa huiusmodi, non est necesse esse..."
unum, quemadmodum hoc debet in necesse esse. Nulla enim earum est causa prima absolute." Ch. 3; fo 98vb, A.

11. "Sed necesse est primum principium etiam illarum primarum ex hoc igitur, et ex eo quod praediximus manifestum est quod necesse esse unum numero est, et patuit quod quidquid aliud est ab illo cum consideratur per se est possibile in suo esse et ideo est causatum et paene innotuit quod in causalitate sine dubio pervenitur ad ipsum." Ibid.

12. "Totum igitur respectu primae causae creatum est." Ch. 3; fo 98vb, B.

13. "Probatum est igitur quod in necessitate essendi non est communicatio; igitur prime nihil communicat; postquam autem liberum est a materia et ab eius appenditiis et ab omni corruptione, sed utraque haec sunt conditionis eius quod cadit sub contrarietate, tunc primus non habet contrarium. Iam igitur manifestum est quod primus non habet genus nec quidditatem nec qualitatem nec quantitatem nec quando nec ubi nec simile sibi nec contrarium quod est altissimus et gloriosus et quod non habet definitionem, et quod non potest fieri demonstratio de eo, sed ipse est demonstratio de omni quod est, immo sunt de eo signa manifesta. Cum autem designatur certitudo non designatur nisi post unitatem per negationem consimilium ab ipse et per affirmationem relationem ad ipsum, quoniam omne quod est ab ipso est et non est communicans ei quod est ab ipso. Ipse vero est omne quod est, et tamen non est aliquod ex his." Ch. 5; fo 99vb. B.

14. "De proprietatibus primi principii quod est necesse esse" Appendix I, p. 123. The text of the entire chapter four is appended to our study.

15. "... quicquid est ad alia quae sunt habet aliquem modum relationis et comparationis, et praecipue id a quo fluit omne esse," #2. Ibid.

16. Metaphysica, Tract. III, c. 10; fo 83va, E.


18. See our discussion of anitas in Section B, pp. 72-79.

19. This is our rendition of a French version of the Arabic test by Mlle d'Alverny. See note 8 in Appendix I, p. 129.

20. See Appendix I, note 9, 22, 29, 56.

21. "Dico enim quod necesse esse non potest habere quidditatem quam comitetur

22. Ch. 14; ed. Crietti, nos. 117-118

23. No.196.

24. Nos. 202-205 (Section A); nos. 206-207 (Section B).

25. Nos. 230-234 (Section D); nos. 235-236 (Section E).

26. No. 247 (Section C).
2. *Comparison*

**Section A**

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<td>7. Dico Qitur good necesse esse non potest esse eiusmodi ut sit in eo compositio, ita ut sit hic quidditas aliqua quae sit necesse esse, et illi quidditati sit intentio aliqua praeter certitudinem eius, quae intentio sit necessitas essendi;</td>
<td>202. Ex his autem quae supra ostensa sunt, uterius probari potest good in Deo non est aliud essentia vel quidditas quam suum esse.</td>
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<td>203. Ostensum est enim supra aliquid esse quod per se necesse est esse, quod Deus est.</td>
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<td>verbi gratia, si illa quidditas esset homo, tunc hominem esse aliud esset quam ipsum esse necesse esse.</td>
<td>Hoc igitur esse quod necesse est, si est alicui quidditati quae non est quod ipsum est,</td>
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<td>8. et tunc non posset esse quin hoc quod dicimus necessitas essendi vel esset haec certitudo, vel non esset.</td>
<td>aut est dissonum illi quidditati seu repugnans, sicut per se existere quidditati albedinis: aut ei consonum sive affine, sicut albedini esse in alio.</td>
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<td>9. Absurdum est autem ut huic intentions non sit certitudo quae sit praeter ipsum quidditatem.</td>
<td>Si primo modo, illi quidditati non conveniat esse good est per se necesse: sicut nec albedine per se existere. Si autem secundo modo, oportet quod vel esse huiusmodi dependeat ab essentia; vel utrumque ab alia causa; vel essentia ab esse.</td>
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<td>10. Si autem ills necessitati essendi fuerit hoc ut pendeat ab ills quidditate, et non est necesse esse sine illa, tune intention de necesse esse inquantum est necesse esse est necesse esse propter aliud quod non est ipsum. Igitur non erit necesse esse inquantum est necesse esse. Ipsum enim in se inquantm est necesse esse considerare esse necesse esse propter aliud quod est ei propter quod est necesse esse, est absurdum.</td>
<td>Prima duo sunt contra rationem eius good est per se &quot;necesseesse&quot;: Via si ab alio dependet, iam non est necesse esse.</td>
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11. Si autem fuerit ut discrepet ab illa re, tunc illa quidditas non erit necesse esse ullo modo absolute, nec accidet ei necessitas essendi absolute. Ipsa enim non fit necesse esse aliquando, sed necesse esse absolute semper est necesse esse. Non est autem sic dispositio entis, cum accipitur absolute sequens quidditatem non ligatum cum necessitate pura.

12. Nec obest si quis dixerit quod illud ens causatum est quidditati hoc modo, vel alii rei. Possibile est enim ut ens sit causatum, et necessitas absoluta quae est per essentiam non sit causata. Restat ergo ut necesse esse per essentiam absolute certificatum inquantum est necesse esse per se, sit necesse esse sine illa quidditate.

13. Ad quod respondeo quod tunc illa quidditas esset accidentalis ad necesse esse, quod est certificatae existentiae per se, si illud esset designatum in intellectu in hoc, etiam esset certificatum necesse esse, quamvis non esset quidditas illa accidentalis. Illa igitur non est quidditas rei designatae in intellectu quae est necesse esse, sed est quidditas alterius rei sequentis eam. Iam autem posita fuerat quidditas sua, non alterius rei, et hoc est inconveniens.

Igitur necesse esse non habet quidditatem, nisi quod est necesse esse, et haec est anitas.

14. Si autem fuerit ut discrepet ab illa re, tunc illa quidditas non erit necesse esse ullo modo absolute, nec accidet ei necessitas essendi absolute. Ipsa enim non fit necesse esse aliquando, sed necesse esse absolute semper est necesse esse. Non est autem sic dispositio entis, cum accipitur absolute sequens quidditatem non ligatum cum necessitate pura.

15. Nec obest si quis dixerit quod illud ens causatum est quidditati hoc modo, vel alii rei. Possibile est enim ut ens sit causatum, et necessitas absoluta quae est per essentiam non sit causata. Restat ergo ut necesse esse per essentiam absolute certificatum inquantum est necesse esse per se, sit necesse esse sine illa quidditate.

16. Ad quod respondeo quod tunc illa quidditas esset accidentalis ad necesse esse, quod est certificatae existentiae per se, si illud esset designatum in intellectu in hoc, etiam esset certificatum necesse esse, quamvis non esset quidditas illa accidentalis. Illa igitur non est quidditas rei designatae in intellectu quae est necesse esse, sed est quidditas alterius rei sequentis eam. Iam autem posita fuerat quidditas sua, non alterius rei, et hoc est inconveniens.

Igitur necesse esse non habet quidditatem, nisi quod est necesse esse, et haec est anitas.

204. Sed contra hoc potest dici quod illud esse non absolute dependet ab essentia illa, ut omnino non sit nisi illa esset: sed dependet quantum ad conjunctionem qua ei coniungitur. Et sic illud esse per se necesse est, sed ipsum coniungit non per se necesse est.

205. Haec autem responsio praedicta inconvenientia non evadit. Quia si illud esse potest intelligi sine illa essentia, sequetur quod illa essentia accidentaliter se habet ad illud esse. Sed id quod est per se "necesse-esse" est illud esse. Ergo illa essentia se habet accidentaliter ad id quod est per se necesse esse. Non ergo est quidditas eius. Hoc autem quod est per se "necesse-esse", est Deus. An igitur illa est essentia Dei, sed aliqua essentia Deo posterior. Si autem non potest intelligi illud esse sine illa essentia, tune illud esse absolute dependet ab eo a quo dependet conjunctione sua ad essentiam illam. Et sic redit idem quod prius.
Next, the hypothetical composition is exemplified: "If that quiddity were man, then being a man would be other than the very being of the necessary being." Here some of the terminology of the initial statement receives clarification. "Man" is parallel to "quiddity," while "being a man" (hominem esse) would seem to be parallel to "its own reality" (certitudinem eius). The Arabic term *haqīqa* underlying the Latin *certitudo* means more than merely quiddity (Arabic: māhiyya). Mlle Goichon gives as the primary meaning of *haqīqa*, vérité, truth, i.e., the truth which is the very essence of a thing especially as that thing exists in reality. [27] Mlle d'Alverny also renders the term as vérité, while Fr. Anawati prefers réalité.[28] Evidently, then, the concept rendered by *certitudo* is not simply the essence as a logical composite, a quiddity composed of genus and difference, but rather the essence as realized. The term *intention* (Arabic: ma'nā) we have translated as notion. Its meaning in this instance is clearly specified as the formality, necessity of being (necessitas essendi), by which the hypothetical composite would, in its totality, be constituted as necessary being.

Within this hypothesis Avicenna recognizes a preliminary pair of alternatives: "...and then it can only be that this which we call the necessity of being would either be this reality, or it would not." Our literal translation discloses the ambiguity of the Latin version. teat is meant by "esset haec certitudo"? The only previous use of *certitudo* was to designate the realization of the quiddity, e.g., hominem esse. Yet the notion of necessity of being should be, according to the hypothesis, something different from the realized quiddity. The demonstrative *haec* would seem to be misleading. Fr. Anawati's translation of the Arabic text casts light on this line: "Alors il faudrait nécessairement ou bien que notre affirmation: 'nécessité de l'existence' ait une réalité ou bien qu'elle n'en ait point"[29] The necessity of existence would either have a reality, or it would not. The meaning seems to be that the necessity of existence must either exist of itself or not. It is not a question of it being identical with the quiddity or with the realization of the quiddity, but rather of its having in and of itself its own reality, its own existence.

The resolution of this question is found in the following line (#9): "It is absurd that this notion not have [its] realization ...." Avicenna, constantly using the logical form of *reductio*, argues in favor of the first alternative by rejecting its opposite. Once again the Latin text is faulty in omitting, probably because of homoioteleuton, the reason for this conclusion.[30] The Arabic text continues, "for it the necessary being is the principle of all reality; moreover it confirms all reality and validates it."[31] The Latin has only the clause, "which is distinct from that quiddity." This clause in fact belongs to a new sentence which takes up the established conclusion in order to lead on to another pair of alternatives treated in #10 and #11. The Arabic text introduces the new set of options thus: "If it has a truth [or reality] which is other than that of the quiddity, and if this necessity of existence is obliged to depend on this quiddity ...." [32] The two new alternatives are these: 1) either this realized and distinct necessity depends upon the quiddity (#10) or, 2) it is somehow independent of and indifferent to the quiddity (#11).

In the former case, the necessary being (or, as the Latin reads, the notion of the necessary being) is necessary on account of something else. This contradicts Avicenna's concept of the necessary, which was proposed in the beginning of the *Metaphysics* as an absolutely primary notion.[33] "It is absurd to consider it in itself, qua necessary being, to be such on account of something which is the reason 'why' (propter quod) it is necessary." The quiddity to which necessity is added cannot
be the inner reason for necessity. It cannot account for necessity without introducing a contradiction into the notion of necessity, the idea of dependence.

The second alternative (#11) envisions a composition of quiddity and necessity in which the latter is not conditioned by some mode of dependence upon the former.[34] A difficulty is discovered in trying to conceive of a manner of composition which would account for the permanent and perpetual union of two such unrelated elements. If, in the sense already noted, necessity is independent, and indifferent to the quiddity, then there seems to be no way for the necessity to belong to the quiddity in an absolute fashion (non erit necesse esse ullo modo absolute). Once again the Latin text imperfectly reflects the original, however it is sufficient for our purposes to note that the argument revolves around the two modes of composition designated by *absolute semper* and *aliqando*. The composition ought to exist in the former manner, but, in this hypothetical situation, only the latter seems to be possible.

The last portion of Section A in the text of Avicenna is made up of an objection (#12) and a response (#13). The objector asks whether it could be the case that the being (ens) is caused with respect to the quiddity, while absolute necessity itself remains uncaused. For the first time in the argument of Avicenna causality is explicitly introduced into the argument. It would have to be a kind of causality that would bring together the quiddity and the necessity without intrinsically vitiating the very notion of necessity. The response is given a scholastic inception in the Latin version (Ad quod respondeo). It proceeds to point out that if this be the situation then the quiddity could be considered only as accidental to the necessary being. It could not properly be regarded as the quiddity of the necessary being. In the hypothesis, however, the quiddity was conceded to be the quiddity of the necessary being, and thus the argument leads to an absurdity. Avicenna concludes, as he began, with the statement of the thesis: "Therefore necessary being does not have a quiddity, but only the fact of its necessary being, and this is 'anity.'" Again the Arabic text has more, but the additional Paragraph will be treated as a preliminary to the next section.[35]

Let us now begin the task of comparing the two texts. Since we have already seen the argument in Avicenna's text, the process of comparison can concern itself more directly with the passages from the *Summa contra gentiles*. Because our purpose is twofold, to prove the fact of dependence of St. Thomas on Avicenna, and then to examine the mode of dependence by means of the differences between the two texts, it will be best to begin by listing the points of similarity and so establish the first half of our task.

The text of St. Thomas in Section A is taken from the first part of chapter twenty-two and together with the text in the following section comprises about two-thirds of the entire chapter (Marietti ed., #202-#207). Section A includes #202-#205. Section B has #206-#207. Following these two texts are three corroborative arguments, one from the notion of potency and act as applied to essence and existence (#208), another from the common argument from composition (#209), and the third from the implications of existence by participation (#210). All three, as well as the brief argument of #206, are in a characteristically simple Thomistic style. They contrast sharply with the intricate dialectical divisions and *reductiones* in the texts we are about to
Looking at both sets of texts in Section A we find the following similarities:

1. Both texts belting with the statement of the thesis: Av.#7; Aq.#202.
2. Both texts adopt the hypothesis of a quiddity: Av.#7; Aq.#203 Hoc igitur...
3. Both texts propose a preliminary division of possibilities: Av.#8; Aq.#203 Aut est...
4. Both texts eliminate one of the alternatives: Av.#9; Aq.#203 Si primo...
5. Both texts pursue a subsequent division of alternatives: Av. in #10 and #11; Aquinas lists them explicity, #203 Si autem secundo...
6. Both texts reject the dependence of necessary existence upon anything else: Av.#10; Aq.#203 Prima duo...
7. Both texts eliminate the remaining alternative: Av.#11; Aq.#203 Ex tertio...
8. Both texts introduce similar objections: Av. #12; Aq.#204.
9. Both texts refute the objection with similar arguments: Av.#13; Aq.#205.

The over-all structure of the argument is similar in both texts. Upon closer examination of the Thomistic text, however, this likeness is seen to be less than perfect. The passage in the SCG is not notably shorter than its Avicennian source, but in many ways it is simpler and more logically complete. It is difficult to escape the conclusion that St. Thomas, in composing this portion of the SCG had either before his eyes or in his memory the Latin text of chapter four, Tract VIII of Avicenna's Metaphysics.

Turning to a more detailed investigation of their similarities we see that there is at least a verbal discrepancy between the proposals of the theses in the two texts. Avicenna proposes to show that in the absolutely necessary being there cannot be a quiddity which is distinct from the necessity of existence. The conclusion which emerges frequently in the chapter is primarily negative: Necessary being does not have a quiddity. Avicenna does not admit that in God, the necessary being, there is any quiddity which could be identified with his existence. The notion of quiddity, for him, has no place in the first principle.

St. Thomas, on the other hand, proposes the thesis that in God, essence and existence are identified. Since essence and quiddity mean the same thing, it is perfectly legitimate to speak of God's existence as his only essence. In God, quiddity is not other than his very existence (#202). Thomas' terminology indicates that for him there is no defect in the notion of quiddity which would exclude its proportional use in spite of the divine simplicity.

In his earlier writings St. Thomas seems to have recognized this Avicennian rejection of quiddity in God, and he accused Avicenna of holding the doctrine that God, in fact, has no essence at all, but is pure existence. In the De ente et essentia he writes, "Et ideo invenitur aliqui philosophi dicentes quod Deus non habet quiditatem vel essentiam quia essentia sua non est aliquid quam esse suum."[36] More explicitly in I Sent., we find, "Quidam enim dicunt, ut Avicenna et Rabbi Moyses, quod res illa quae Deus est, est quoddam esse subsistens, nec aliquid aliquid nisi esse, in Deo est; unde dicunt, quod est esse sine essentia."[37] We have not been able to find, in
either of these two authors, this precise expression. Avicenna used at least ten different words to signify essence, each designating one aspect or another.[38] The simplest equivalent for essence is *dāt* which occurs in such expressions as *per essentiam* meaning per se or of itself. Further precisions are signified by the terms we have already seen: *māhiyya*, meaning quiddity or logical essence; *haqīqa* the realized essence; and *anīyya*, the Latin *anitas*. "Henna writes, of the certitude, the haqīqa of the necessary being. While always denying his particularly precise notion of quiddity to the necessary being, he has no hesitation to speak of its certitude and its anitas. The Latins did not insist on such precision, and so we find St. Thomas using such expressions as "essentia vel quidditas." The Latins' inference that thus God was without essence has not been unequivocally documented from the Arabic authors. It is an oversimplification to claim on the basis of his rejection of quiddity in God, that Avicenna held a doctrine of "esse sine essentia."

Does this mean that such an interpretation entirely vitiates St. Thomas' utilization of his source? Not at all, for both philosophers share the rejection of all composition in God at the ultimate metaphysical level. Although their statements of the thesis differ, their understandings of the realities are similar. St. Thomas, in the face of the difficult Latin version of Avicenna, was forced to oversimplify. No doubt his own synthetic purpose would have led him to modify the Avicennian dialectic even if the latter had been perfectly intelligible. His effort to cast the thoughts of others into the framework of his own philosophy, typifies the meaning of synthesis.

We might also note at this time the fact that St. Thomas does make use of the Avicennian *necesse esse*. The Leonine editors have indicated this by means of quotation marks Cf. #203 and #205). What is not found in this Thomistic text is the formality designated by Avicenna as the necessitas essendi.[39] While Avicenna is pursuing the implications of a distinct necessitas essendi added to some quiddity, Aquinas writes simply of the "act of being which is necessary" (esse quod necesse est) and which is combined in various ways with quiddities of one sort or another.

In positing hypothetical quiddities the two authors differ. Avicenna gives the specific example of the quiddity "man," which is in the category of substance. Aquinas asks only that the quiddity be other than the act of being, and his first division of alternatives deals with the possible *per se* existence of accidental quiddities or substantial quiddities. The preliminary divisions of alternatives differ in both texts. Avicenna inquires whether necessity must have its own realization or not, whereas Aquinas is concerned about the congruity between a quiddity and some mode of existence. It is incongruous (dissonum, repugnans) for an accidental quiddity such as whiteness to exist *per se*. On the other hand it is appropriate (consonum, affine) for the same quiddity to exist in another. Although the Avicennian text may seem to suggest no source for this distinction, it may well be that the usual term, discrepet, found in the beginning of the argument of #11, lies beneath the dissonum--consonum distinction of St. Thomas.

We have seen Avicenna argue that since the necessity of existing must have its own realization, for it is absurd to think it would not exist, there remain two alternatives: 1) it must depend upon the quiddity (#10), or 2) it will be independent of the quiddity (#11). Aquinas argues that if being or the act of existence is not *a priori* discordant with some quiddity, but is at least
consonant with it, then three possibilities remain: "Either such an act of being would depend upon
the essence, or both upon another cause, or the essence upon the act of being." St. Thomas' first
alternative certainly corresponds with Avicenna's first. The notion of necessary being -- for
Avicenna: "intentio de necesse esse," for Aquinas: "ratio eius quod est per se 'necesse-esse'" --
precludes its dependence upon anything else. The simple response of Aquinas contrasts sharply
with the incredible prolixity of Avicenna's text, but both say the same thing.

It becomes more difficult to find exact parallels to St. Thomas' second and third alternatives
in the text of Avicenna. St. Thomas finds that the argument against dependence holds for both of
his first two alternatives. Avicenna does not envision the conjunction of quiddity and necessity by
some outside cause at this stage of his argument. It is introduced to some extent in the objection
of #12, but there the response does not direct itself to dependence. External causality is more
prominent in his arguments in Section B. St. Thomas' response to the third alternative, that the
essence would depend upon the esse, is that in such a case the essence would be too
late to be the quiddity. Whatever follows upon the act of being is accidental. There is no reflection
of the Avicennian argument which speaks of semper--aliquando. Rather, the argument of Aquinas
seems to be a somewhat premature foreshadmrning of the response to the objection which follows.

The parallelism between Avicenna's #12 and #13 with Aquinas' #204 and #205 is very close.
St. Thomas interprets the objection by distinguishing between the esse which is per se necessary,
and the conjunction of the esse with the quiddity which is not. His response acknowledges his
earlier remarks apropos of the third alternative. Like Avicenna he argues that in this case the
quiddity would have to be accidental to the already existent necessity and thus could not be its
quiddity. He frames his response in terms of a disjunction that is Avicennian in nature although
not found in the immediate source text. If that esse can be understood without that essence, then
the accidentality of the quiddity or essence is evident. If, however, it cannot be understood
without that essence, then it is intrinsecally dependent upon the essence and the earlier arguments
against dependence hold.

It may seem to the reader that so many differences have been indicated that one might
question whether any real parallelism can be proved. It is true that upon close examination the
pieces do not fall into line perfectly. Yet when we look at the over-all structure of both
arguments, the common rejection of dependence based upon the notion of necessity, the similar
objections and responses it becomes clear enough that St. Thomas must have had the text of
Avicenna before his eyes or at least in his memory in considerable detail. The formal structure of
Avicenna's text is the matrix of St. Thomas' argumentation. It was not the style of Aquinas to cite
source materials with scrupulous exactitude even then their author was explicitly mentioned.
Here, there is no mention made of Avicenna, but the Arab masters thought indubitably underlies
this important Thomistic passage.

NOTES

27. Goichon, Lexique. pp. 82-83, no.171.


30. d'Alverny, *loc. cit.*, n. 76.


32. "Si elle a une vérité et qui est autre que celle de la quiddité, et si cette nécessité de l'existence l'oblige à dépendre de cette quiddité..." Anawati, *loc. cit.*


34. The Latin term *discrepet* here seems to signify the counterpart of *pendeat*. What is unconditioned by any causal reference to the quiddity is independent of and indifferent to the quiddity.


39. The term *necessitas essendi* is rarely used by St. Thomas. One example, derived from Averroes, can be found in *De pot.*, q. 5, a. 3.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Meta., VIII, 4.</th>
<th>SCG I, 22 (continued).</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>206. Item. Unumquodque est per suum esse. Quod igitur non est suum esse, non est per se &quot;necesse esse&quot;. Deus autem est per se &quot;necesse esse&quot;. Ergo Deus est suum esse.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>207. Amplius. Si esse Dei non est su, essentia, non autem pars eius esse potest, cum essentia divina sit simplex, ut ostensum est (cap. 18), oportet good huiusmodi esse sit aliquid praeter essentiam eius.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Omne autem good convenit alicui good non est de essentia eius, convenit ei per aliquam causam: ea enim quae per se non sunt unum, si coniungantur, oportet per aliquam causam uniri. Esse igitur convenit illi quidditati per aliquam causam.</td>
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<tr>
<td>15. Tu autem iam nosti good ex anitate et esse non constat quidditas que est praeter anitatem ad modum quo aliquid constat ex constituente; erit igitur de comitantibus.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>16. Aut igitur per aliquid quod est de essentia illius rei, sive per essentiam ipsam, aut per aliquid aliud.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>17. Si autem fuerit hoc quod anitas sequetur quidditatem, et comitetur eam propter aliquid aliud. Intentio autem de hoc good dicimus &quot;comitantur,&quot; est &quot;sequi esse&quot; et quod esse sequitur non &lt;nisi&gt; esse,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Si primo modo, essentia autem est secundum illud esse, sequitur good aliquid sit sibi ipsi causa essendi. Hoc autem est impossibile: quia prius secundum intellectum est causam esse quam effectum; si ergo aliquid sibi ipsi esset causa essendi, intelligetur esse antequam haberet esse, quod est impossibile: --nisi intelligatur quod aliquid sit sibi causa essendi secundum esse accidental, quod esse est secundum quid. Hoc enim non est impossible: inventur enim aliquod ens accidental causatum ex principiis sui subjecti, ante quod esse intelligitur esse substantiae subjecti. Nunc autem non loquitur de esse accidental, sed de substantiali.</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
The Avicennian text presented in Section B continues uninterrupted from the first section and offers the second and final stage of the basic argument in the chapter. The Thomistic text in Section B is also an immediate continuation of the former passage taken from the first part of chapter twenty-two. Following our stated procedure we shall first attempt to understand the text of Avicenna.

Between the closing words of the Avicennian portion of Section A "...et haec est anitas," and the "Item dico..." of this section, the Arabic manuscripts have a paragraph which, we must presume, was not available to the Latins. It seems to anticipate sons of the argumentation of this section. It says:

Furthermore, we say that if "anity" and existence (wujūd, Latin: esse) come to be accidents of the quiddity, they would necessarily accompany it either because of its essence, or on account of something extrinsic. Now it is impossible that this happen because of the essence of the quiddity, for a concomitant follows only an existent. It would thus be the case that the quiddity would have an existence before its existence. This is impossible. [40]

This passage seems to condense the argument of #15-#17. Whatever its significance may be for the student of Avicenna, its absence from the Latin version rules out its influence as a source of doctrine. It is of some interest, however, as another instance of 'anniyya underlying anitas, and especially since this term is here juxtaposed to the term for existence.

The single line which we have designated as #14 seems to state the secondary thesis of this phase of the argument. The over-all purpose of the argument, as we have seen, is to show that in the necessary being there can be no quiddity. To establish the proposition that whatever has a quiddity besides "anity" is caused, is to be just one short logical step from the final conclusion. Causality and existence (esse) seem to be particularly important in this section of the argument. In Section A the discussion seemed to center on the question of priorities between the hypothetical quiddity and its intrinsic essential constituent, the necessity of being. In this section, however, the debate is about the quiddity and its relationships to certain concomitants, namely anitas and esse. The shift in vocabulary indicates the relocation of the argument to another area in the philosophy of Avicenna.
In #15 this shift is explained. "You already know that a quiddity which is other than 'anity' is not composed of 'anity' and existence and the way that something is made up out of a constituent. Therefore it will be a matter of concomitants."[41] The distinction between constituents and concomitants is of major importance in Avicenna's thought. It is basic to his notion of predicables. Constituent characteristics are those factors such as genus, difference and species which are the very essence of a thing. Concomitants (āzim) are those realities which belong to a thing, which are outside of the essence itself although they may even follow necessarily upon the essence. They do not include the purely predicatable accidents (ārid) which may or may not be in any given individual, but which do include both those properties which immediately result from the essence, e.g., risibility in man, and those accidents which are not strictly proper, but rather common to a given species. In the latter group existence itself is to be located.[42] Thus we can see that the argumentation in Section A concerned the interrelationships of essential aspects such as genus and difference, and in this context quiddity and necessity were compared. In this section Avicenna shifts to the area of necessary concomitants where the factor of causality is more evident.

In #16 he posits a disjunction of basic alternatives. The subject of the disjunction, at least in the Latin text, seems to be both anitas and esse. They must accompany (comitantur) the quiddity either in virtue of the quiddity itself, or because of something else. This accompaniment, signified by comitantur, means "to follow existence." The being (esse) of the concomitant can only follow a previous being or existence. The Latin text at this point, in all the exemplars we have seen, reads: "...et quod esse sequitur non esse." The Arabic, as well as the context of the argument, suggests the addition of nisi in the place we have indicated.[43] This means that, according to Avicenna, the concomitants always presuppose existence, either the existence of the essence or the existence of some external cause. When the concomitant in question is existence itself, the existence presupposed is that of the extrinsic cause. When the concomitant is a resultant property, the accidental existence presupposes the existence of the essence which causes it.

Avicenna's refutation of the first alternative is quite clear (#17). If "unity" follows the quiddity and accompanies it in virtue of that very quiddity, then "unity" in its own being would follow upon a previous existent. The existence of the quiddity would have to be prior to "anitas in suo esse." Therefore the quiddity will exist essentially prior to its own esse. This conclusion has force only if we understand "suo esse" as signifying what previously was designated by the terms "anitas in suo esse." "Anity" in its being is really the very being of the quiddity. The impossible consequence would be that somehow quiddity would have to have existence prior to its own proper existence.

The only remaining alternative is that, given a quiddity, the concomitant esse can belong to it only by reason of a cause (#18). Everything that has a quiddity, then, is caused. Everything except the necessary being has a quiddity which makes it to be a possible being (possibile esse), and its existence is due to it from some extrinsic source. The first being does not have a quiddity, but is the source of existence, pouring out existence upon those things having quiddities.

Having seen the argument in the text of Avicenna, let us now list the similarities between it and the text of Aquinas.
1. Both texts set aside the case of a composite quiddity: Av.#15; Aq. #207 non autem pars...
2. Both texts make causality the central issue: Av.#14; Aq.#207 Omne autem...
3. Both texts give similar divisions of alternatives: Av.#16; Aq.#207 Aut igitur...
4. Both texts refute the first option by the argument from prior existence: Av.#17; Aq.#207 Si primo modo...
5. Both texts reject the other alternative in the case of necessary being: Av.#18; Aq.#207 Si autem illi...

The Thomistic text in Section B begins with #206 which reflects the Avicennian term *necesse esse* but not the Avicennian mode of argumentation. The linear syllogistic form is that of St. Thomas and is a good example of how compact his thought could become when he did not choose to follow another text closely.

The argumentation of #207 is nearly parallel to the source-text. St. Thomas writes that if God's existence is not his essence, then it must be something other than his essence. It cannot be a part of the essence, since, as has been shown, the essence is simple. The Leonine editors refer the reader to chapter eighteen. Avicenna's text also has a back-reference, "Tu autem iam nosti...," which would seem to recall some earlier treatment of "anity" and existence. The uncomposed nature of the divine essence was the subject of the discussion in Section A, and one wonders if St. Thomas' reference could not be to the earlier portion of chapter twenty-two. The distinction between what is part of the essence and what is outside of (praeter) the essence corresponds quite closely to Avicenna's distinction between constituents and concomitants.

Causality is the issue in both arguments. Avicenna's "Whatever has a quiddity outside of 'anity' is caused," corresponds roughly to St. Thomas' "Whatever comes to something which is not of its essence, comes to it through some cause." The former is more specific than the latter. Avicenna looks only to the composition of quiddity and "anity" whereas St. Thomas' principle is broader in scope. The example which follows in the text of the SCG, that of unity, is interesting when we recall that the textual tradition of the Latin Avicenna suffered from frequent attempts to clarify the unusual term *anitas*. The Venice 1508 edition replaces the first letter with "u" and reads *unitas* for all its occurrences.[44] After the example of unity, St. Thomas focuses the question upon existence (esse).

The division of alternatives is similar in both authors. Avicenna would seem to restrict the notion of causality to the latter alternative, that of being caused by another. Aquinas, on the other hand, conceives of both options in terms of causality. Existence would be caused either "by something which is of the essence of that thing, that is, through the essence itself, or by something else." When Avicenna says that whatever has a quiddity outside of "anity" is caused, he wants us to understand that this cause cannot be the quiddity itself.

St. Thomas' argument against the first alternative, like Avicenna's, shows that the quiddity or essence cannot account for its own existence, because it would then have to exist before its existence, which is absurd. Avicenna achieved this conclusion by defining the notion of accompaniment which is characteristic of concomitants. Aquinas reaches the same conclusion via
the notion of a cause. The cause must exist prior to its effect, at least *secundum intellectum*. The paragraph in St. Thomas which begins with the words *nisi intelligatur*, is an example of his pedagogical thoroughness covering the case of an accidental existence which may be caused by a quiddity already existing substantially. The existence in question in the main argument, however, is substantial existence and this in no way can be explained simply by the essence.

Existence comes to an essence through some cause other than that essence. Again we may compare St. Thomas' "Everything then that acquires existence from another cause is caused, and is not the first cause," with Avicenna's similar conclusion. Avicenna excludes the necessary being from the realm of causality. His use of the term *primus* certainly inspires the more explicit argumentation to be found in St. Thomas' text, which then concludes "therefore this quiddity which acquires existence from elsewhere, is not God's quiddity."

The verbal contrast between the concluding lines in each text is striking. Avicenna writes "Therefore the first does not have a quiddity...," while St. Thomas has "Therefore it is necessary that Gods existence be his quiddity." Once again we see different extensions of this term, "quiddity," as it is used by both authors. For Avicenna, a quiddity is, by definition, something apart from "anity" and existence. For Aquinas, quiddity may be as broad a term as essence, and when there is no other essence than pure existence, as in God, then existence is his quiddity. Both authors can use almost exactly the same arguments, and yet arrive at conclusions which appear contradictory.

In the course of examining the text of Avicenna in Section B we have encountered the term *aniitas* no fewer than five times. It appeared twice previous to this section (#4 and #13). We have hesitated to use the term, preferring to use the abstract transliteration "anity." It is now opportune to investigate this curious term which plays such an important role in the argumentation. First we should discover the origin and meaning of the Latin *aniitas*. This will lead in turn to the investigation of the meaning of the Arabic term it translates in these passages, *'anniyya*. Finally, we should look at the text of St. Thomas to see if there are any indications of how he understood it.

There seems little doubt that *aniitas* is the correct reading in the Latin Avicenna. The manuscript tradition reveals the consternation of copyists, readers and editors in face of such a neologism. One manuscript "corrects" the term to *entitas*. Another reads *animalitas*! Yet another, along with the edition of 1508, reads *unitas*, as we have earlier mentioned.[45] The Lyon edition of Ockham's *Sentences* replaces the authentic reading with *esseitas*.[46] Evidently, the Latins were uneasy with the term which Gundissalinus used in Avicenna's *Metaphysics*. This was not the first use of the terms, however, for another Toledan translator must be given the credit for introducing the word into Latin philosophical vocabulary. S. M. Stern has drawn attention to the beginning of Isaac Israeli's *Liber de definitionibus* as translated by Gerard of Cremona. When treating of the four methodological questions, Israeli's text reads:

_VERAM CUM IPSI CONATI SUNT PERSCRUTARI DE DEFINICIONIBUS RERUM, INVENERUNT EUM INTERROGATIONES QUATUOR, AD QUA" DEFINICIONUM SCIENCIAM ABSQUE EIS NON PERVERNITUR; QUARUM_
una est *anitas*, sicut si dicas an est hoc et hoc; et secunda est *quidditas*, ac si dicas quid est hoc et hoc; et tercia est *qualitas*, sicut si dicas quale est hoc et hoc; et qarta est *quaritas* sicut si dicas quare est hoc et hoc.

Isaac Israeli's original text was written in Arabic of which a large fragment is still extant. Unfortunately, the beginning and the ending of the book is missing, including the passage cited above. Ordinarily the Aristotelian *et ēt ētā*, *an sit*, is expressed in Arabic by *hal huwa*. Stern conjectures, on the basis of a Hebrew translation, that the Arabic term underlying *anitas* was also a neologism, *haliyya*. [48] This term looked, and in fact was, quite similar to a more common term *huwiyya* often translated as ipseity. *Huwiyya* was frequently used synonymously with another Arabic term *'anniyya*, and so, via *huwiyya*, *anitas* came to be used as the translation of *'anniyya*. Stern concludes:

...the Latin term *anitas* which occurs for the first time in his passage of Israeli as translated by Gerard of Cremona, and in some translations of Gundissalinus ... is probably coined (by Gerard) to render *haliyya* and was also used (taken over by Gundissalinus ?) to render the synonymous *'anniyya*. (It is more likely that *anitas* is derived from *an est*, and is not an imitation of *'anniyya*. [49]

The Latin readers of these translations were able to sense the opposition of *an est* to *quid est* in the terms *anitas* and *quidditas*, and could have derived some semblance of meaning from them. They would not have been aware, of course, of the full subtlety which lay behind the Arabic term *'anniyya* and *māhiyya*. With the help of Mlle d'Alverny's article "Anniyya-Anitas" let us look into the origin, use and interpretation of *'anniyya* as contemporary Arabic scholarship sees it.

Merely from our own experience with *anitas* in the text of the Latin Avicenna we can perceive that it is a notion clearly distinct from *quidditas*. The necessary being, according to Avicenna, does not have a quiddity but only an "anity," *anitas* (#4,13). *Anitas*, in this case, is simply the fact that it is necessary being. All other beings have a quiddity that is distinct from their *anitas* and are caused (#14). *Anitas* however seems also to be distinct in some way from the notion of existence, *esse* (Arabic: *wujūd*), although it is closely related to *esse* and not opposed to it: e.g., "Tu autem iam nosti ex anitate et esse non constat quidditas," (#15) and "tunc erit hoc quod anitas in suo esse sequetur esse," (#17). The main disjunction of alternatives in the argument of Section B has as its compound subject the two notions of *anitas* and *esse* (#16). We have seen, too, that in the argumentation that follows this disjunction, their meaning is so close that they can almost be used interchangeably. From the usage in this chapter, then, we can conclude that *anitas* (and the Arabic *'anniyya* which underlies it) stands in clear opposition to *quidditas*, and that, although notionally distinct from *esse*, it is closely related to and implicated with existence.

The Arabic scholars have shown considerable interest in *'anniyya*, for it is of far more philosophical importance and is used far more frequently in Arabic philosophy than *anitas* in Latin philosophy. There are a variety of suggested etymologies. Some, inspired by its usage in mystical writings have sought to trace its origin to the personal pronoun of the first person, *ānā*, "I." By the addition of the abstract suffix -*iyya* there would result *'anniyya* meaning "I-ness."[50] Most
reject this etymology on grammatical grounds, but there are examples of the use of this word which demand that its meaning tend in this direction. Avicenna’s famous thought-experiment of the suspended man in the De Anima concludes at one point with the remark that, under the given conditions, a man would know "the existence of his 'anniyya as one something ...."[51]

The most commonly accepted etymology of 'anniyya derives the term from the conjunction 'an or 'anna meaning “that,” equivalent to the Greek ὁτι. The abstract term would then reran "that-ness," the fact that a thing is. It strongly connotes an existential significance. Just as the Aristotelian τὸ ὁτι is opposed to the τὸ τὸ ἔστιν in the crucial passage of the Posterior Analytics, II, 1, generally agreed to be one of the primary sources of the development of the "real distinction between essence and existence in both Arabic and Latin thought, so 'anniyya is opposed to nāhiyya Tj. de Boer and F. van den Bergg support this theory in their articles in the Encyclopaedia of Islam.[53] S. Munk, commenting on the use of the term in Ibn Gabirol's Fons Vitae writes: "Littéralement: L'être (ou l'existence) qu'on appelle en arabe ANNIYYA. Ce terme désigne la pure existence;.."[54] To say that 'anniyya means simply existence is to recognize no distinction between it and the usual term for existence, wujūd. Not all agree with this equivalence.

Etymology, however useful, cannot determine the significance of a word in actual usage. Another group of scholars have taken up the task of examining the occurrence of this word in Arabic philosophical literature, seeing in this method the only sure way of determining its meaning. Notable among this group are L. Massignon, A.-M. Goichon, and M. Alonso. Massignon, in studying the mystical and philosophical writings has concluded by rejecting "that-ness" (Munk's quoddité) as a rendition of 'anniyya in favor of a term that preserves the sense of presence and individuality, hecceité.[55] Mlle Goichon once preferred haecceité and gave several definitions which strongly emphasized the essential aspect of 'anniyya. She listed it, along with māhiyya and huwiyya as one of the ten words expressing the essence.[56] It could mean "le sujet reel mais considérée cependant sous l'angle de l'abstraction," or "un essence individuelle en tant qu'elle est."[57] In a work later than her masterful La distinction de l'essence et l'existence she seems to prefer the ambiguous term être as a rendering of an equally ambiguous 'anniyya.[58] Fr. Alonso has done extensive research into the Greek terms which underlay the use of 'anniyya in the Arabic translations of Aristotle. In the Arabic Version of Aristotle's Metaphysics which accompanies the commentary of Averroes, for example, 'anniyya is the term used, in the vast majority of cases, to render the Greek τὸ τὸ ἕν ἐνα. The Latin translator of the 1560 edition uses essentia 138 times for this term.[59] Clearly, this proves the 'anniyya is not precisely existence. It would be distinguished from māhiyya, quiddity, not as existence is distinguished from essence, but as an existing, realized, individualized essence is distinguished from an abstract, remote, generalized essence. Evidence along this line shatters any simplistic interpretation which would make 'anniyya the equivalent of pure existence.

No single definition, it seems, can adequately render the meaning of 'anniyya. Mlle d'Alverny suggests that it was a rather flexible term, yielding to the demands of its context.[60] Conceived in the age when Greek philosophical abstractions were passing into the Arabic language, it was one of a number of terms which bore, even in the new, language, the inherited tensions of Platonism and Aristotelianism. At times, when 'anniyya was used in the sense of an existential
affirmation, as when it translated the Greek conjunction ὅτι or the verb ἐίναι, it revealed the Aristotelian background of the Posterior Analytics. So it is found in those authors who use it in discussing the four questions, or contrast it with mahiyya as in the theological dictum: About God, one can know only that he is, not what he is (his 'anniyya, not his mahiyya).

At other times the meaning of 'anniyya is more "essential" than "existential." It is used to translate the Platonic category, ὀν, as well as the Aristotelian ὅτι ἐίναι and ὅτι ἐίναι where it would mean "being, substantive, either the concrete existant, or the particular essence, or the archetypal idea according as the author is inspired by the Aristotelian or Platonic tradition."[61] In either case, whether its meaning is shaded towards the existential or towards the essential, 'anniyya cannot be equated with pure essence (dāt) or pure quiddity (māhiyya) or pure existence (wujūd). Such ambiguity, depending upon one's point of view, can be considered as richness or as imperfection. Gundissalinus' translation of Avicenna's Metaphysics uses anitas for this term, but other Latin translations from Arabic show a bewildering variety of forms: esse, esse suppositale, entitas, quia est, quid est, essentia, quidditas, quale quid, quale esse, esseitas and even the simple transcription alania. Attempts to find an equivalent in modern languages labor under the same difficulty: l'être, l'existence, quoddité, haecceité, le "que", die Daseinheit, der Individualität, being, identity, I-ness. Such confusion precludes any utterly definite conclusions. If we must summarize the results of our inquiry, they can be listed as follows:

1. The Latin anitas seems to have been coined by Gerard of Cremona to express that reality which answers to the methodological question an est.
2. It was subsequently, although rather infrequently, used to translate the Arabic term 'anniyya, as in Gundissalinus' version of Avicenna's Metaphysics.
3. 'Anniyya, of frequent use in Arabic philosophical texts, is probably derived from the conjunction 'an meaning "that," although other influences are possible.
4. 'Anniyya is used with both existential and essential shades of meaning.
5. Its best rendering would be: the individual essence, considered as existent.
6. In the Metaphysics of Avicenna it carries strong existential overtones in contrast with mahiyya although it is not precisely equivalent to existence (wujūd).

With a better understanding of anitas and 'anniyya we may now turn our attention to the text of St. Thomas in order to see whether these notions are reflected therein.

St. Thomas never uses the term anitas. In Section B we see that Avicenna's quidditas is roughly paralleled by Aquinas' essentia or quidditas. Esse also appears in both texts with a similar function and meaning. Wherever Avicenna's disjunction of the two possible alternatives whereby the concomitants may accompany the quiddity has as its subject both anitas and esse, St. Thomas' disjunction deals simply with esse. Aquinas inserts the example of unity which may reflect one of the variant readings of anitas in the manuscript tradition. From the evidence in this section, it is premature to say that he simply equated anitas with esse. Even Avicenna found it possible to formulate his responses in #17 and #18 without always mentioning anitas along with esse. There is no positive evidence, then, that St. Thomas simply equated the two. Enough latitude is present in the argumentation of the source-text to justify its incorporation into the Summa contra gentiles with only esse in mind. The only sharp contrast between the two authors lies in the formulation of their thesis. Avicenna maintains that a quidditas--anitas distinction bespeaks causality. Aquinas
argues that any essence which has something added, of which esse is only an instance, implies causality. This contrast is not explicit enough to demand the conclusion that, for him, anitas means esse. If we are to be persuaded that this is his position, further evidence must be forthcoming.

NOTES

40. See Appendix I, p. 130, n. 29.

41. A possible reference to *Metaphysica*, V. 6; fº 900, B.

42. Goichon, *La distinction*, pp. 111-121.


44. See Appendix I, nn. 8, 29, 31, 32, 36, 37, 49.


46. Ockham, *In I Sententiarum*, d. 8, q. 4; *Opera plurima* (Lyon, 1494-1496), Vol. III, no p., letter M.


49. Ibid., parentheses by the author.


51. Ibid., p. 84, n. 102.

52. Ibid., p. 60.


58. Ibid., p. 66.


60. d'Alverny, "Anniyya-Anitas," p. 73.

61. Ibid., pp. 73-74.
The Avicennian texts we have studied up to this point have been those which argued for the ultimate simplicity of the first or necessary being. The term "simplicity" does not appear, but this doctrine is clearly what is at stake. No composition can be admitted in God, neither the composition of essential constituents such as necessity with a quiddity (Section A), nor the composition of concomitants such as that of *esse* and "anity" with the quiddity (Section B). In the remaining paragraphs of chapter four, Avicenna elaborates some of the immediate consequences of such simplicity. In a loose sense these conclusions can be considered to be divine attributes although they are not attributes in the sense that perfection, goodness, truth and knowledge are attributes in chapter six.[62] It is better, perhaps, to designate the remaining conclusions of chapter four as corollaries to the main thesis. They seem to fall into three divisions. First of all, Avicenna distinguishes precisely the unique purity of the divine being from the abstract, common concept of being (Section C). Secondly, he shows how the logical notions of genus, difference, definition and demonstration do not apply to the first being (Section D). Finally, in the concluding paragraphs of chapter four, Avicenna excludes God from the particular genus of substance by clarifying the definition of the latter (Section E).

The text of St. Thomas which we have placed parallel to the Avicennian text in Section C is taken from chapter twenty-six of the first book of the *SCG*. It will soon be evident that this Thomistic passage does not show the same type of detailed dependence upon its source as found in the other sections. There is, nevertheless, a true community of interest and a remarkable similarity of solutions which justifies our comparison. We believe dependence can be shown. Moreover, by including this section (Section C) in our study, we are able to maintain the literal continuity of the source-text.
19. Igitur ne est esse expoliatum conditione negandi privationes et caeteras proprietates ab eo. Deinde caetera alia quae habent quidditates sunt possibilia, quia habent esse per ipsum.

20. Intentio autem de hoc good dicimus quod ipse est esse expoliatum conditione negandi caeteras additiones ab eo, non est quod ipse sit esse expoliatum in quo communicet aliquid aliud esse.

Si fuerit esse cuius haec sit proprietas, ipse enim non est illud enim expoliatum conditione negandi, sed est ens non conditione affirmandi; scilicet de primo quod est ens cum conditione non addendi cow positionem. Set hoc aliud est ens non conditione additionis. Et VU illud fuit universale quod praedicatur de omni re, istud vero non praedicatur de eo in quo est addendo. Ideo in omni quod est praeter illud, est addendo.

247. Secundum quod eos in hunc errorem promovit, est rationis defectus.

a) Quia enim id quod commune est per additionem specificatur vel individuatur, aestimaverunt divinum esse,oui nulla fit additio, non esse aliquod esse proprium, sed esse commune omnium; non considerantes quod id quod commune est vel universale sine additione esse non potest, sed sine additione consideratur: non enim animal potest esse absque rationali vel irrationali differentia, quamvis absque his differentis cogitetur. Licet etiam cogitetur universale absque additione, non tamen absque receptibilitate ad-ditionis; nam si animali nulla differentia addi posset, genus non esset; et similiter est de omnibus alis nominibus.

b) Divinum autem esse est absque additione non solum in cogitatione, sed etiam in rerum natura: nec solum, absque additione, sed etiam absque receptibilitate additionis. Unde ex hoc ipso quod additionem, non recipit nec re-cipere potest, magis concludi potest quod Deus non sit esse commune, sed proprium: etiam ex hoc ipso suum esse ab omnibus alis distinguitur quod nihil ei addi potest.

Following our usual methodology, let us first try to understand the text of the source, and then we can examine St. Thomas' text, looking for signs of dependence as well as differences.

The flow of thought in Avicenna's text moves easily from the elaborate dialectic of the basic arguments to the discussion of the corollaries to the main thesis. In the first paragraph of this section (#19) he presents a new description of the divine being. The "First" is "stripped being (esse expoliatum) with the condition of denying privations and other properties of it." All other beings, having quiddities, are possibles because they have their existence through the first being. By designating God as "stripped being" Avicenna creates
the possibility of confusing this being with the abstract notion of being, predicative of all beings. Thus he is led to make perfectly clear the distinction which obtains between the purity of the divine being and the deliberate obscurity of the notion of common being.

The term expoliatum which precipitates the possible confusion, and which we have translated as "stripped," is Gundissalinus' translation of the Arabic participle mujarrad. Mlle Goichon renders the Arabic term as abstrait, séparée. It is the term used to translate the very important Greek notion of χωριστός. In Platonic thought it refers to the separate state of the Ideas. Aristotle, especially in Metaphysics, XIII (M), witnesses this usage. For Avicenna to introduce this term into his own discussion of the absolute simplicity and "apartness" of God is not at all surprising. Modern language translations of Avicenna's Metaphysics from the Arabic have tended to interpret the term in a less privative way than suggested by the Latin. Anawati uses "l'existence pure," while Horton reads "das reine Sein." Earlier in our study we have seen how William of Auvergne in the thirteenth century seemed to have been influenced by expoliatum when he referred to the divine being as spoliatissimum. He later exploited the correlative notion vestitum as an apt metaphor for created being.

To obviate the difficulty of confusing divine being with common being Nice proceeds to distinguish them in explicit terms. "the meaning of our saying, that he is 'stripped being with the condition of denying all other additions of him,' is not that he is stripped being in which some other being communicates." In this statement, the modern language translations of the original render the second "stripped being" in a fashion which suggests that the Arabic is not exactly identical with the earlier instances (l'existence absolue, das Sein im absoluten Sinne). They also read the plural, "beings," instead of the singular aliquid aliud esse. The Latin text, by using esse expoliatum to express common being as well as the divine being, sets the stage for a sharp contrast of differences. This Avicenna achieves through a subtle use of negation.

The being which is participated by other beings is not "stripped being with the condition of denying, but it is being without the condition of affirming." The "First," for example, is the being with the condition of non-composition. The other being, common being, is simply being without the condition of addition, and thus it is the universal which is predicatable of all things. The former being, the divine being, cannot be predicated of anything in which it would exist with some kind of an addition. Although common being is defined as being without addition, it is found in everything, except in the first being as existing in the manner of having some addition to it.

Avicenna's exposition of the differences between the divine being and common being is somewhat confusing in the way that it shifts back and forth from one notion to the other. For the sake of clarity allow us to gather together first the expressions he uses in describing divine being, and then those used of common being.
Divine being:

esse expoliatum conditione negandi privationes et caeteras proprietates ab eo,
esse expoliatum conditione negandi caeteras additiones ab eo,
ens expoliatum conditione negandi,
ens cum conditione non addendi compositionem,
non praedicatur de eo in quo est addendo.

Common being:

esse expoliatum in quo communicet aliquid aliud esse,
ens non conditione affirmandi,
ens non conditione additionis,
universale, quod praedicatur de omni re.

In this scheme it is evident that the essential distinction between these two notions is the fact that whereas the divine being must always be understood with the condition of the denial of all particular additions, common being is understood in an abstract fashion, i.e., without the condition of affirming or adding any specifying notes. Common being always exists with additions. Its conceptualization is possible only when we abstract from these additions. The subtlety of a distinction between "the condition of denying" and "without the condition of affirming" must have been somewhat puzzling to the Latins whose negative theology had not the development nor the tradition found in Arabic thought. Moses Maimonides (d. 1204) knew the work of Avicenna and seems to have reflected it in his explanation of the divine attributes by means of his theory of the negation of privations.[70]

It is not possible in this section, Section C, to compile a list of detailed parallels between the text of Avicenna and that of St. Thomas. Although there is a similarity of aim in both passages, there is no common structure. Even the language of each exposition is different with the exception of the one common term, additio. Both authors, however, agree in their purpose, to attempt to distinguish the uniquely positive purity of the divine being from the abstract purity of common being.

In chapter twenty-six of the SCG St. Thomas poses the question: Whether God is the formal being (esse formale) of all things? In the previous chapter (ch. 25), from which we shall take our texts for Sections D and E, he has dealt with the problem of God's being in a genus. By esse formale St. Thomas means the act of existence, for he dedicates the subsequent chapter (ch. 27) to the possibility of God's being the form of something. By establishing the fact that God is in no way to be identified with the existential aspect of contingent beings, Aquinas certifies the divine uniqueness and escapes the pitfalls of pantheism. Six different arguments (#238-#243) are presented in this regard. In the paragraph numbered #244, at a point about half-way through the chapter he introduces so the scriptural texts to support his position. According to the procedure of the first part of the SCG this scriptural argument should conclude the chapter, but this is not so in chapter twenty-six. The latter half of the chapter consists of an analysis of four causes which have
led to this particular error. He first lists these causes and then proceeds, to explain each one in turn. They are: 1) a distorted understanding of theological authorities, i.e., Dionysius' remark that God is the esse omnium; 2) defective reasoning; 3) misuse of the notion of simplicity; 4) misunderstanding of the divine immanence. It is his second cause of error, explained in #247, which we have juxtaposed to the Avicennian text.

The Thomistic explanation of the difference between the divine being and common being is more systematic and more coherent than that of Avicenna. It is more systematic in that the two notions are explained in paragraphs appropriately allotted to each, the first to common being (a), the second to divine being (b). It is more coherent in that St. Thomas, in both cases, uses the disjunctions thought vs. reality and addition vs. receptibility of addition to explain the two notions. "For, since that which is common is specified or individuated through addition, they thought that the divine being, which receives no addition, was not the proper being but the common being of all things. They ignored the fact that what is common or universal cannot exist without addition, but is considered without addition."[71] St. Thomas makes explicit in this last statement what was only implicit in Avicenna, the fact that common being exists as common only in thought. He exemplifies his point with the notions of animal, irrationale and rationale. The genus animal, of itself, is without either specific difference, but it must have the receptivity for specific differences or it could not be a genus, nor could it exist in reality.

The divine being is without addition not only in thought but also in reality. Moreover it has no receptivity for addition. It is thus not something common but rather something proper and distinct and is distinguished from all other being in that nothing can be added to it. Let us schematize the

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Esse comنمو, universale} & \quad \text{cogitatur} \\
\text{esse divinum, proprium} & \quad \text{absque additio}nibus, \\
\text{sed non potest esse} & \quad \text{non absque receptibilitate} \\
\text{et potest esse in} & \quad \text{additionis.} \\
\text{rerum natura} & \quad \text{et etiam absque recepti} \\
\end{align*}
\]

Thomistic distinction between the two notions:

St. Thomas does not employ, the Avicennian expoliatum in this paragraph although he has used the term in #241 earlier fn this chapter with reference to intellectual abstraction: "...intellectus apprehendit formam animalis expoliatum ab omnibus individuantibus et specificantibus." Neither does he invoke the, Avicennian term conditio so frequent in the source
text. In his commentary on I Sent., d.8, q.4. a.1, ad 1m and 2m he has a much closer paraphrase of this source in which, for example, he describes the divine being as "aliquid determinatum per conditionem negandi ab ipso omnem additionem," (ad 2m). Since we are concerned primarily with the SCG we can only refer the interested reader to this place.

NOTES


63. Goichon, Lexique, p. 38, n. 89.

64. Goichon, Vocabulaires comparés, p. 5.

65. Ch. 4, 1078 b 31.


68. William of Auvergne, *De Trinitate*, ch. 3; *ed. cit.*, p. 4 a.


Section D

The texts in this section, Section D, argue that God cannot be in any genus, or, as Avicenna puts it: "The First does not have a genus." The doctrine in Section C, that the divine being is distinct from common being, can be understood as a rejection of the proposition that God is the most universal "genus" itself, common being, although both authors would deny that being could be a genus in the strict sense. If God is not in any genus, it easily follows that he does not have any specific difference, and consequently no definition and demonstration via definition.

Avicenna's text is extremely concise; befitting the purpose of this passage, to spell out some immediate corollaries to the main thesis of the chapter. The text of St. Thomas is drawn from chapter twenty-five of the first book of the SCG entitled: "That God is not in some genus." He devoted the preceding chapter (c. 24) to the task of showing that God cannot be some genus by arguing "that the divine being cannot be specified by the addition of some substantial difference." In chapter twenty-five he offers four arguments which directly conclude that God is not in any genus (#228, #229, #230 and #231). After an explanatory paragraph (#232) which recounts the Aristotelian argument that being (ens) is not a genus, he adds the further conclusions that God has no definition and no a priori demonstration (#233-234). The remaining half of the chapter is devoted to the special question regarding substance and its meaning in respect to God. This will be studied in Section E. For our comparisons in Section D we have chosen to transcribe the third and fourth arguments of chapter twenty-five along with the complimentary material up to the treatment of substance.

<table>
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<td>21. Primus etiam non habet genus. Primus enim non habet quidditatem; sed quod non habet quidditatem non habet genus: Genus enim respondetur ad interrogationem: per quid est?</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Genus etiam aliquo modo pars est rei. Certificatum est quod primus non est compositus.</td>
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Item intentio generis non potest esse quin vel sit necesse esse, et tune non cessabit quousque sit ibi differentia, vel non sit necesse esse, sed sit constituens ipsum necesse esse, et tune necesse esse erit constitutum ab eo quod non est necesse esse, quod est inconveniens. Primus igitur non habet genus.

232. Quod autem ens non possit esse genus, probatur per PHILOSOPHUM in hunc modum. Si ens esset genus, oporteret differentiam aliquam inveniri per quam traheretur ad speciem. Nulla autem differentia participat genus, ita scilicet quod genus sit in ratione differentiae, quia sic genus ponetur bis in definitione speciei: sed oportet differentiam esse praeter id quod intelligitur in ratione generis. Nihil autem potest esse quod sit praeter id quod intelligitur per ens, si ens sit de intellectu eorum de quibus praedicatur. Et sic per nullam differentiam contrahi potest. Relinquitur igitur quod ens non sit genus. Unde ex hoc de necessitate concluditur quod Deus non sit in genere.

22. Et ideo non habet differentiam; quid non habet genus, non habet differentiam; ideo non habet definitionem,

nec fit demonstratio de eo, quia ipse non habet causam. Similiter non quaeritur de eo quare. Tu enim scies postea quod eius actio non habet quare.

233. Ex quo etiam patet quod cus definiri non potest; quia omnis definitio est ex genere et differentiis.

234. Patet etiam quod non potest demonstratio de ipso fieri, nisi per effectum: quia principium demonstrationis est definitio eius de quo fit demonstratio.

Avicenna's text presents three brief arguments why the "First" cannot have a genus. The initial argument simply states that whatever does not have a quiddity cannot have a genus. The genus of anything is the answer to the question: What is it? In Arabic, "what it is" is signified by 

This is the masculine form. of 

The second argument is the most concise of all. The genus is, in a certain sense, a part of the thing. It has been proved that God has no parts and is not a composite. He cannot, then, have a genus. In spite of the extreme brevity of this argument, its essential elements would play a significant part in Latin scholasticism after St. Thomas. Duns Scotus quoted this text in support of the divine simplicity and saw in it some foundation for his doctrine of common natures. For him, the Avicennian argument from the "partiality of genus" indicated that the genus was never without some partial reality in the species. Ockham, in rejecting Scotus, was forced to offer his own interpretation of the argument. He held that this passage in Avicenna meant that genus, as equivalent to quiddity, was a part not of the essence but of the whole composite of quiddity and
"anity." In spite of Ockham's rejection of the real distinction, he took pains to paraphrase the basic arguments of this chapter of the *Metaphysics* of Avicenna in order to counter the use of it which Scotus had made.[74] Thus the argument from the "partiality of genus" occasioned a fourteenth-century testimony to the significance, if not the validity of the text we are studying.

The third argument in Avicenna's text is in the familiar form of a *reductio*. If the first being were to have some genus, this genus would have to be either necessary being, or something which is not necessary being. In the former case, the essential completeness of the genus would not be achieved until some specific difference was present. Avicenna does not detail the impossibility of this situation in chapter four, but there is an extensive treatment of such an impossibility in the following chapter. The other alternative is that the genus of the first being would be something which is not necessary being. In that case, necessary being would be constituted out of that which is not necessary, namely its generic aspect. The unsuitability of this alternative has already been elaborated in the main argumentation of this chapter. With both alternatives found to be undeniable, the argument concludes that the "First, therefore does not have a genus."

In rapid succession further consequences are spelled out. The first being does not have a specific difference because it does not have a genus. The basis of this conclusion is simply the correlative nature of these two logical categories. Without the elements of definition, there can be no definition. Having no prior cause, the absolutely first and necessary being cannot be the subject of a proper scientific demonstration. One cannot ask of this being its reason why. "You will come to know later that its action does not have a 'why.'"

Although there are some notable differences between the text of Avicenna and the text of St. Thomas, the following similarities are evident:

1. Both texts note the correspondence of genus to *quid est*: Av.#20 genus enim...; Aq.#230 quia de omnibus ..., and #231 genus enim praedicatur ...
2. On this basis both texts reject the possibility of God being in a genus: Av.#20; Q.#231.
3. Both texts exclude specific difference from God (although the respective argumentation is not similar): Av.#21; Aq.#232.
4. Both texts exclude definition: Av.#21; Aq.#233.
5. Both texts exclude (a priori) demonstrations of God: Av.#21; Aq.#234.

When we examine the text of St. Thomas presented in Section D we encounter first the argument in #230. It seems to be profoundly Avicennian in nature although no immediate and evident parallel text is evident. The argument that "whatever is in a genus differs according to its being or existence from other things in the same genus," with the result that "the being or existence of whatever exists in a genus is outside of the quiddity of that genus," occurs frequently in the writings of St. Thomas. It is sometimes identified as Avicennian by an explicit ascription. We believe and hope to show, that it is derived from the doctrine of this chapter in the *Metaphysics*. For the moment, however, let us continue with the analysis of the Thomistic texts that are clearly parallel to the source-text. Later we shall return to the question of the origin of the argumentation in #230.
St. Thomas' argument in #231 agrees with Avicenna in its basic principle, the identification of genus with the *quid est* of a thing. For Avicenna, however, God does not have any quiddity or *quid est*. The conclusion is immediate. If there is no quiddity in God, then he cannot have any genus. The matter is more complex in St. Thomas, who, as we have seen, does not exclude quiddity from God but identifies quiddity with the divine being or existence. A further step is necessary in this case, for if the divine quiddity is *esse* or *ens*, could not *ens* be a genus for God?

The following paragraph, #232, recounts the Aristotelian argument which shows that being (and unity) cannot be a genus on the grounds that no adequate difference can be found outside of the scope of this "genus," a condition required for a true difference. This doctrine was a scholastic commonplace and Avicenna himself would have agreed with it. The fact that St. Thomas saw fit to interpolate this element of direct Aristotelianism in order to complete his own discussion indicates a slightly different approach from that of his Avicennian source. In St. Thomas, as we have frequently noted, God is said to have a quiddity, and that quiddity is his very existence. There seems to be no reflection in the text of St. Thomas of the second and third Avicennian arguments, that genus is a part of a thing, and that necessary being cannot be the genus. Avicenna, it would seem, had no reason to suggest the possibility that God's genus could be being rather than necessary being. He had already dealt with this question in the previous section where he distinguished *esse commune* from the divine being. St. Thomas does not take up the Avicennian discussion of necessary being as a possible genus. The Aristotelian argument excluding being itself as a genus is deemed sufficient.

Having settled the question of genus with respect to God by means of the demonstration that no difference is possible for the genus *ens*, St. Thomas moves on to the exclusion of the other logical functions, definition and demonstration. Avicenna had seen fit to exclude by separate and distinct statements, difference, definition and demonstration from God. In this place, St. Thomas explicitly treats of only the last two. In other works of his, as we shall see, this Avicennian passage excluding difference, definition and demonstration is more adequately reproduced, and it is usually situated between an argument similar to that in #230, and a consideration of substance like that of Section E.[75] St. Thomas here, and elsewhere, qualifies the conclusion about the indemonstrability of God by explicitly making an exception for demonstrations *a posteriori*, demonstrations of the fact from effects to cause.

Let us now return to the Thomistic argument formulated in #230 in order both to understand it and to trace its origins. First we must understand it as it is found in the *SCG*. Next, in order to show its importance in the philosophy of St. Thomas we will note its frequent occurrence in other works of his. Finally we will try to determine its source.

The argument itself begins with two propositions both of which explain certain properties of beings existing in a genus. The first proposition states: "Whatever is in a genus differs with respect to existence (esse) and from others which are in the same genus." The operative terms in this statement are *secundum esse differt*. It is crucial to appreciate exactly what is meant by the verbs *est* and *sunt* (Whatever *is* ... others which *are* ...), for it is one thing to formulate a principle
about notions in the abstract, e.g., "Whatever notion is included in the notion of a genus," and quite another thing to speak about existent realities, e.g., "Whatever concrete reality exists and is capable of generic classification ...." We believe that the principle should be taken in the latter sense, for the conclusion *secundum esse differt* definitely signifies the existential order. St. Thomas offers a reason for this principle: "Otherwise the genus would not be predicated of many things." A genus is predicable of species and of individuals. In the former case "difference according to being" would refer to the essential or specific difference. If the "many things" of which a genus is predicable are understood to be many existing individuals, then the *esse* which is directly and immediately involved in their differences is the very act of existing. This, we believe, is the most consistent interpretation of these principles.

St. Thomas' argument continues with the proposition: "But all things that are in the same genus must agree with respect to the quiddity of the genus, because the genus is predicated of all of them in terms of what they are (in quod quid est)." With these principles before him, St. Thomas formulates a statement embracing both truths: "Therefore the being (esse) of whatever is existing in a genus is outside of (praeter) the quiddity of the genus." This situation is impossible at the level of the divinity, whose essence or quiddity is the same as his existence. God, therefore does not belong to the class of things which are in a genus. The existential signif-icance of the premise about God should be obvious in the context of chapter twenty-five of the *SCG*, following as it does the chapter which especially established the existential nature of the divine being (c. 22).

The argument proving that God is not in a genus on the basis of the distinction between quiddity and *esse* in things contained in a genus is an important constant in St. Thomas' philosophical thought. We shall now list the occurrences of this principle in order to demonstrate its importance and to be able to examine more closely the exact phraseology in each case. This will aid us in tracing its source. As will soon be evident, St. Thomas' formulation of this argument and especially its basic principle is so frequent and so regular that we may be justified in calling it a Thomistic dictum. Our list of texts is arranged in approximate chronological order with the *SCG* placed late according to Marc's thesis. Major instances will be transcribed at greater length.

1. *De ente et essentia*, c. 5:

   ... et ideo inveniuntur aliqui philosophi dicentes quod Deus non habet quiditatem vel essentiam quia essentia sua non est aliud quam esse sum. Et ex hoc sequitur quod ipse non sit in genere, quia omne quod est in genere oportet quod habeat quiditatem preter esse sum, cum quidditas vel natura generis aut speciei non distinguatur secundum rationem nature in illis quorum est genus vel species, set esse diversum est in diversis (Ed. Roland-Gosselin, p.37).

2. *I Sent.*, d. 8, q. 4, a. 2, sol.:

   Tertia ratio subtilior est Avicennae, tract. V *Metaph.*, cap, iv, tract. IX, cap. i. Omne quod est in genere, habet quidditatem differentem ab esse, sicut homo; humanitati enim ex hoc quod est humanitas, non debetur esse in actu; potest enim cogitari humanitas et tamen ignorari an aliquis homo sit. Et ratio huius est, quia commune, quod praedicatur de his quae sunt in.
genere, praedicat quidditatem, cum genus et species praedicentur in eo quod quid est. Illi autem quidditati non debetur esse nisi per hoc quod suscepta est in hoc vel in illo. Et ideo quidditas generis vel speciei non communicatur secundum unum esse omnibus, sed solum secundum unam rationem communem. Unde constat quod esse suum non est quidditas sua. In Deo autem esse suum est quidditas sua; aliter eni accideret quidditati, et ita esset acquisitum sibi ab alio, et non haberet esse per essentiam sum. Et ideo Deo non potest esse in aliquo genere (Ed. Mandonnet, I, 222).

3. *I Sent.*, d. 19 q. 4, a. 2, sol.:

   Respondeo dicendum quod in divinis non potest esse universale et particulare. Et huius ratio potest quadruplex assignari: primo, quia, secundum Avicennam II parte *Logicae*, cap. ii, ubicumque est genus et species, oportet esse quidditatem differentem a suo esse, ut prius dictum est; et hoc in divinis non competit.(Ed. Mandonnet, I, 483).

4. *II Sent.*, d. 3, q. 1, a. 1, ad 1m:

   ... unde non oportet illud quod est in praedicamento substantiae habere quidditatem compositam, sed oportet quod habeat compositionem quidditatis et esse; omne enim quod est in genere suae quidditatis non est suum esse, ut Avicenna *Met.*, tract VII, c. iv, etc., dicit. Et ideo non potest Deus in praedicamento substantiae poni (Ed. Mandonnet, II, 88).

5. *II Sent.*, d. 3, q. 1, a. 5, sol.:

   Respondeo dicendum quod secundum Avicennam, ubi supra, omne id quod habet esse aliud a sua quidditate, oportet quod sit in genere (Ed. Mandonnet, II, 99).

6. *III Sent.*, d. 11, a. 2, ad 2m (in 1/2 of mss. and in eds.):

   Esse autem non est genus nec inducitur in significatione alicuius generis, ut dicit Avicenna, cum ea quae sunt in uno genere non conveniant in uno esse, sed in natura communi (Ed. Moos, III, 364).

7. *Expositio super librum Boethii de Trinitate*, q. 6, a. 3, c.:

   Hoc autem non potest esse per cognitionem alicuius generis proximi vel remoti eo quod deus in nullo genere est, cum non habet quod quid est aliud a suo esse, quod requiritur in omnibus generibus, ut Avicenna dicit (Ed. Decker, p. 222).

8. *De potentia*, q. 7, a. 3:

   ... nihil ponitur in genere secundum esse suum, sed ratione quidditatis suae; quod ex hoc patet, quia esse uniucuiusque est ei proprium, et distinctum ab esse cuiuslibet alterius rei; sed

9. Summa contra gentiles, I, ch. 25:


10. Summa theologiae, I, q. 3, a. 5:

   Tertio, quia omnia quae sunt in genere uno, communicant in quidditate vel essentiae generis, quod praedicatur de eis in eo quod quid est. Differunt autem secundum esse: non enim idem est esse hominis et equi, nec huius hominis et illius hominis. Et sic oportet quod quaecumque sunt in genere, differant in eis esse et quod quid est, idest essentia. In Deo autem non differet, ut ostensum est. Unde manifestum est quod Deus non est in genere sicut species (Ed. Leonine, IV, ").

11. Compendium theologiae, ch. 13:

   ... ex genere enim habetur quid est res, non autem esse (Ed. Parma, XVI, 3).

A cursory examination of these texts makes it apparent that the formulation of the principle under investigation is usually somewhat different from the way it appears in the SCG. The most typical phrasings of this dictum are found in the De ente et essentia and in the first text from the Sentences both of which begin: "Omne quod est in genere ...." The scope of the subject, however, seems to be wider than simply "all those which are in a genus." Text #3 begins, "Ubicumque est genus et species," and from the explanations in other places it becomes evident that the quiddity which is common to many is either the generic quiddity or the specific quiddity. Text #1 has, "cum quiditas vel natura generis aut speciei." Text #2 cites the example of humanitas, a specific quiddity. Test #10 reads "non enim idem est esse hominis et equi, nec huius hominis et illius hominis," wherein a difference is found between two beings either specifically or individually different. With this in mind we are led to the conclusion that the esse spoken of in the dictum is the act of existence. The principle bears upon the distinction between quiddity and actual existence, and it is in this sense that it is applied to the minor premise about the identity of essence and existence in God.

In the various formulae of the dictum, the term praeter occurs twice, once in the De ente (#1) and once in our text from the SCG (#9). Twice we find this same idea expressed by differentem ab (#2,#3), and twice by aliud a (#4,#7). Quidditas is usually used but there are variations, e.g., quod quid est (#7,#10) and quid est res (#11). All the examples concur in the use of esse.

Six of the texts attribute the dictum explicitly to Avicenna, five of which are found in the Sentences (#2-#6). The sixth explicit citation is from the commentary on Boethius (#7). In the
first text, that of the *De ente*, the dictum is placed in a context which alludes to Avicenna. The *aliqui philosophi* spoken of in this place are identified in *I Sent.*, d. 2, q. 1, a. 3, sol., as Avicenna and Moses Maimonides.[76] In three of the five texts from the Sentences (#2,#3,#5) the Mandonnet edition includes detailed references to places in Avicenna, but no two of the four references agree. We shall examine these editorial efforts later. For the present it is sufficient to note that the dictum, "Omne quod est in genere..." is a significant element of Thomistic thought. From his earliest works to his latest and most definitive, St. Thomas used it prominently, varying the formula only accidentally and always approving of its probative force. It is interesting too to note that the explicit citations of Avicenna occur in the three earliest works, the *De ente* (c. 1256), the *Sentences* (1252-1256), and in the *Exposition on Boethius' De Trinitate* (c. 1256). The anonymity of the other texts is not suggestive of a rejection of such attribution, but rather of a tendency on the part of St. Thomas to suppress the name of a controversial author when citing his doctrine favorably.

The time has come to attempt to trace this Thomistic dictum to its Avicennian source. We can be confident of the fact that Avicenna, in some way, is the source. The question precisely is: How? The principle as found in St. Thomas has a conciseness which varies little in essentials. Can it be found literally in the Latin Avicenna, or is it there only implicitly? We shall begin our investigation by tracing the references given in the printed editions of the *Sentences*. Next we shall offer some other Avicennian texts in which various aspects of the dictum seem to be present. Finally we shall focus on the evidence of Thomistic context and offer our own theory as to the origin of the dictum.

The reference in text #3 to the *Logic* of Avicenna (II parte *Logicae*, cap. ii) directs us to his version of the *Isagoge*. It is the first of nine logical treatises in the *Shifa* and the only one widely known and used by the mediaeval Latins. The second part of this work consists of an analysis of similarities and differences between every possible combination of predicables. In the list of likenesses between genus and species the second item reads as follows: "Secunda est communitas generalis: scilicet unumquodque eorum est universale; et qui hanc communitatem assignent indicant quod haec communitas est generalis quam iterum repetit. Si autem hic aliter voluit accipi universale; tunc debet intelligi praeter universale absolutum scilicet quod est commune esse suorum singularium."[77] In this statement we find genus and species designated as universals in virtue of a generic community. There is also a mention made of the *esse* of singulars as somehow contrasted to this universality. However the *esse* is called the *commune esse*, and thus can hardly be seen as the *esse* of the Thomistic dictum which is treated almost as a differentiating factor. Although the context of this location in the *Logic* of Avicenna seemed promising as a source of our principle, none of its propositions definitely approximates it.

The references to the *Metaphysics* of Avicenna prove equally unenlightening. In Tract V, ch. 4, the subject of the discussion is the notion of genus, and precisely how certain notes which are outside of the notion of the genus are received by the genus. Differentiating notes are distinguished from non-differentiating notes, and the latter are identified simply as accidents. Further subdivisions of accidents into concomitant and non-concomitant yield a remarkable analysis of metaphysical composition but there is no clear evidence of any principle like "Omne
quod est in genere ...." Text #4 has a reference to *Metaphysics*, Tract VII, ch. 4, but there are my three chapters in this tract as we find it in the available editions. If VII should really read VIII then it would be a reference to the chapter with which our study is concerned. Finally, the reference of #2 to Tract IX, ch. 1, is probably to the initial part of this chapter where Avicenna summarizes his previous conclusions about the divine essence and attributes established in Tract VIII. There is simply a repetition of the earlier theses: the "First" has no quiddity, no genus, no difference, etc. Thus the editorial references to specific places in Avicenna's works given in the printed version of the *Sentences* are of little help, except for evoking the suspicion that *Meta.* , VII, 4 should really read *Meta.* , VIII, 4.

It is easy enough to find single elements of Avicenna's thought which parallel certain aspects of the Thomistic dictum and the argument that God cannot have a genus. In the first part of his *Logic*, Avicenna says of genus: "Ad ostendendum autem quid sit genus: non est necesse considerare aliquid horum, cum enim multa fuerint diversa in esse. Et deinde praedicatur de illis aliud tali praedicacione illud aliud erit genus. Debet autem intelligi hoc: quod dicimus de hac re, scilicet, quod praedicatur de multis ad interrogationem per quid."[78] Diversity in *esse* and predication according to the question *per quid* are integral parts of the doctrine we are investigating. Moreover, the example of "humanity" used by St. Thomas to explain his dictum in text #2 is frequent in Avicenna: "Dicemus ergo quod naturae hominis ex hoc quod est homo accidit ut habeat esse."[79] Nowhere, however, in the text of Avicenna have we been able to find these elements arranged in a manner so concise and so clear as is found in the Thomistic dictum, "Omne quod est in genere habet quidditatem praeter esse suum."

Since the direct method of locating the source has proved fruitless, perhaps a less direct method will yield better results. When we examined the principal instances of the dictum in the major works of St. Thomas (texts #1,#2,#8,#10), we were struck by the fact that the dictum and its argument appeared in contexts along with other passages which clearly reflected materials drawn from chapter four, Tract VIII of Avicenna's *Metaphysics*.[80] In text #1 from the *De ente* the dictum and its argument is followed immediately by a distinction of the divine being from the *esse universale* by which all things formally exist (cf. Section C). Text #2 from the *Sentences* is drawn from an article which follows a similar passage regarding the same distinction. Immediately following the response cited in text #2 there are passages explaining why God is not in the genus of substance (cf. Section E). The text from the *De potentia* is likewise preceded by a discussion similar to Section C, and is followed by a discussion of substance (Section E). Our whole study demonstrates the context of the instance in the *SCG*. The text from the *Summa theologiae* (#10) is immediately followed by a brief paragraph of conclusions proving that God has no difference, no definition and no demonstration (Section D). The answer to the first objection in this article treats of the notion of substance in a fashion identical with Section E. All of this evidence leads to the conclusion that St. Thomas' use of the dictum "Omne quod est in genere..." is, in each of its principal instances, surrounded by other arguments which clearly parallel chapter four of Tract VIII of Avicenna's *Metaphysics*. If in the composition of these articles, St. Thomas had in mind this precise Avicennian source, it is likely that the dictum itself is to be found implicit in the doctrine of chapter four. It remains to be shown how the Thomistic formula is developed from the principles and conclusions of this chapter.
In St. Thomas' formulation of the dictum, twice he uses praeter, twice differentem ab, and twice aliud a. If one of these formulae more accurately reflects the Avicennian source we will have to choose praeter and regard the others as its equivalents. In #14 of our Avicennian text we find the proposition: "Item dico quod quicquid habet quidditatem praeter anitatem causatum est." The content of this proposition justifies the conversion "quicquid causatum est habet quidditatem praeter anitatem." If, to this premise, we can add the proposition "Omne quod est in genere, causatum est," then we could conclude to something quite similar to our dictum. Avicenna in paragraph #18 has stated "Omne habens quidditatem causatum est." Simply by adding the reflection, as Avicenna himself does, that genus corresponds to quiddity ("genus enim respondetur ad interrogationem per quid est?" #20) we can easily justify the premise: "Omne quod est in genere, causatum est." Thus:

Quicquid causatum est habet quidditatem praeter anitatem.
Atqui: Omne quod est in genere causatum est.
Ergo: Omne quod est in genere habet quidditatem praeter anitatem.

The simple substitution of esse for anitas in the conclusion will give us the Thomistic dictum in its ideal form: "Omne quod est in genere habet quidditatem praeter esse." We have previously examined the possibility that St. Thomas understood the Avicennian anitas as equivalent or at least as closely related to his notion of esse. Merely on the grounds of parallel passages we found that this could not be asserted with certainty, for where St. Thomas has esse, Avicenna uses both anitas and esse. We believe that the derivation of the Thomistic dictum "Omne quod est in genere..." from the above texts of chapter four adds considerable probability to the thesis that St. Thomas received anitas as equivalent to esse. M1le d'Alverny in the conclusion of her article "Anniyya-Anitas" has already stated as much:

Our own discussion of the derivation of the dictum adds, we hope, some further light on precisely how St. Thomas was accustomed to use the text of Avicenna. He did not hesitate to assign explicitly to Avicenna a principle which at best was only implicitly contained in his premises. Furthermore, he took the liberty of interpreting an Avicennian term of considerable subtlety, anitas, by the simpler language of his own synthesis. The consistency and force of Avicenna's argument thus came over into a new setting and continued to contribute to the upbuilding of a philosophical theology. It was somewhat changed, perhaps, and could no longer be called Avicennian in the strictest sense, but it retained enough of its Arabic heritage to be recognizable...
as a valuable contribution from the East to Latin scholasticism.

NOTES

72. Goichon, _La distinction_, p. 32.


75. Ockham, _loc. cit._

75. _Cf. De potententia_, q. 7, a. 3 and _S. t._, I, q. 3, a. 5. For further indications of the presence of Avicenna, _Meta._, VIII, 4 in the works of St. Thomas see Appendix II, p. 132.

76. _Supra_, p. 60, n. 37.

77. Avicenna, _Logica_, II; fº 10 va.

78. _Ibid._, I; fº 6 rb-6va.

79. Avicenna, _Metaphysica_, V, 2; fº 87va.

80. See Appendix II, p. 132.

**Meta.**, VIII, 4. | SCG, I, 25 (continued).

<table>
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<tr>
<th>23. Potest autem aliquis dicere quod licet refugiamus dicere de primo nomen substantiae, non tamen possumus refugere quin dicamus de eo intentionem substantiae, quoniam <em>est et non in subiecto</em>, quae est intentio substantiae quam posuimus genus.</th>
<th>235. Potest autem alicui videri quod, quamvis nomen <em>substantiae</em> Deo proprie convenire non possit, quia Deus non <em>substat acci-dentibus</em>; res tamen significata per nomen ei conveniat, et ita sit in genere substantiae. Nam substantia est <em>ens per se</em>: quod Deo constat convenire, ex quo probatum est (cap. 23) ipsum non esse accidens.</th>
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<td>24. Contra quod dico quod haec non est intentio substantiae quam posuimus genus, immo intentio eius est quod est res habens quidditatem stabilem cuius esse est esse quod non est in subiecto corpore vel anima.</td>
<td>236. a) Ad ad hoc dicendum est ex dictis quod in definitione substantiae non est <em>ens per se</em>.</td>
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<td>25. Cuius rei probatio haec est, quoniam nisi hoc fuerit intellectum de substantia, erit genus nullo modo ipsa. Quod enim significatur per hoc nomen ens non iudicatur esse genus.</td>
<td>Ex hoc enim quod dicitur <em>ens</em> non posset esse genus: quia iam probatum est quod ens non habet rations generis.</td>
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<td>26. Negatio vero quae sequitur, non dat ei aliquid super esse nisi occasio discretionis. Haec vero intentione non affirmatur aliquid quod iam sit acquisitum in esse, nec est intentio alicuius nisi per se, sed est in respectu tantum. Esse igitur non in subiecto non est intentio affirmative nisi quod essentiae eius hoc potest esse ut sit ens, et deinde ipsum sit aliquid negative et relative, quod est extra identitatem quae est rei. Haec igitur intentio, si accipitur hoc modo, non erit genus. Tu autem plene nosti hoc in Logica.</td>
<td>b) Similiter nec ex hoc quod dicitur <em>per se</em>. Quia hoc non videtur importare nisi negationem tantum: dicitur enim ens per se ex hoc quod non est in alio; quod est negatio pura. Quae nec potest rationem generis constituere: quia sic genus non dicere quid est res, sed quid non est.</td>
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<tr>
<td>27. Et nosti etiam in Logica quod cum dicimus: omis anitas non est, intelligimus omne appropriatum, quia non habet certitudinem aliam nisi anitatem.</td>
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28. Tunc de hoc quod dicimus de definitione substantiae, quia ipsa est ens non in subiecto, intentio est quod est res de qua dicitur quod est ens non in subiecto, ita ut ens non in subiecto praedicitur de ea, et habeat in seipsa quidditatem sicut homo, lapis et arbor. Sic igitur oportet Wginare substantiam ad hoc ut sit genus.

c) Oportet igitur quod ratio substantiae intelligatur hoc modo, quod substantia sit res cui conveniat esse non in subiecto; nomen autem rei a quidditate imponitur, sicut nomen entis ab esse; et sic in ratione substantiae intelligitur quod habeat quidditatem cui conveniat esse non in alio.

29. Probatio autem quod inter haec duo sit differentia, et quod unum eorum sit genus et non alterum est haec, scilicet, quod de individuo alicuius hominis cuius esse ignoratur, potest dici quod ipsum sine dubio modo est non in subiecto. Sed videtur sufficere quod assignavimus de hoc cum loquebamus de Logica.

Hoc autem Deo non convenit: nam non habet quidditatem nisi suum esse (cap. 22). Unde relinquitur quod nullo modo est in genere substantiae. Et sic nec in aliquo genere: cum ostensum sit (cap. 23) ipsum non esse in genere accidents.

The Latin text of Avicenna in Section E is quite clear, with the exception of #27. His format is entirely in keeping with one who has "fixed the classical form of the philosophical style in the Arab language.[82] Having excluded God from every genus by the argumentation of the previous section, he now takes up the special case of the primary genus, that of substance. The discussion begins: "Someone may suggest that although we can refuse to attribute the name 'substance' to the first being, we cannot refuse to predicate the notion of substance in him. The first being both is, and is not in a subject, and this is the notion of substance which we consider a genus." (#23)

Avicenna repudiates this line of argumentation because he rejects the definition of substance upon which it is based. The true notion of substance is expressed when we speak of a thing having a stable quiddity whose being is not in a subject. The first definition is apt to overlook the presence of quiddity, without which genus is impossible. Avicenna then demonstrates the inadequacy of such a definition using his favorite logical device, the reductio ad absurdum. Taking each element in turn, he shows that neither esse nor non in subiecto can provide adequate grounds for constituting a genus.

Esse, the positive part of the preliminary definition, cannot be a genus. "What is signified by this word 'being' is not judged to be a genus," (#25). Avicenna simply states the fact without further proof. "Being" for Avicenna as well as for Aristotle is an analogous term, lacking the
necessary univocity required of a genus. Earlier in the Metaphysics Avicenna made this clear: "Therefore we shall now say that although being (ens), as you know, is not a genus, nor is it predicated equally of those which are under it, nevertheless it is a notion in which they come together according to an order of priority and posteriority; it first belongs to quiddity which is in substance, then to that which is after it ...."[83]

On the other hand, the negative element of the preliminary definition, *non in subiecto*, adds nothing to *esse* but an opportunity for distinction, presumably a distinction from accidents which are in a subject (#26). The negative phrase, then, designates nothing absolute but only a relationship. It is a notion which is both negative and relative, and such a notion cannot be a genus. It is extrinsic to the "identity," i.e., to the quiddity of some thing.

At this point in his discussion, Avicenna offers an example from logic which, owing to a confusion in translation, must have been totally unintelligible to his latin readers. In #27 we twice encounter the term *anitas*. The underlying Arabic term here is not *'anniya*, but merely the logical symbol "A" representing any particular nature whatsoever. Perhaps it should have been transliterated as *a-itas* meaning "A-ness."[84] In the Latin version Avicenna seems to mean that when we say "all A," the term "all" has no intrinsic significance in itself. It is a syncategorematic term whose whole content is derived from "A" or "A-ness." This example clarifies the significance of *esse non in subiecto*, for without a definite *res* or quiddity, the descriptive phrase lacks essential content.

The following paragraph (#28) explicates this point. When we say that the definition of substance is "a being, not in a subject," the full meaning is that it is a thing of which it is said that it is a being not in a subject. *Ens non in subiecto* is predicated of this definite *thing* which has a quiddity in itself, like man, stone or tree. Only in this sense can we understand substance as a genus.

The concluding paragraph (#29) offers proof that there is a difference between these two definitions, and that one is a genus while the other is not. About a doubt we can predicate of an individual man the notion of being not in a subject although we have no knowledge of his actual existence. The quiddity of which this predication is made adequately accounts for its being a substance. Actual existence need not be postulated. This would not have been the case if the notion of substance ignored quiddity and meant simply being not in a subject.

The parallels between the text of Avicenna and that of St. Thomas are clear:

1. Both texts begin by suggesting that although the name of substance is not appropriate to God, its meaning is applicable to him. Definitions are offered: Av.#23; Aq.#235.

2. In reply, both authors reject this first definition: Av.#24; Aq.#236.

3. Both find the first element of the definition, *ens*, unacceptable as constitutive of a genus: Av.#25 *Cuius rei...*; Aq.#236 Ad ad hoc....
4. Both find the second element to be negative, and likewise unacceptable: Av.#26 Negatio vero...; Aq.#235 b).

5. Both reformulate the definition to include the notion of res or quiddity: Av.#28; Aq.#236 c).

St. Thomas' dependence on the text of Avicenna is more literal in this section than in any of the other sections of our study. Nevertheless, no mention of the name of Avicenna appears. This discussion of the definition of substance occurs at least eight other times in the works of St. Thomas. On six occasions Avicenna is explicitly cited:

I Sent., d. 8, q. 4, a. 2, ad 2m.
II Sent., d. 3, q. 1, a. 5, sol.
II Sent., d. 3, q. 1, a. 6, sol.
IV Sent., d. 12, q. 1, a. 1, qtl. 1, ad 2m.
Quodlib. IX, q. 3, a. 1, ad 2m.
De pot., q. 7, a. 3, ad 14 m.

The two other instances, both in the Summa theologiae, are anonymous (I, q. 3, a. 5, ad lm, and III, q. 77, a. 1, ad 2m). Thus the only three examples of this discussion which depart from the norm of citing the source are those found in the two great Summae. Ren we recognize that the most thorough exploitation of the Avicennian source is that in the SCG, this trait is more noteworthy.

Both authors begin with the presentation of the pseudo-definition. Avicenna has esse non in subiecto while St. Thomas has ens per se. This latter formula or one much like it is explicitly attributed to Avicenna by St. Thomas on two occasions,:

IV Sent., d. 12, q. 1, a. 1, qtl. 1, ad 2m: Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut probat Avicenna in sua Metaphysica, per se existere non est definitio substantiae.

De pot., q. 7, a. 3 ad lam: Ad quartum dicendum, quod ens per se non est definitio substantiae, ut Avicenna dicit.

In spite of his reformulation of the objectionable definition, St. Thomas did not hesitate to refer it to the author of the passage from which so much of the discussion was derived. This illustrates the freedom with which philosophical sources were used and the generous scope given to explicit attribution.

Aquinas refrains from presenting the acceptable definition of substance until after he has analyzed and rejected both elements of the pseudo-definition. Strictly speaking, no real definition of a supreme genus can be given, but only a quasi-definition or description: "Sed definitio vel quasi-definitio substantiae est res ...."[85] Ens, the first element of the definition ens per se, cannot be constitutive of a genus as has already been proved in a previous paragraph from chapter twenty-five "#232, Section D). Per se, moreover, is a negative notion: "It is said to be being per
se from this, that it is not in a subject, which is a pure negation." As negative, this second element likewise cannot constitute a genus. If it did, it would tell us not what a thing is but merely what it is not. Thus both elements of the proposed definition fail to fit the requirements of a genus, for *ens* is far too broad in its meaning, and the negative notion, *per se*, tells far too little.

Understandably passing over the obscurities of #27, St. Thomas next paraphrases the text of Avicenna which explains the true definition. "Substance is a thing (res) to which it belongs to be not in a subject." Since the team *res* bespeaks quiddity, just as *ens* bespeaks existence, the aforesaid definition can be given in terms of quiddity. "And so in the notion of substance there is understood the fact that it has a quiddity to which it belongs not to be in another." In giving the true definition of substance in his other works St. Thomas very frequently incorporates both *res* and *quidditas* into his formulae:

*II Sent.*, d. 3, q. 1, a. 5, sol.: ...*res quidditatem habens cui debeatur esse per se, non in alio.*

*IV Sent.*, d. 12, q. 1, a. 1, ql. 1, ad 2m: ...*res habens quidditatem cui acquiritur esse vel debetur (ut) non in alio.*

*De pot.*, q. 7, a. 3, ad 4m: ...*res cuius quidditate debetur esse non in aliqou.*

*Quodlib. IX*, q. 3, a. 1, ad 2m: ...*res cuius naturae debetur esse non in alio.*

On some occasions, however, he simply omits the term *res*:

*I Sent.*, d. 8, q. 4, a. 2, ad 2m: ...*habens quidditatem quam consequitur esse non in subiecto.*

*S. t.*, I, q. 3, a. 5, ad 1m: ...*essentiam cui competit sic esse, idest per se esse.*

The formula, *ens per se*, is inadequate of itself to define substance and is but a "circumlocution of the true definition."[86] It can and does have a place in the true definition, as we see from the last example above, provided it is predicated of *res*, quiddity or essence.

In order to complete the argumentation of the chapter, St. Thomas draws out the immediate conclusion. Since God does not have any other quiddity but his very existence, he cannot fit into the genus of substance. Aquinas' phrase "*non habet quidditatem nisi suum esse*" recalls a similar saying of Avicenna, "*Primum non habet quidditatem nisi anitatem*," (#4). Since accidents have no place in God, he cannot be in any accidental genus. In no way then does God belong to a genus.

There can be no doubt that St. Thomas has relied heavily upon the discussion of the definition of substance found in the concluding passage of chapter four, Tract VIII of Avicenna's *Metaphysics*. Both in format and in content he parallels his source with only one notable exception, the reformulation of the pseudo-definition of substance from *esse non in subiecto* to *ens per se*. In the *SCG* more than in any other place, St. Thomas has followed Avicenna, but he never mentions his name.
3. Reflections on Essence and Existence

Throughout this study we have been concerned with the close dependence of the text of St. Thomas upon its Avicennian source. The preoccupation with similarities is justified within the scope of our proposed goals, and although there has been some discussion of the Thomistic variants a reader might be left with the impression that St. Thomast metaphysical positions are fundamentally those of Avicenna. There are some grounds for this inference, but basically it is false. The texts we have been studying from both authors are concerned with the divine simplicity. The negative conclusions which are reached consist in the denial of the most radical type of metaphysical composition conceivable, the composition of essence and existence. Although the distinction between essence and existence is a presupposition of the arguments, this context does not provide the opportunity for expressing precisely the relationship between essence and existence. It is in the understanding of this relationship that there is to be found a radical difference between the two philosophers. Gilson has characterized the Thomistic position as not an evolution from the thought of Avicenna, but a revolution.[87]

Avicenna's clear and distinct conception of essence as that which of its very nature abstracts from and is indifferent to existence leads him to put existence into the category of accidents (lāzim). This is not to say that existence is accidental in the sense that quantity or quality are accidental, i.e., as predicamental accidents, but in the sense that it is something other than the essence and added to the essence from without by virtue of the creative power of an extrinsic cause. The implication of this interpretation is that essence is absolutely indifferent to existence, and that the only reference existence has is to its extrinsic cause. The explicitation and isolation of the notion of existence whereby all creation can be clearly distinguished from the Creator is one of the greatest achievements of Arabic philosophy as it is embodied in Avicenna.

Averroes reacted sharply to the implications of the accidentality of existence in any way whatsoever. In his refutation of Avicenna, he accuses his predecessor of contaminating the truth of Aristotle with the theories of the theologians who so insistently proclaimed the utter contingency of creation. Averroes refuses to admit of a real distinction between essence and existence. For him, the abstractness of the definition is purely a mode of signification which in no way bespeaks a real indifference on the part of a quiddity to some added existence.[88] In this judgment he seems to reflect Aristotelian thought more faithfully than Avicenna.

St. Thomas was fully aware of Averroes' position on this matter. In his own assessment of the question he accepts the Averroistic critique of the accidentality of existence, but does not accept the simple identification of essence and existence in created reality. The innovation of St. Thomas consists in positing a new relationship between essence and existence, a relationship that avoids the extremes of Avicennian accidentality and Averroistic identity. Applying the Aristotelian distinction of act and potency to essence and existence he specifies their relationship in a way that is not found in Aristotle, Avicenna or Averroes. For him essence is related to existence as potency to its proper act. The ordinary model of this relationship, matter and form, gives only a remote analogy of the rapport between these profound aspects of being, essence and existence. In virtue of this relationship the otherness of existence with regard to essence is not just the otherness of a
superadded accident, utterly extrinsic to the essence, but rather the otherness of an actuality in respect to that which it actualizes. This means that existence is the proper act of essence, and such propriety can be expressed, as St. Thomas in fact does, in a way that intrinsically relates the essence to its existence: "(esse) ... quasi constituitur per principia essentiae."[89] Existence still requires an extrinsic efficient cause but in addition to this there is an intrinsic causality traceable to the essence itself which is that of a potency with respect to its proper act. Essence is not indifferent to its existence. The very name "essence," obviously in Latin but not obviously at all in its Arabic equivalents, bespeaks a relationship to esse, existence.

It is in the recognition of this ultimate actuality, an actuality that regards form and essence as potential, and which is their very completion and perfection, that metaphysics enters into a new dimension. The principle that act is prior in dignity to potency makes it evident that in a system which recognizes the act of existence as the perfection of essence, this act of existence must be seen to be first in the order of metaphysical values and dignities: "Unde patet quod hoc quod dico esse est actualitas omnium actuum, et propter hoc est perfectio omnium perfectionum."[90] It is the ultimate of all values. The first principle in an "existential" metaphysics is best characterized as Subsistent Existence, not as Simplest Essence or the One. All things other than this first principle participate in existence in a limited fashion according to the exigencies of their own particular essence or nature, but this participation is not some diluted and remotely mediated realization. Rather it is the crowning achievement of what it is, an ontological energization directly and immediately from the source of existence, Subsistent Existence itself. The primacy of esse or existence over essence is fully justified only when two conditions are realized: 1) that existence is distinct from essence, and 2) that existence is the proper and ultimate act of essence, perfecting the potentiality of the essence. For the first of these conditions, the system of St. Thomas draws heavily upon the insights and arguments of Avicenna. For the second, Aquinas passes beyond Avicenna and, in a sense, corrects him by bringing to bear the Aristotelian principle of potency and act upon the relationship of these two aspects of being.

Thus, from the historical point of view, the texts we have been studying embody only one phase of the Thomistic metaphysics of existence. In his borrowing from Avicenna, St. Thomas can substantiate only the distinction of essence from existence, and their identity in the first principle. It is for this reason that the picture presented in our study highlights similarities more than differences. There are texts, however, which indicate that St. Thomast doctrine is not totally dependent upon the Avicennian source. Even in his discussion of the divine simplicity, Aquinas finds opportunities for indicating his own doctrine on the real distinction in which the Avicennian picture is completed by reference to the relationship of potency to act. In the Summa contra gentiles, for example, chapter twenty-two begins the proof that in God essence is identified with existence with the long and complicated argumentation we have seen in sections A and B of our study (#202-207). Once Avicenna has contributed all that he can to the question, St. Thomas adds a paragraph which completes the argument along the lines of his own proper understanding of essence and existence as potentiality and actuality: "#208 Amplius. Esse ac quendam nominat; non enim dicitur esse aliquid ex hoc quod est in potentia, sed ex eo quod est in actu ...." In the Summa theologiae, I, q. 3, a. 4, we find the same procedure. There the Avicennian argument similar to that in Section B begins his response: "Primo quidem, quia quidquid est in aliquo quod
est praeter essentiam eius, oportet esse causatum vel a principiis essentiae, sicut accidentia propria consequentia speciem ... vel ab aliquo exteriori ...." The second argument brought forward by St. Thomas draws upon an insight which Avicenna did not have, but which is characteristic of Aquinas: "Secundo, quia esse est actualitas omnis formae vel naturae .... Oportet igitur quod ipsum esse comparetur ad essentiam quae est aliud ab ipso, sicut actus ad potentiam."

With this perspective we can see the proper place of Avicenna's *Metaphysics* in the construction of St. Thomast doctrine on essence and existence. Aquinas uses the Persian master whenever he can to establish the fact and to expound the implications of the real distinction between essence and existence. In the reconciliation of these notions, however, that is, in the establishment of their proper relationship to each other, St. Thomas uses his own genius to apply the principle of potency and act.

**NOTES**

82. Achena and Massé, *op. cit.*, p. 16.

83. "Dicemus igitur nunc quod quamvis ens, sicut scisti, non sit genus nec praedicatum aequaliter de his quae sub eo sunt, tamen est intentio in qua conveniunt secundum secundum prius et posterius; primum autem est quidditati quae est in substantia, deinde ei quae est post ipsum." Avicenna, *Metaphysica*, I, 6; P 72vb.

84. See Anawati's translation in Appendix I, p. 131, n. 51.

85. *IV Sent.*, d. 12, q. 1, a. 1 ad 2m.

86. *Quodlibetum IX*, q. 3, a. 1, ad 2m.


89. *In IV Meta.*, lect. 2, #558.

90. *Quaes. disp de anima*, q. 7, a. 2, ad 9m.

91. Freiburg, i. B.: Herder, 1933.
4. Conclusion

We have proposed two goals for our study. The first was to demonstrate the fact of an extraordinarily detailed dependence of certain passages in the *Summa contra gentiles* upon the fourth chapter, Tract VIII, of Avicenna's *Metaphysics*. Our second goal was to determine by means of a careful comparison the characteristics of St. Thomas' adaptation of his source to his own synthesis.

As to the first of these goals, we believe that our comparison of texts and especially the listing of numerous similarities in each of the five sections has demonstrated the fact of dependence beyond question. It is difficult to specify whether Aquinas wrote the *Summa contra gentiles* with the text of Avicenna physically present before him, or whether his retentive memory provided him with a facsimile detailed enough so that from it he was able to reproduce its many arguments almost verbatim. In either case it is impossible to overlook the importance of this Avicennian passage to which the Angelic Doctor had recourse all through his scholastic career.

Throughout our research we have been continually amazed by the failure of Thomistic editors and scholars to recognize the importance of this chapter from Avicenna's *Metaphysics* as the primary source for so many significant doctrines. The editorial references found in the editions of the *Sentences* are hopelessly misleading. Decker's edition of the commentary on Boethius and Roland-Gosselin's edition of the *De ente* mention Tract VIII, chapter four in their notes. Yet these studies usually give a series of Avicennian *loci* when a single direct indication of chapter four would be perfectly adequate. Even some of the most scholarly monographs on Avicenna and St. Thomas have overlooked this chapter. For example, Dr. Wilhelm Kleine's dissertation *Die Substanzlehre Avicennas bei Thomas von Aquin*, [91] cites Avicenna's chapter four on the matter of God's not having a quiddity, a difference or demonstration, but completely overlooks the extremely important discussion on substance as a genus (Section E), which, as we have seen, St. Thomas uses no fewer than nine times in his own works. Since St. Thomas seems to have deliberately omitted explicit references to Avicenna in his *Summae*, those who rely principally upon these works for an understanding of his thought are apt to overlook his dependence upon the Arab sage. Although we are not prepared to claim that St. Thomas' use of Avicenna in the passages we have studied is the most extensive and most detailed of his borrowings from this author -- Avicenna-studies are still in their infancy -- we may claim that it is to be classified as one of the more remarkable of such instances. Almost the entirety of the Avicennian chapter can be seen reflected in the *SCG* with both the doctrine and the very articulation of the arguments leaving their trace. This fact might suggest that the effort of source study would do well to focus special attention upon this work of St. Thomas wherein the detailed configuration of borrowed sources seem to have left their sharpest imprint.

The Avicennian chapter which influenced St. Thomas was not merely transcribed by him, however, for it underwent certain modifications and adaptations as it was fitted to the *SCG*. We have seen several of these adaptations which characterize St. Thomas' use of Avicenna.

Where Avicenna proposes that in God there is no quiddity, St. Thomas speaks of the identity
of essence and existence in God. Aquinas uses essence and quiddity interchangeably. Avicenna has a much stricter conception of quiddity, and so cannot be accused of precisely denying essence of God.

Avicenna speaks of both anitas and esse as concomitants of quiddity. St. Thomas seems to ignore the strange term anitas and formulates his parallel argument simply in terms of esse. The comparison in Section B does not force us to conclude that he read anitas as the equivalent of esse. A strong persuasion in favor of this interpretation can be found, however, when one traces the Avicennian origin of the Thomistic dictum "One quod est in genere habet quidditatem praeter esse suum." The text of chapter four yields the distinction "quidditas praeter anitatem." St. Thomas would have his dictum, if he substituted esse for anitas.

In the discussion about substance the pseudo-definition introduced by Avicenna for refutation is esse non in subiecto. St. Thomas for his own reasons reformulates it into esse per se and then proceeds to use Avicennian arguments to repudiate it.

Underlying the discussion of the divine simplicity in both authors is the doctrine of the real distinction of essence (or quiddity) and existence (esse, anitas ?). For Avicenna, existence is an accident. For St. Thomas, it is the actualization of the essence, bearing the relationship of proper act to its potency. The Thomistic doctrine "correcting" Avicenna is not found in the passages cited in our study, but, as we have seen, they are found in close proximity to the Avicennian borrowings.

Thus we can see that although dependence upon Avicenna is considerable in the SCG, it is not an unthinking or an uncritical use of a source. St. Thomas is indebted to Avicenna for plowing the ground and planting the seeds. In many ways Aquinas follow earlier paths and harvests a useful crop. But not all is acceptable to him. He corrects in places, and sifts out what he desires. The borrowing from Avicenna is in itself a creative process and the result is Thomistic thought, not Avicennian.

There remains one further item to be noted before concluding. We have reported earlier the observations made by Gorce and Marc on the phenomenon of St. Thomas' omission of the name of Avicenna in his later works. While we preferred not to become entangled in the difficult debate on the date of the SCG, we did hope that our study would add further evidence to the question. Nowhere in the texts we have transcribed from the SCG nor in the chapters from which they came, is Avicenna cited explicitly. In our quest for the origin of the Thomistic dictum in Section D we here able to observe the frequent explicit attributions to Avicenna in the Sentences followed by total anonymity in the later works. More striking, perhaps, is the observation in Section E where the Avicennian substance-doctrine was explicitly attributed to him by St. Thomas in six of the nine instances cited. The three exceptions were those found in the Summa contra gentiles and the Summa theologiae. St. Thomas did not cease to use Avicennian materials, he only ceased to use the name of Avicenna. If in this pattern of citation there is to be recognized two stages in Aquinas' career, then the SCG must be associated with the Summa theologiae in the latter of these two periods. The evidence of our own study does not conflict with the statistical data presented by
Dom Marc. Both Summae exhibit characteristics which can be explained by the sharpening tensions in and about the University of Paris during the rise of Latin Averroism and the reactionary climate threatening the works of all the "gentile" philosophers. It would have been the height of imprudence for St. Thomas to fill his works with the names of philosophers unnecessarily, especially since his borrowings from them were presented for consideration on their own merit and not for belief on human faith. His commentaries on the works of Aristotle were meant to be a vindication of the presence of the Stagirite in the philosophical thinking of Christians. The vindication of Averroes or Avicenna must be found in his own borrowings from their works, both explicit and implicit.

Within the limits of a study such as ours, it is impossible to exhaust the avenues of investigation opened up by passages so rich in content. We have seen a meeting point of two philosophies and two metaphysical world-views with respect to their doctrines on God, essence and existence, common being, genus, species, difference and substance. Behind this single chapter from Avicenna lies the vast tradition of Arabic thought, reshaped and synthesized by one of the greatest philosophical geniuses of history. From the Thomistic doctrine on the divine essence, on the other hand, flows an entire Christian world-view, one that until modern times has been unequalled breadth and insight. It is our hope that this limited study has been able to illuminate one of the most interesting points of contact in the history of philosophy, St. Thomas? use of Avicenna's Metaphysics in his Summa contra gentiles.
APPENDIX I

Avicenna: *Metaphysica*, Tractatus VIII

Capitulum iv: De proprietatibus primum principii good est necesse esse.

1. Iam stabilitum est esse aliquid quod necesse est [1] esse, sed stabilimentum eius fuit per hoc good necesse esse unum est; igitur ei quod est necesse esse non communicat aliquid in suo ordine; igitur nihil est praeter ipsum quod sit necesse esse. Postquam autem nihil praeter ipsum est necesse esse, tunc ipsum est principium debendi esse omne quod est quod facit debere ipsum esse debito primario vel mediante alio. Sed postquam esse omnis good est praeter eum est ab eius esse, tunc ipsum est primum. Non intelligitur autem per primum intentio quae addatur ad debitum sui esse, ita ut per hoc multiplicetur debitum sui esse, sed intelligitur per hoc respectus relationis suae ad id quod est extra se.


3. Si quis autem dixerit quod si illae fuerint causatae, tunc illis erit etiam alia relatio et procedet hoc usque in infinitum, nos iniungemus ei ut consideret id good certificavimus de huiusmodi in capite relationum ubi volomus [7] ostendere good relatio pervenit ad finem, et ibi solvetur eius quaestio.


6. Iam autem poteris considerare et scire hoc ex eo loco in quod accidit diversitas sententiarum in *Naturalibus*, scilicet, good principium vel est unum vel multa. Quidam enim ex eis posuerunt principium unum, et quidam multa. Qui autem posuerunt unum, quidam posuerunt primum principium non essentiam unius, sed id quod est unum, sicut
aqua, vel aer, vel ignis, vel alia huiusmodi; et [13] quidam posuerunt principium essentiam
unius inquantum ipsum est unum, non aliquid cui accidit unum. Unde differentia est inter
quidditatem cui accidit unum vel ens, et inter ipsum unum vel ens inquantum est unum.

7. Dico igitur good necesse esse non potest esse eiusmodi ut sit in eo compositio,[14] ita
ut sit hic quidditas aliqua quae sit necesse esse, et illi quidditati [15] sit intentio aliqua
praeter certitudinem eius, quae intentio sit necessitas essendi; verbi gratia, si illa quidditas
esset homo, tunc hominem esse [16] aliud esset [17] quam ipsum esse necesse esse,

8. et tunc non posset esse quin hoc quod dicimus necessitas essendi vel esset haec
certitudo, vel non esset.

ipsum quidditatem.

10. Si autem illi necessitati essendi fuerit hoc ut pendeat ab illa quidditate, et non est
necesse esse sine illa, tunc intentio de necesse esse inquantum est necesse esse est necesse
esse propter aliud quod non est ipsum.[20] Igitur non [21] erit necesse esse inquantum est
necesse esse. Ipsum enim in se inquantum est necesse esse considerare esse necesse esse
propter aliud quod est ei propter quod est necesse esse, est absurdum.

11. Si [22] autem fuerit ut discrepet ab illa re, tunc illa quidditas non erit necesse esse
ullo modo absolute, nec accidet ei necessitas essendi absolute. Ipsa enim non fit [23]
necesse esse aliquando, sed necesse esse absolute semper est necesse esse. Non est autem
sic dispositio entis, cum accipitur absolute sequens quidditatem non ligatum cum
necessitate pura.

12. Nec obest si quis dixerit quod illud ens causatnm est quidditati hoc modo, vel aliui
rei. Possibile est enim ut ens sit causatum, et necessitas absoluta quae est per essentiam
non sit causata. Restat ergo ut necesse esse per essentiam absolute certificatum inquantum

13. Ad quod respondeo quod tunc illa quidditas esset accidentalis ad necesse esse,
quod est certificatae existentiae per se, si illud esset possibile. Igitur necesse esse [26]
esset designatum in intellectu in hoc, etiam [27] esset certificatum necesse esse, quamvis
non esset quidditas illa accidentalis. Illa igitur non est quidditas rei designatae in intellectu
quae est necesse esse, sed est [28] quidditas alterius rei sequentis eam. Iam autem posita
fuerat quidditas sua, non alterius rei, et hoc est inconveniens. Igitur necesse esse non habet
quidditatem, nisi quod est necesse esse, et haec est anitas.[29]


15. Tu autem iam nosti quod ex anitate [31] et esse non constat quidditas quae est
praeter anitatem [32] ad modem quo aliquid constat ex constituent; erit [33] igitur de
comitantibus.

16. Et tunc non potest esse quin vel comitentur quidditatem, ex hoc quod est ipsa quidditas, vel comitentur eam propter aliquid aliud. Intentio autem de hoc quod [34] dicimus "comitantur," est "sequi esse" et quod esse sequitur non <nisi> esse.[35]

17. Si autem fuerit hoc quod anitas [36] sequetur quidditatem et comitetur eam per se, tunc erit hoc quod anitas [37] in suo esse sequetur esse. Quicquid autem in suo esse sequitur esse, id post quod sequitur habet esse per essen tiam prius eo. Igitur quidditas per essentiam erit prior suo esse, quod est inconveniens.

18. Restat igitur ut esse sit ei ex causa. Igitur omne habens quidditatatem causatum est, et caetera [38] alia, excepto necessesse esse, habent quidditates quae sunt per se possibiles esse, quibus non accidit ci esse nisi extrinsecus. Primus igitur non habet quidditatatem, sed super habentia quidditates fluit esse ab eo.


20. Intentio autem de hoc quod dicimus quod ipse est esse expoliatum conditione negandi caeteras additiones ab eo, non est quod ipse sit esse expoliatum in quo communicet aliquid aliud esse. Si fuerit esse cuius haec sit proprietas, ipse enim non est illud ens expoliatum conditione negandi, sed est ens non conditione affirmandi; scilicet de primo quod est ens cum conditione non addendi compositionem.[41] Sed [42] hoc aliud est ens non conditione additionis. Et quia illud fact universale quod praedicatur de omni re, istud vero non praedicatur de eo in quo est addendo. Ideo in omni quod est praeter illud, est addingo.

21. Primus etiam non habet genus. Primus enim non habet quidditatem; sed quod non habet quidditatem non habet genus. Genus enim respondetur ad interrogationem: per quid est? Genus etiam aliquo modo pars est rei. Certificatum est autem quod primus non est compositus. Item intentio generis non potest esse quin vel sit necessesse esse, et tunc non cessabit quousque sit ibi differentia, vel non sit necessesse esse, sed sit constitutum ipsum necessesse esse, et tunc necessesse esse erit constitutum ab eo quod non est necessesse esse, quod est inconveniens. Prius igitur non habet genus.

22. Et ideo non habet differentiam; quia non habet genus, non habet differentiam; ideo non habet definitionem, nec fit demonstratio de eo, quia ipse non habet causam. Similiter non quaeritur de eo quare. Tu enim scies postea quod eius actio non habet quare.

23. Potest autem aliquis dicere quod licet refugiamus dicere de primo nomen substantiae, non tamen possimus refugere quin dicamus de eo intentionem substantiae, quoniam est et non in subjecto, quae est intentio substantiae quam posuimus genus.
24. Contra quod dico quod haec non est intentio substantiae quam posuimus genus, immo intentio eius est quod est res habens quidditatem stabilem cuius esse est esse quod non est in subjecto corpore vel anima.


27. Et nosti etiam in Logica quod cum dicimus: omne anitas [49] non est, intelligimus omne [50] appropriatum, quia non habet certitudinem aliam nisi anitatem.[51]


29. Probatio autem quod inter haec duo sit differentia, et quod unum eorum sit genus et non alterum est haec, scilicet, quod de individuo alicuius hominis cuius esse ignoratur, potest dici quod ipsum sine dubio modo est non [55] in subjecto.[56] Sed videtur sufficere quod assignavimus de hoc cum loquebamus [57] de logica.

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**Variant Readings and Notes**

**Sigla:**

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<th>P</th>
<th>Ms. Paris, Bib. Nat. Lat. 16096</th>
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<tr>
<td>a</td>
<td>Edition, Venice, 1495</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b</td>
<td>Edition, Venice, 1508</td>
</tr>
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1 nescesse est a b
2 quae a
3 *add.* esse a
4 *del.* sicut P
5 et b
6 creatae P
7 voluimus b
8 entitatem P; unitatem b; a lacuna in the Latin translation results in the abbreviation of
the sentence. Mlle d'Alverny provides the following translation of the original Arabic. After anitatem read, "et tu as appris la signification de la 'mahiyya' <quidditas>, et en quoi elle se distingue de la 'anniyya' <anitas>, et en quoi elle s'en rapproche, au début de cet exposé," op. cit., p. 78, n. 68.

9 add. in marg. et distincta P
10 add. in marg. qui intelligit P
11 del. per, add. quod P
12 add. in marg. idest, suum esse P
13 hoc P
14 comparatio b
15 quidditate b
16 add. esset a b
17 esse a b
18 add. in marg. quae est necessitas essendi P
19 Here occurs another lacuna in the Latin translation. The beginning of this sentence in its complete form in the Arabic is translated, "Il est absurde <de dire> qu'à cette notion <d'existence nécessaire> n'apartienne pas la vérité, alors qu'elle est principe de toute vérité; bien plus, c'est elle qui affermit toute vérité et qui la rend vraie; et si cette notion a une vérité..." d'Alverny, op. cit., p. 79, n. 76.
20 ipsa P
21 tum a; tunc b
22 The first part of this sentence in the original Arabic does not appear in the Latin translation. The sentence should begin, "S'il est pris de façon absolue, sans être lié par l'existence pure qui suit la quiddité, et s'il est pris comme conséquent à la quiddite,..." d'Alverny, op. cit., p. 79, n. 77.
23 sit b
24 om. b
25 om. per se sit necesse esse a
26 om. esse a b
27 et b
28 om. est b
29 add. interlin. enti- P; unitas b; the following phrase, omitted by the Latin text is supplied from the Arabic by Mlle d'Alverny: "Bien plus, nous disons que la 'anniyya et l'existence (wūjūd) s'ils devenaient des accidents pour la quiddité, ou la suivraient nécessairement à cause de son essence, ou pour quelque chose d'extrinsèque; or, il est possible que cela soit, à cause l'essence de la quiddité, car le concomitant ne suit qu'un existant; il faudrait donc qu'il y ait pour la quiddité un existence avant son existence, ce qui est impossible," op. cit., pp. 79-80, n. 79
30 add. interlin. enti- P; unitatem b
31 unitate b
32 unitatem b
33 erunt b
34 quod a b
35 est b We have added the word nisi on indications from the Arabic. Cf. footnote
n. 42 to our study. Its presence is required for intelligibility and its absence is easily explained palaeographically.

36 unitas b
37 unitas b

38 cuncta P
39 Ipse igitur P
40 esset a
41 comparationem b
42 Si a
43 add. si a
44 add. ipsa b
45 om. ipsa b
46 addit b
47 hanc vero intentionem a
48 Erit P
49 unitas b
50 esse a b

All three witnesses read unitatem. The Latin version probably read anitatem which here translates not 'anniyya but a logical device meaning "A-ness." Fr. Anawati translates this paragraph from the Arabic as follows: "Et tu as appris également en Logique que si nous disons par exemple: 'Tout A' nous entendons toute chose qualifiée comme étant 'A' même si elle avait une réalité autre que l'essence de A [litt. que l'Aétité]," La Métaphysique du Shifa (Quebec, 1952), III, 15.

52 add. ergo P
53 om. est a
54 om. ens b
55 non est a b

The Arabic text has an additional line here, omitted in the Latin text (homoioteleuton?). Anawati translates: "Tu ne dis pas [cependant] qu'il est né nécessairement existant, parce qu'il nest pas dans un sujet," loc. cit.

57 add. etiam P
APPENDIX II

Meta., VIII, 4 in the Works of St. Thomas

A. (#7-13) Necessary existence is incompatible with a particular quiddity.
B. (#4-18) Gods esse is uncaused.
C. (#19-20) The divine esse is distinguished from common being.
D1. (#21) God does not have a genus (and the dictum: "Omne quod est in genere...").
D2. (#22) Therefore he has no difference, definition or demonstration.
E. (#23-29) God cannot be called "substance." Definition of substance.

The explicit citations of Avicenna are indicated by an asterisk (*).

Principal locations:

| 1. *De ente et essentia*, c. 5 | D1, D2, C |
| 2. *I Sent.*, d. 8, q. 4, a. 1, *ad lm, 2m* | C |
| a. 2, sol. | D1 |
| *ad lm, 2m* | E |
| 3. *De potentia*, q. 7, a. 2, *ad 6m* | C |
| a. 3, sol * | D1, D2 |
| *ad 4m* | E |
| 4. *SCG.*, I, c. 22 | A B |
| c. 25 | D1, D2, E. |
| c. 26 | C |
| 5. *Summa theologiae*, I, q. 3, a. 4, c | B |
| *ad lm* | C |
| a. 5, c | D1, D2 |
| *ad lm* | E |
Secondary Locations (according to topic):

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<td>II Sent., d. 3, q. 1, a. 5, c. *</td>
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<td>II Sent., d. 3, q. 1, a. 1, ad 1um *</td>
<td>II Sent., d. 3, q. 1, a. 6, c. *</td>
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<tr>
<td>II Sent., d. 3, q. 1, a. 5, sol. *</td>
<td>IV Sent., d. 12, q. 1, a. 1, q. 1, ad 2m. *</td>
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<td>III Sent., d. 11, q. 1, a. 2, ad 2m *</td>
<td>Quodlibetum IX, q. 3, a. 1, ad 2m. *</td>
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<tr>
<td>In Boeth. De Trin., q. 6, a. 3, c. *</td>
<td>Summa theol., III, q. 77, a. 1, ad 2m.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Comp. theol., c. 13.</td>
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